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  INTRODUCTION   
The one-voice doctrine is a mainstay of U.S. foreign rela-
tions jurisprudence.1 It has appeared in some of the Supreme 
Court’s most prominent foreign affairs cases—cases addressing 
the allocation of foreign relations authority among the Presi-
dent, Congress, the courts, and the states.2 In the 2011 Term 
alone, the doctrine appeared in two cases: Arizona v. United 
States, in which the Court analyzed the preemption of Arizona’s 
controversial immigration laws,3 and Zivotofsky v. Clinton, in 
which the Court found justiciable a dispute between the execu-
tive and Congress concerning the status of Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel.4
The doctrine maintains that in its external relations the 
United States must be able to speak with one voice in order to 
achieve its interests and avoid negative responses from other 
nations. The doctrine has both intuitive appeal and constitu-
tional moorings.
 
5
 
 1. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. 
Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 979 (2001) (describing “[t]he ‘one-
voice’ doctrine” as “a familiar mantra of U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence”). 
 It seems sensible that in dealing with other 
 2. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 
(1994) (power of the President, Congress, and states); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 
U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (power of 
the President and courts); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (power of 
the courts and states); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936) (power of the President). 
 3. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012). 
 4. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1438 
(2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 5. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 390, 445 (1998) (“Th[e] one-voice argument has strong intuitive 
  
2014] BEYOND ONE VOICE 955 
 
nations, the United States must be able to formulate and exe-
cute a cohesive foreign policy, rather than conflicting policies.6 
Indeed, the Constitution, and especially its allocation of foreign 
affairs authority, was motivated in significant part by the cen-
tral government’s inability under the Articles of Confederation 
to speak for the nation with one voice.7
Nonetheless, the doctrine’s contributions are outweighed 
by its wide-ranging flaws. Given relatively scant scholarly at-
tention to the doctrine, these flaws have gone underappreciat-
ed. This Article provides the first comprehensive assessment of 
the doctrine, exposing the doctrine’s several failings. 
 Consistent with its intu-
itive and constitutional underpinnings, the one-voice doctrine 
captures, from certain perspectives, valuable principles. 
First, the doctrine is used to address divergent questions 
concerning the allocation of foreign affairs authority. A failure 
to recognize the different contexts in which the doctrine applies 
has led to bleed over from contexts in which the constitutional 
justification for the doctrine is strong into those in which that 
justification is weak, shifting authority to actors—namely, the 
President—whose constitutional claim as the nation’s voice in 
foreign affairs is disputed. Second, the doctrine masks different 
theories of constitutional interpretation, leading to a lack of 
transparency in the Court’s assessment of the allocation of for-
eign affairs authority. Third, while the doctrine partially cap-
tures constitutional principles, it is in key respects inconsistent 
with constitutional text, structure, and history. Fourth, the 
doctrine diverges from actual practice of the President, Con-
 
appeal.”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the “One-Voice” 
Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in WORLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 44 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991) [hereinafter Stein-
hardt, Orthodoxy] (“The ideal of a unified foreign policy has a powerful hold on 
the popular mind . . . .”). 
 6. Cf. Bradley, supra note 5, at 445–46 (discussing reasons for the one-
voice doctrine’s intuitive appeal while arguing that the appeal decreases when 
the federal government addresses traditionally domestic matters through the 
treaty power). 
 7. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 32–46 (2007). This inability had both substantive and procedural 
roots. Substantively, the national government lacked authority to negotiate 
trade agreements on behalf of the entire U.S. market, to enforce customary 
international obligations, and to prevent states from violating treaties. See id. 
at 35–45. Procedurally, the national government suffered from the assignment 
of foreign policy execution to a multi-person, deliberative body—the Continen-
tal Congress. See, e.g., Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President 
in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers 
of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 52–63 (1979).  
  
956 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:953 
 
gress, Supreme Court, and states. And fifth, the doctrine rests 
on functional assumptions that are faulty or incomplete. The 
doctrine fails to account, for example, for prudential reasons 
why the United States might benefit from more than one voice 
in foreign affairs.  
This Article exposes each of these failings and considers 
their implications for the future of this conspicuous doctrine.8
The Article begins by discussing in Part I the limited 
scholarship on the one-voice doctrine. Part II explores the doc-
trine’s history, exposing the many contexts in which the doc-
trine is used. Part III builds on that history to identify the doc-
trine’s scope. Parts IV through VIII expose each of the above-
mentioned features of the doctrine. Part IX explains why these 
features are flaws and explores the implications of these flaws 
for the future of the one-voice doctrine. The Article concludes 
that, notwithstanding both its prominence and staying power, 
the one-voice doctrine should be abandoned. At best, functional 
arguments based on the need for one voice might survive, but 
they should be evaluated for what they are—arguments that 
the particular circumstances of a case call for one voice, rather 
than the dictates of a compelling doctrine. Even in this down-
graded form, the doctrine’s value is questionable as the judici-
 
Given these failings, one might argue at the outset that it is in-
appropriate to apply the label “doctrine” to the one-voice ra-
tionale. Clearly, the failings identified in this Article ultimately 
undermine any notion of a unified, coherent doctrine. At the 
same time, the prevalent and uncritical employment of the ra-
tionale suggests that it has, to date, been treated as a doctrine 
and that this Article is necessary to demote the doctrine to 
something less. 
 
 8. Other, related failings, might also be identified. For example, at least 
when used to police state action bearing on foreign affairs, the one-voice doc-
trine arguably lacks clear content, leading to inconsistency of result. See 
Cleveland, supra note 1, at 984; Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: 
State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1150–54 
(2000). To illustrate, in Zschernig, the Court struck an Oregon statute not-
withstanding the executive department’s lack of concern that the statute as 
applied would interfere with foreign affairs. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 
432, 434–35, 440–41 (1968). By contrast, in Barclays Bank, the Court upheld a 
California tax law notwithstanding executive opposition and outcry from for-
eign states. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 320, 324 
& n.22, 327–31 & n.30 (1994); see also Cleveland, supra note 1, at 984. But cf. 
infra note 46 (discussing the executive department’s inconsistent opposition to 
the California tax methodology at issue). 
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ary lacks the competence to evaluate such functional one-voice 
arguments.  
I.  PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP ANALYZING THE ONE-VOICE 
DOCTRINE   
Notwithstanding the important issues to which it is ad-
dressed, the one-voice doctrine has received little focused atten-
tion in the scholarship. No scholar has looked critically at the 
doctrine as a whole.9
 
 9. For passing criticism of the doctrine, see, for example, Bradley, supra 
note 
 Only Sarah Cleveland, in a colloquium ar-
5, at 445–48 (noting empirical and doctrinal weaknesses of the one-voice 
doctrine); Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Con-
stitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 130–34 (2009) (noting the one-voice doctrine’s 
inconsistency with the Constitution and practice and the lack of justification 
in goals of accountability and avoidance of embarrassment); Julian G. Ku, The 
State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with Inter-
national Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 464, 475–76, 527–29 (2004) (noting that 
longstanding state participation in compliance with international law under-
cuts the Supreme Court’s one-voice pronouncements both empirically and 
functionally); Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Com-
ment on Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189, 
2195–200 (2001) (criticizing the doctrine on normative and descriptive 
grounds); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
941, 964–65 (2004) (criticizing as empirically false “the ‘single voiced’ ra-
tionale” for treating foreign affairs cases as political questions); Michael D. 
Ramsey, International Law as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
555, 561–64 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Non-preemptive] (“The ‘one voice’ in 
foreign affairs has always been more of a slogan than a constitutional reali-
ty.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1150 (noting the doctrine’s unpredictability, lack 
of textual support in the Constitution, and failure to adequately identify the 
distribution of federal foreign affairs authority); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out 
the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 449–50 
(2002) (criticizing the one-voice doctrine, among other things, because of his-
torical comfort with federal and state court application of customary interna-
tional law as general law). 
Ralph Steinhardt provides a more in-depth analysis of what he calls the 
“‘one voice’ metaphor,” which he asserts underlies “doctrines of judicial diffi-
dence” that restrict the judiciary from resolving international human rights 
claims. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 23–31. These doctrines include 
act of state, political question, immunity, self-execution, private right of ac-
tion, and international comity. Id. at 29–31. Ultimately, Steinhardt argues for 
“[a] qualified version of the ‘one-voice’ orthodoxy” that would apply “when the 
political branches have actually committed the United States internationally 
pursuant to a delegated and exclusive power in the Constitution, when there 
are no international standards to apply, and when individual rights are not at 
issue.” Id. at 44. Steinhardt’s focus is at once wider and narrower than that of 
this Article. On one hand, Steinhardt identifies a broad one-voice metaphor 
that assertedly underlies an array of doctrines. This Article, by contrast, fo-
cuses on the one-voice doctrine and perceives the various doctrines of diffi-
dence that Steinhardt identifies as tending to undercut the one-voice doctrine 
because they limit, rather than preclude, judicial involvement in foreign af-
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ticle, has endeavored anything along those lines.10 In that piece, 
Cleveland made two principal contributions. She described the 
one-voice doctrine’s inconsistency with the Constitution.11 And 
she documented ways in which the doctrine does not cohere 
with actual practice.12 At this point it is clear that, notwith-
standing the federal government’s claim as the one voice in for-
eign affairs, states take many actions affecting foreign affairs 
that are tolerated and sometimes encouraged by the national 
government.13 Similarly, although the President is often identi-
fied as the one U.S. voice in foreign affairs, Congress and the 
courts are far from mute.14
II.  CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF THE ONE-VOICE 
DOCTRINE   
 This Article builds on these insights 
to offer a comprehensive analysis of the failings of the one-voice 
doctrine that formalizes its multiple dimensions, identifies its 
conflicting theoretical footings, expands on its constitutional 
and practical infirmities, documents its functional failings, and 
ultimately tracks the implications of these failings to the doc-
trine’s demise. 
The one-voice doctrine applies along multiple axes: it is 
used to patrol state action bearing on foreign affairs, to decide 
the propriety of judicial resolution of foreign affairs questions, 
and to assess the scope of presidential foreign affairs power or 
 
fairs. For example, the act of state doctrine requires the judiciary to presume 
the validity of only certain acts by foreign governments. See infra text accom-
panying notes 286–89; cf. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 29 (recogniz-
ing, for example, that the act of state doctrine does not limit judicial involve-
ment in all foreign affairs cases, while also suggesting that “the contours of 
the doctrine might be determined by its ‘one-voice’ purpose”). On the other 
hand, this Article assesses the one-voice doctrine as it applies across its vari-
ous dimensions rather than focus, as Steinhardt does, on relations between 
the judiciary and the political branches. See infra Part III. 
 10. See generally Cleveland, supra note 1.  
 11. See id. at 984–85, 988–91. 
 12. See id. at 975–76, 979, 985–89, 991–1014. Others have also noted this 
inconsistency. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 5, at 446 (“It is likely . . . that the 
one-voice metaphor has never been very accurate.”); Jack L. Goldsmith, Fed-
eral Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1634–39, 
1688 (1997) (noting both state action affecting foreign affairs and the fact that 
“[t]he federal government itself rarely speaks with one voice in foreign rela-
tions”). 
 13. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 975–76, 979, 989–1014; Gold-
smith, supra note 12, at 1674–78; Ku, supra note 9, at 476–526. 
 14. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 985–89; Goldsmith, supra note 
12, at 1688–89. 
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the relative power of Congress and the President. Along these 
axes, the doctrine surfaces in many contexts. This Part, which 
provides a brief history of the doctrine15
A. STATE POWER  
 and identifies the 
many contexts in which it is applied, employs the doctrine’s 
main axes (state power, judicial power, and relative power of 
the political branches) as organizing principles. The next Part 
explores these and other axes in the course of highlighting a 
critical, and ultimately troubling, feature of the one-voice doc-
trine: its many dimensions. 
The one-voice doctrine has played the most consistent role 
in delineating the proper scope of state action bearing on for-
eign affairs. The doctrine’s roots stretch at least as far back as 
the 1827 case of Brown v. Maryland,16 in which the Supreme 
Court struck a state law for encroaching on the federal power 
to regulate foreign commerce.17 Since that time, the Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that the states have no role to play in 
foreign affairs.18
 
 15. In exploring that history, the Article focuses, albeit not exclusively, on 
historical invocation of the doctrine, rather than on the broader history of the 
three questions the doctrine has been used to answer. A history exploring the 
foreign affairs powers of the political branches, judiciary, and states is a mul-
tivolume project beyond the scope of this Article. 
 The Court has stated, for example, that “for 
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign na-
 16. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). The Supreme Court’s approach to the 
compatibility of state taxes with the Commerce Clause has changed since 
Brown. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179–83 
(1995); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309–10 (1992). 
 17. Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 445–49, 459; see Cleveland, supra note 
1, at 980. In a prior, domestic case addressing the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion to hear certain appeals from state courts, the Court noted that “the gov-
ernment which is alone capable of controlling and managing [the American 
people’s] interests in [matters of war, peace, and commerce] is the government 
of the Union.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821). 
 18. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 980–84 (tracing judicial recognition of 
the federal government’s exclusive control of foreign affairs to the early 
1800s); Ku, supra note 9, at 466–68 (discussing the Supreme Court’s frequent 
endorsement of “a nationalist conception that assumes the exclusion of states 
from any activities relating to foreign affairs”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1129–
30 & n.3, 1221 n.331 (collecting cases noting federal exclusivity in foreign af-
fairs). Until recently, scholars shared the Supreme Court’s view. See, e.g., 
Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Per-
spective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1015 
(2001) (“[R]evisionist scholars have challenged the previously dominant view 
that States have no place in foreign affairs.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1129 
(“Everyone used to agree that state and local governments had no role to play 
in U.S. foreign relations.”). 
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tions, we are but one people, one nation, one power”;19 that “in 
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disap-
pear. . . . [and] the State . . . does not exist”;20 and that “[p]ower 
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in 
the national government exclusively.”21
In making conclusions of this sort, the Court has relied 
heavily on the one-voice doctrine. The doctrine’s prominence is 
evidenced by the fact that the doctrine surfaces across genres of 
preemption. For example, in enforcing the Constitution’s Im-
port-Export Clause, which generally prohibits states from lay-
ing “Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,”
 
22 the Court, 
since 1976, has asked whether the challenged state law inter-
feres with the national government’s ability to “speak with one 
voice when regulating” foreign commerce.23 The doctrine has al-
so informed whether state law is preempted by statute24 or by 
executive agreement.25
 
 19. Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see also 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (quoting Chae Chang Ping, 130 
U.S. at 606). 
 The doctrine has even led to preemption 
 20. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also id. 
(“[C]omplete power over international affairs is in the national government 
and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part 
of the several states.”).  
 21. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); see also id. at 242 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In our dealings with the outside world, the 
United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the 
complications as to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of 
political power between the national government and the individual states.”). 
But cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514–15 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Even in its international relations, 
the Federal Government must live with the inconvenient fact that it is a Un-
ion of independent States, who have their own sovereign powers.”). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 23. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1976); see also 
United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 853 (1996); Itel Con-
tainers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 62, 76–77 (1993); Limbach v. 
Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 359–60 (1984); Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n 
of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752–54, 758 (1978).  
 24. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375, 380–86 
(2000). While Crosby might be interpreted as preempting state law based sole-
ly on conflict with a statutory command that the President speak for the Unit-
ed States in developing a multilateral strategy on Burma, the opinion argua-
bly invokes the President’s, or federal government’s, role as the nation’s voice 
as well. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 1012–13 (“[T]he [Crosby] Court’s reli-
ance on the ‘one-voice’ doctrine was sufficiently broad that the Court might 
have reached the same conclusion in the absence of [a f]ederal . . . [s]tatute.”). 
 25. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327, 330 (concluding that an executive 
agreement recognizing the Soviet government and assigning to the United 
States Soviet claims to nationalized property trumped any conflicting state 
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based on executive policy derived from executive agreements.26 
And, as discussed more fully below, the doctrine has justified 
preemption on dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and 
dormant foreign affairs grounds.27
B. POWER OF THE JUDICIARY VIS-À-VIS THE POLITICAL 
BRANCHES 
 In short, the one-voice doc-
trine has, for years and across preemption categories, played a 
notable role in the prohibition of state foreign affairs activity. 
The history of the one-voice doctrine’s role in fixing the 
separation of powers between the judiciary and the political 
branches has unfolded largely in the litigation context. No sin-
gle type of case captures the history, however. Instead, the doc-
trine has played a role in two principal categories of cases: (1) 
cases addressing the political question doctrine or, relatedly, 
recognizing the need for some level of judicial respect for politi-
cal branch determinations, and (2) cases addressing dormant 
preemption under the Foreign Commerce Clause and under 
federal foreign affairs authority. 
 
policy as “the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the feder-
al] government” in entering the agreement); see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 221–23, 
226–34. The Pink Court affirmed Belmont and upheld the same executive 
agreement in the face of contrary state law and policy based in part on “a 
modest implied power of the President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations’” to settle the claims of U.S. 
nationals in the course of recognizing the Soviet government. Id. at 229 (quot-
ing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
 26. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Garamendi 
Court struck a state law that “interfere[d] with foreign policy of the Executive 
Branch, as expressed principally in . . . executive agreements,” id. at 413, rely-
ing on the President’s status “as the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs,” id. at 
414 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
109 (1948)), and the law’s interference with the President’s ability “to speak 
for the Nation with one voice,” id. at 424 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381). 
But cf. id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (refusing to preempt “[a]bsent a 
clear statement [supporting preemption] . . . by the ‘one voice’ to which courts 
properly defer in matters of foreign affairs”). 
 27. See infra Part I.B.2; see also Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 (“There is, of 
course, no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches 
on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the 
‘concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations’ that an-
imated the Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the Na-
tional Government in the first place.” (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964))); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1620–
23 (summarizing “[t]he conventional view . . . that courts . . . . must invalidate 
state laws or acts that impermissibly impinge upon the unique federal foreign 
relations interest” because “[i]n foreign affairs, the nation must speak with 
one voice, not fifty”).  
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1. Political Question and Related Cases 
The one-voice doctrine has, at times, led the Court to con-
clude that certain foreign relations issues should be left to the 
discretion of the political branches. This conclusion may lead to 
a spectrum of deference. On one end of the spectrum, the Court 
may treat an issue as a political question. In such cases, if the 
political branches contest how the issue should be resolved, the 
Court will refuse to hear the dispute.28 If, by contrast, the au-
thoritative political branches have resolved the issue, the Court 
may defer to, and decide the case based on, that resolution.29
 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 
 
110–13. 
 29. For example, in Doe v. Braden, the Court faced a land dispute that, 
under a treaty between the United States and Spain, would be resolved 
against the plaintiff. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 654, 657 (1853). The plaintiff at-
tempted to avoid the force of the treaty by claiming that the King of Spain 
lacked authority under Spanish law to annul by treaty the grant under which 
the plaintiff asserted title. Id. at 657–58. The Court concluded that this argu-
ment presented a political, not judicial, question, based in part on the fact that 
“it would be impossible for the executive . . . to conduct our foreign relations 
with any advantage to the country . . . if every court in the country was au-
thorized to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty on 
behalf of a foreign nation had the power, by its constitution and laws, to [do 
so].” Id. at 657. The U.S. treatymakers had concluded that the Spanish King 
acted within his authority, and the Court ruled against the plaintiff on that 
ground. Id. at 657–59; see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702–03, 705 
(2008) (dismissing habeas petitions of U.S. citizens held in Iraq based in part 
on the executive’s assessment of prison conditions in Iraq); Pasquantino v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (refusing to second guess the execu-
tive’s assessment of the likely foreign relations impact of a wire fraud prosecu-
tion involving Canada); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 
298, 327–31 (1994) (upholding a state tax scheme that had generated foreign 
and executive opposition “[g]iven . . . indicia of Congress’ [sic] willingness to 
tolerate” the scheme, the political branches’ relative preeminence in foreign 
affairs, and Congress’s role as the nation’s voice in foreign commerce); First 
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764–70 (1972) (plu-
rality opinion) (concluding that the judiciary need not apply the act of state 
doctrine if the executive so concludes); New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 756–57 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding “that the 
scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive . . . 
in . . . foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted” and generally does not extend 
to reevaluating the executive’s determination of “the probable impact of disclo-
sure [of sensitive data] on the national security”); cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 
592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(suggesting that the President’s sole organ power supports authority to termi-
nate untrustworthy intelligence agents without judicial review of claimed con-
stitutional violations); id. at 614–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. at 432–33 (finding the act of state doctrine applicable to dictate the 
outcome of—but not preclude jurisdiction over—a claimed violation of interna-
tional law because independent judicial resolution of the claim would interfere 
with the executive’s ability to advocate a change in international law). But cf. 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 282 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Where 
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Under either scenario, the motivation for the Court’s refusal to 
independently adjudicate the question may lie in the one-voice 
doctrine. The Court has acknowledged that many “questions 
touching foreign relations . . . . uniquely demand single-voiced 
statement of the Government’s views”30 and has treated such 
questions as political. This practice dates to at least 1818,31
 
the [political] question arises in the course of a litigation involving primarily 
the adjudication of other issues between the litigants, the Court accepts as a 
basis for adjudication the political departments’ decision of it. But where [the 
question’s] determination is the sole function to be served by the exercise of 
the judicial power, the Court will not entertain the action.”).  
 
 30. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; see also Waterman, 333 U.S. at 104, 111–12, 
114 (concluding that decisions made by the President on citizen applications 
for authorization “to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation” are 
political and therefore non-justiciable based in part on the President’s status 
“as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs”). 
 31. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 281 & n.11 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(listing these and other “cases concerning war or foreign affairs” that have 
been dismissed based on “the necessity of the country’s speaking with one 
voice in such matters”); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947) (“[T]he ques-
tion whether a [foreign] state is in a position to perform its treaty obligations 
is essentially a political question.”); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588–89 
(1943) (holding that courts are bound by immunity decisions of “the Depart-
ment of State, the political arm of the Government charged with the conduct of 
our foreign affairs”); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913) (recognizing a 
“plain [judicial] duty” to enforce a voidable extradition treaty after “[t]he exec-
utive department . . . elected to waive any right to” void the treaty); Terlinden 
v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (“[T]he question whether power remains in a 
foreign State to carry out its treaty obligations is . . . political and not judicial, 
and . . . the courts ought not to interfere with the conclusions of the political 
department in that regard.”); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) 
(“Who is the sovereign . . . of a territory is not a judicial, but a political ques-
tion, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments 
of any government conclusively binds the judges . . . .”); Kennett v. Chambers, 
55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 51 (1852) (explaining that the judiciary could not recog-
nize a newly independent state “before she was recognized as such by the trea-
ty-making power” as to do so would be to exercise a “political authority . . . 
which the Constitution has conferred exclusively upon another department”); 
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (reasoning “that 
when the executive branch of the government, which is charged with our for-
eign relations,” declares that certain territory lies outside the sovereignty of a 
foreign power, that determination “is conclusive on the judicial department,” 
whether or not the executive is right, as “[n]o well regulated government has 
ever sanctioned a principle so unwise, and so destructive of national charac-
ter” as to allow the executive and judiciary to disagree on such important 
questions); The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 63–64 (1819) (citing 
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818), for the rule that U.S. 
courts must regard as lawful those acts permitted in war by feuding states 
when the United States has recognized the war but remained neutral); Palm-
er, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 634–35 (noting that “[t]hose questions which respect 
the rights of a part of a foreign empire . . . [that] is contending for its inde-
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though the Court did not expressly use one-voice language in 
these political question cases until the mid-1900s.32
This does not mean “that every case or controversy which 
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”
 
33 As 
noted, just recently in Zivotofsky the Supreme Court concluded 
that a dispute between the President and Congress regarding 
the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was justiciable 
notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s one-voice argument to the 
contrary in dissent.34 In light of Zivotofsky, the current trajecto-
ry is arguably toward a greater judicial role, and thus more 
voices, in resolving disputes touching on foreign affairs.35
In harmony with this trend in cases implicating the politi-
cal question doctrine, the one-voice doctrine leads to lesser 
shades of deference in other cases. The Zadvydas v. Davis
 
36 
case in the foreign relations area of immigration exemplifies 
this end of the deference spectrum. The Zadvydas Court im-
plied a statutory limitation on the government’s ability to de-
tain aliens who had been ordered removed.37 In so doing, the 
Court rejected the government’s argument that “a federal ha-
beas court would have to accept the Government’s view about 
whether the implicit statutory limitation is satisfied in a par-
ticular case, conducting little or no independent review of the 
matter.”38
 
pendence” are generally political and should be addressed not by the courts 
but by those “to whom are entrusted all [the nation’s] foreign relations”).  
 Instead, the Court merely recognized the need to 
 32. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (noting that many issues touching on for-
eign affairs present political questions because they “uniquely demand single-
voiced statement of the Government’s views”); id. at 281 & n.11 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (noting “cases concerning war or foreign affairs” that have been 
dismissed based on “the necessity of the country’s speaking with one voice in 
such matters”); Waterman, 333 U.S. at 104, 111–12, 114 (concluding that deci-
sions made by the President on citizen applications for authorization “to en-
gage in overseas and foreign air transportation” are political and therefore 
non-justiciable based in part on the President’s status “as the Nation’s organ 
for foreign affairs”); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208–09, 215 (1948) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding that the Supreme Court could not review 
decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East because the 
decision to create the Tribunal was a political one within the President’s ulti-
mate authority as Commander in Chief and as “sole organ of the United States 
in the field of foreign relations”).  
 33. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
 34. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotosfsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27, 
1430 (2012); id. at 1438 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 280–84. 
 36. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 37. Id. at 699. 
 38. Id. 
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conduct its review with sensitivity to, among other things, “the 
Nation’s need to ‘speak with one voice.’”39 The one-voice doc-
trine thus extracted only relatively weak deference to the exec-
utive’s immigration judgments.40
2. Dormant Preemption 
  
Just as the one-voice doctrine has supported varying de-
grees of judicial deference to political branch authority, the doc-
trine has influenced how aggressively the judiciary polices and 
preempts state action bearing on foreign affairs in the absence 
of political branch action. Use of the doctrine for dormant 
preemption bears both on the division of authority between the 
federal government and the states (as noted above), and the 
role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the political branches.41
As cases from the 1800s and early 1900s reflect, the Court 
has long justified dormant preemption of state laws regulating 
foreign commerce on the need for national uniformity.
 The judi-
ciary has principally engaged in dormant preemption informed 
by the one-voice doctrine under two federal powers: federal 
commerce authority and federal foreign affairs authority.  
42
 
 39. Id. at 700. 
 In 
1979, the Court expressly adopted a one-voice standard that 
state taxes bearing on foreign commerce must satisfy to escape 
 40. See id. 
 41. What dormant preemption says about the role of the judiciary vis-à-
vis the political branches may not be consistent. On one hand, dormant 
preemption might reflect not judicial usurpation of “federal prerogatives,” but 
judicial preservation of those prerogatives “for exclusive exercise by the politi-
cal branches.” See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1246. On the other hand, at least 
when courts preempt notwithstanding evidence of political branch acceptance 
of state action, dormant preemption suggests an independent role for the 
courts in foreign affairs. 
 42. See Bd. of Trs. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) (noting that 
“[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade 
the people of the United States act through a single government with unified 
and adequate national power” and concluding that allowing states “to import 
commodities for their own use” without compliance with federal law “would 
undermine, if not destroy, the single control which it was one of the dominant 
purposes of the Constitution to create”); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 
259, 273 (1875) (reasoning that issues in foreign commerce that “may be, and 
ought to be, the subject of a uniform system or plan” do not permit of state 
regulation, even if there might be other aspects of foreign commerce that could 
be regulated by the states until addressed by treaty or statute); Cooley v. Bd. 
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–21 (1851) (upholding a state pilotage 
law while explaining that Congress’s commerce power is exclusive as to sub-
jects that “are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system”).  
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preemption.43 Because “[f]oreign commerce is preeminently a 
matter of national concern” that requires “federal uniformity,” 
the Court concluded that “a state tax on the instrumentalities 
of foreign commerce” must not “prevent[] the Federal Govern-
ment from ‘speaking with one voice when regulating commer-
cial relations with foreign governments.’”44 The Court has 
struck state taxes, and other burdens on foreign commerce, for 
violating this one-voice requirement.45 At the same time, where 
Congress or the broader federal government has expressed 
comfort with multiple voices, the Court has allowed state taxes 
to stand. In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of Cali-
fornia, for example, the Court upheld a state tax scheme under 
the one-voice standard, notwithstanding executive branch46
 
 43. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 
(1979). 
 and 
 44. Id. at 448–51 (quoting, with slight alteration, Michelin Tire Corp. v. 
Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). “[A] state tax at variance with federal policy 
will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues 
which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal di-
rective.” Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).  
 45. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84, 92–93 & 
n.7 (1984) (striking a state regulation requiring partial processing of “timber 
taken from state lands” before export where Congress had not unmistakably 
indicated a desire to exempt the regulation from dormant preemption, reason-
ing that the need “for affirmative [congressional] approval [was] heightened by 
the fact that” the state provision impacted foreign relations, which calls for “a 
consistent and coherent federal policy”); Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 436, 453–54 
(holding unconstitutional a California tax as applied to “foreign-owned in-
strumentalities (cargo containers) of international commerce” because the tax, 
among other things, contravened “a national policy to remove impediments to 
the use of containers” in international trade and thus “prevent[ed] the Federal 
Government from ‘speaking with one voice’”); see also Container Corp., 463 
U.S. at 201–05 & n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that California’s fran-
chise tax methodology should be preempted under the one-voice standard in 
light of the threat and occurrence of foreign protest and the executive’s posi-
tion expressed in a related, pending case); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 
280 (1875) (rejecting a California statute requiring a bond for certain passen-
gers identified by the California Commissioner of Immigration as intruding 
on, among other things, Congress’s foreign commerce power which “belongs 
solely to the national government” lest states “embroil us in disastrous quar-
rels with other nations”).  
 46. The executive’s opposition to California’s tax methodology was not 
constant. While the executive opposed California’s scheme by introducing 
preemptive legislation, writing letters to California’s governor and the Senate 
Finance Committee Chair, and submitting amicus briefs, the Solicitor General 
urged the Supreme Court to uphold the tax assessments at issue in Barclays 
Bank, notwithstanding foreign opposition, because “federal officials had not 
articulated a policy opposing” state use of California’s approach “during the 
years [therein] at issue.” See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 
U.S. 298, 328–30 & nn.30, 32 (1994); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1159. 
  
2014] BEYOND ONE VOICE 967 
 
foreign opposition, because Congress had tolerated the 
scheme.47
The one-voice doctrine has played a role in dormant 
preemption not only under the Foreign Commerce Clause, but 
under the federal government’s more general foreign affairs 
power.
 
48 The Court endorsed dormant preemption of this varie-
ty (without expressly using one-voice language) in 1968 in 
Zschernig v. Miller.49 In Zschernig, the Court concluded that an 
Oregon statute regulating inheritance rights of nonresident al-
iens50 was “an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign af-
fairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the 
Congress” and struck the statute even though the executive 
was unconcerned by the statute’s application to the petitioners 
and the statute addressed an area of traditional state regula-
tion.51
 
 47. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 302–03, 320, 324, 326–31 (upholding 
California’s “worldwide combined reporting” method for assessing “the state 
corporate franchise tax” owed by two multinational enterprises); see also Itel 
Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1993) (upholding a 
state tax because the federal government had indicated the tax did not disrupt 
the nation’s capacity to project a uniform voice); Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9–13 (1986) (upholding a state tax against a one-
voice challenge because the federal government had adopted a policy permit-
ting such taxation); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193–97 (concluding that Cali-
fornia’s franchise tax methodology did not violate “the ‘one voice’ standard” 
where it did not seriously threaten foreign retaliation or U.S. foreign policy, 
and did not contravene an express federal directive); cf. Ray v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978) (upholding a Washington “tug-escort require-
ment for [certain] vessels” in Puget Sound because the rules for “entering a 
particular body of water” do not demand national uniformity (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 The law, the Court found, “illustrate[d] the dangers 
 48. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1637 (noting that the Foreign Com-
merce Clause’s “one-voice test is functionally identical to dormant foreign rela-
tions preemption”).  
 49. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Prior to Zschernig, the Court had rejected as “far 
fetched” the notion that a similar state inheritance law would be deemed fa-
cially unconstitutional as a state intrusion on federal foreign affairs power 
where the state law addressed a matter of traditional state regulation and had 
only “incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.” See Clark v. Allen, 331 
U.S. 503, 516–17 (1947). 
 50. The statute provided that a nonresident alien could inherit Oregon 
property to the same extent as a U.S. citizen only if the alien could prove that 
a U.S. citizen would have “a reciprocal right” to inherit under the laws of the 
alien’s country of nationality, that the U.S. citizen would be able to receive the 
inherited property in the United States, and that the alien’s government 
would not confiscate the inherited property. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430–31. 
 51. Id. at 430–35, 440; see also id. at 442–43 (Stewart, J., concurring) (de-
scribing foreign affairs as “a domain of exclusively federal competence,” as “an 
area where the Constitution contemplates that only the National Government 
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which are involved if each State . . . is permitted to establish its 
own foreign policy.”52 While Zschernig’s dormant preemption 
has received play in the lower courts,53 the Supreme Court has 
cast doubt on its current standing. In American Insurance Ass’n 
v. Garamendi,54 the majority suggested that the approach en-
dorsed by the two Justices who did not join the Zschernig ma-
jority might be proper under certain circumstances.55 And the 
Garamendi dissent noted that the Court had “not relied on 
Zschernig since it was decided,” and suggested that Zschernig’s 
“dormant foreign affairs preemption” is most appropriate 
“when a state action reflect[s] a state policy critical of foreign 
governments and involve[s] sitting in judgment on them.”56 In 
light of opinions like Garamendi and Barclays Bank, the trend 
in dormant preemption generally appears to be shifting away 
from judicial policing of state action affecting foreign affairs.57
C. RELATIVE POWERS OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
 
The Court thus seems to be moving toward greater involvement 
in foreign relations in the political question context, but away 
from such involvement through dormant preemption. 
In the relationship between the political branches, the one-
voice doctrine has largely, though not exclusively, been used to 
expand presidential power. The Court’s most famous invocation 
of one-voice principles in this context occurred in United States 
 
shall operate,” and as a project “entrusted under the Constitution to the Na-
tional Government”); cf. id. at 441–42 (noting a willingness to go further than 
the Court and hold the statute unconstitutional on its face). 
 52. Id. at 441 (majority opinion). 
 53. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1638–39 & n.97. 
 54. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). Garamendi concerned the constitutionality of a 
California statute that required insurance companies doing business in the 
state to disclose information about European insurance policies that were in 
effect before and after World War II to facilitate recovery on policies by Holo-
caust victims. Id. at 401, 409–10, 412. The law was successfully challenged as 
inconsistent with the policy reflected in executive agreements President Clin-
ton entered into to address the problem of Holocaust victim insurance policies 
that were not properly paid. See id. at 401, 405–08, 413. 
 55. See id. at 417–20. That is, the Court suggested that field preemption—
the Zschernig majority’s approach—might be appropriate “[i]f a State were 
simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to 
be addressing a traditional state responsibility,” whereas conflict preemp-
tion—the Zschernig minority’s approach—would govern where the state had 
acted in an area of traditional state competence. See id. at 419 n.11. 
 56. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164 
(2d ed. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. See infra note 301. 
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v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., a case in which Congress had 
authorized the President to criminalize certain arms sales to 
the South American states involved in the Chaco War.58 Citing 
John Marshall’s fabled speech while he was a member of the 
House of Representatives,59 the Court in Curtiss-Wright desig-
nated the President as “the sole organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations.”60 Descriptions of 
the President as the “sole organ” or “nation’s organ” in foreign 
affairs slightly alter the one-voice metaphor but substantively 
form part of the one-voice doctrine.61
Curtiss-Wright has been discredited in many ways, includ-
ing for its reliance on Marshall’s speech.
 Curtiss-Wright thus ener-
gized the doctrine in a powerful way. 
62 Nonetheless, its sole 
organ dictum has defied demise.63 Unsurprisingly, the execu-
tive has claimed the sole organ mantle with vigor.64
 
 58. 299 U.S. 304, 311–15 (1936). 
 In opinion 
after opinion, the U.S. Office of Legal Counsel, Attorney Gen-
eral, and State Department have justified executive authority 
 59. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800); see also 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 458–75 (describing Marshall’s speech and the 
Thomas Nash extradition controversy to which it was addressed); Louis Fish-
er, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 PRES-
IDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 140–42 (2007) (same). 
 60. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20. 
 61. See, e.g., United States. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (finding 
that “the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal] 
government” when recognizing and settling U.S. nationals’ claims against the 
Soviet government); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting Marshall’s sole 
organ language in support of the proposition that “the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation”); Cleveland, supra 
note 1, at 981 (“That the United States should speak with one voice through 
the President . . . was the animating principle . . . behind the Court’s land-
mark . . . decision in Curtiss-Wright.”). 
 62. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 
94–95 & nn.121–23, 127 (1990) (describing and citing criticism of Curtiss-
Wright); Fisher, supra note 59, at 140–43 (explaining that, consistent with his 
later opinions on the Supreme Court, Marshall was not advocating “an inde-
pendent, [exclusive,] inherent presidential power over external affairs,” but 
that the President could “act as the channel for communicating with other na-
tions” and implement an extradition treaty, absent congressional imposition of 
a different procedure, under his constitutional duty to execute the law). 
 63. As Anthony Simones put it, “for every scholar who hates Curtiss-
Wright, there seems to exist a judge who loves it.” Anthony Simones, The Real-
ity of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 415 (1996). 
 64. This is not to suggest that the executive always prefers to go it alone. 
See, e.g., infra note 245 and accompanying text. In negotiating international 
agreements, for example, the executive’s negotiating strength may improve on 
the existence of another voice. See infra text accompanying notes 367–72.  
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on one-voice grounds.65 Likewise, the executive has repeatedly 
invoked its power as the nation’s organ in litigation on a wide 
range of issues.66
 
 65. See, e.g., Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2006/nsa-white-paper.pdf (recognizing the 
presidential power “to conduct[, through the National Security Agency,] war-
rantless surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect and 
disrupt armed attacks on the United States”); Authority of the President Un-
der Domestic and International Law to Use Military Force Against Iraq, 26 
Op. O.L.C. 143, 150–51 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2002/ 
milit-force-iraq.pdf (advising that the President has the power to “take mili-
tary action [against terrorist organizations and the countries that support 
them] to protect the national security interests of the United States”); Whis-
tleblower Protections for Classified Disclosures, 22 Op. O.L.C. 92, 95 (1998) 
(recognizing the presidential power to keep national security data from Con-
gress); Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic 
Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21–22, 28 (1996), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/olc/gray.11.htm (recognizing the presidential power to control communica-
tions with other countries and to decide U.S. policy concerning the “Arab 
League passport policy”); Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
Override International Law in Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 
Op. O.L.C. 163, 168 (1989) (recognizing the presidential authority to violate 
customary international law); Legal Issues Raised by Proposed Presidential 
Proclamation to Extend the Territorial Sea, 12 Op. O.L.C. 238, 238 (1988) 
(recognizing the presidential power to “extend the [U.S.] territorial sea from 
three to twelve miles”); International Load Line Convention, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 
119, 123 (1941) (recognizing the presidential authority to declare a treaty in-
operative); LOUIS FISHER, STUDY NO. 1: THE “SOLE ORGAN” DOCTRINE 1–2 
(2006), available at http://loufisher.org/docs/pip/441.pdf (citing additional ex-
amples from the Office of Legal Counsel as well as examples from the State 
Department); Letter from Edward H. Levi, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, U.S. Vice President (June 13, 1975), in REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOR-
EIGN POLICY 240, 249 (1975) (criticizing proposed legislation that would re-
quire the executive to transmit executive agreements to Congress for either 
House to veto within a certain period as potentially impairing the President’s 
sole organ powers). 
 As Harold Koh put it, “[a]mong government 
 66. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 19–21, Kiyemba v. 
Obama, 559 U.S. 1005 (2010) (No. 09-581), 2010 WL 638462, at *19–21 (argu-
ing, on one-voice grounds, against judicial interference with executive man-
agement of detainee transfers from Guantánamo); Brief for Petitioners at 26, 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (No. 03-358), 2004 WL 
250237, at *26 (“[S]ubjecting the President’s conduct of international diploma-
cy to the procedural requirements of [the National Environmental Policy Act] 
would impair the President’s ability to ‘speak for the Nation with one voice’ . . . 
.” (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000))); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Am. Ins. 
Ass’n v. Garamendi at *10–21, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722), 2003 WL 
721754, at 10–21 (arguing for preemption of a state law that interfered with 
the President’s ability to speak with a single voice); Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Clinton v. Jones, 510 U.S. 681 
(1997) (No. 95-1853), 1996 WL 448091, at *8–9 (citing, among other things, 
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attorneys, Justice Sutherland’s lavish description of the presi-
dent’s powers is so often quoted that it has come to be known as 
the ‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right’ cite.”67 The Supreme Court has 
endorsed this line of argument in various cases,68
 
the President’s role as sole organ in foreign affairs in arguing for a stay of civil 
litigation against the President based on pre-office conduct); Reply Brief for 
the Petitioners, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) 
(No. 92-344), 1993 WL 290141, at *2–4 (arguing against judicial review of a 
presidential “policy of interdiction and repatriation of Haitian migrants on the 
high seas” in part on the grounds that judicial review would interfere “with 
the President’s ability to speak with one voice” and would “seriously prejudice 
the national interest”); Brief for the United States at 13–17, New York Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Nos. 1873, 1885) (citing the Presi-
dent’s sole organ status in asserting that the executive has the power “to pro-
tect the nation against publication of [national security] information”); Brief 
for the United States at 31–57, United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348 U.S. 
296 (1955) (No. 14) (relying on the President’s sole organ power in asserting 
presidential authority to enter a commercial executive agreement). In addition 
to the executive, other entities have made one-voice arguments in the Presi-
dent’s favor. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Center for Law and Jus-
tice & European Centre for Law and Justice Supporting Respondents at 11–
12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 467691, 
at *11–12 (citing the President’s status as sole organ in arguing for judicial 
deference to the President’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions); Brief 
of Citizens for the Common Defence as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respond-
ents at 5–6, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 
683613, at *5–6 (citing the President’s sole organ role to support presidential 
“authority to detain a [U.S.] citizen as an enemy combatant”). 
 strengthening 
The executive has also made the one-voice claim to Congress. See, e.g., 
Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Bill Prohibiting the 
Export of Technology for the Joint Japan-United States Development of FS-X 
Aircraft, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1042, 1043 (July 31, 1989) (asserting that the United 
States must speak with one voice in foreign negotiations and claiming that 
“[t]he Constitution provides that that one voice is the President’s”); Statement 
on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1541, 1541–42 (Dec. 22, 1987) (objecting to certain por-
tions of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act as potentially obstructing the 
President’s sole organ responsibilities); Warren Christopher, U.S. Deputy 
Sec’y of State, Role of the President’s National Security Affairs Assistant, 
Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Apr. 17, 1980), in 
80 DEP’T ST. BULL., July 1980, at 32, 32–34 (1980) (recognizing a congressional 
role in foreign affairs, but opposing, in part on sole organ grounds, a proposal 
to subject certain national security appointments to Senate advice and con-
sent). 
 67. KOH, supra note 62, at 94 (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (us-
ing Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ language in the course of deferring to the exec-
utive’s assessment of the foreign relations impact of a wire fraud prosecution 
involving Canada (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 320 (1936))); Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003) 
(recognizing the President’s lead role in foreign affairs and striking down a 
state law that prevented the President from “speak[ing] for the Nation with 
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one voice” (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (“Th[e] presumption [against extraterritoriality] 
has special force when . . . construing treaty and statutory provisions that may 
involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique re-
sponsibility.”); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) (describing the 
President as “the guiding organ in the conduct of our foreign affairs” in up-
holding the President’s power to remove enemy aliens under the Alien Enemy 
Act); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 
(1948) (recognizing that the President has independent constitutional powers 
“as the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 
221–23, 226–34 (1942) (upholding an executive agreement in the face of con-
trary state law and policy based in part on “a modest implied power of the 
President who is the ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of inter-
national relations’” to settle the claims of U.S. nationals in the course of rec-
ognizing a foreign government (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320)); 
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327, 330–32 (1937) (concluding that 
an executive agreement trumped inconsistent state policy where “the Execu-
tive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal] government” 
when entering into the agreement); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 
n.17, 306 (1981) (concluding that the executive’s revocation of a passport was 
authorized by statute so that it was unnecessary to decide the scope of the 
President’s sole organ power); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 715 
(1974) (emphasizing the strength of executive privilege claims as to intelli-
gence information that comes to the President because of his role “as Com-
mander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs” (quoting Wa-
terman, 333 U.S. at 111)); David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign 
Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POL-
ICY 19, 25–27 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“Even when 
the sole-organ doctrine has not been invoked by name, its spirit, indeed its tal-
ismanic aura, has provided a common thread in a pattern of cases that has ex-
alted presidential power above constitutional norms.”). 
Numerous non-majority Supreme Court opinions have also endorsed this 
line of argument. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Marshall’s sole organ language to support the President’s preemi-
nence in foreign affairs); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430, 442 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (referring to the President as “the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly 
defer in matters of foreign affairs,” but concluding that the state law in ques-
tion “would not compromise the President’s ability to speak with one voice for 
the Nation”); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that Congress could prohib-
it federal judicial review of CIA decisions to terminate untrustworthy employ-
ees since the power to make those decisions derives primarily from, and 
judicial review would infringe upon, the President’s power as sole organ); id. 
at 614–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting serious constitutional doubts that 
Congress could—in light of, among other things, the President’s sole organ 
power—authorize judicial review of all terminations of CIA intelligence em-
ployees); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 551–52 & n.6 (1977) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ language in 
the course of highlighting the vast scope of the President’s responsibilities and 
the President’s corresponding need for confidentiality of advice and instruc-
tions); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766–68 
(1972) (plurality opinion) (citing Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ language in sup-
port of executive primacy in foreign affairs); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 
727 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Curtiss-Wright, among other cases, in not-
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the President’s claim to exclusive authority to recognize foreign 
governments as well as presidential unilateralism in treaty- 
and war-making.69 Members of Congress have, at times, voiced 
support for the President’s sole organ status as well.70
Interestingly, while Curtiss-Wright is the modern engine 
behind the President’s role as the nation’s voice in foreign af-
fairs, Curtiss-Wright was not merely the resurrection (or, more 
accurately, the distorted reincarnation) of a historic speech. 
The concept of the President as the nation’s organ in foreign af-
  
 
ing the executive’s enormous international relations power that is “largely un-
checked by” Congress and the courts); id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Curtiss-Wright, among other cases, in support of the proposition “that the 
President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the con-
duct of our foreign affairs”); id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Mar-
shall’s sole organ speech and Curtiss-Wright in concluding “that the scope of 
the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive . . . [in] for-
eign affairs is very narrowly restricted”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 679 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the 
President possesses confidential information “as ‘the Nation’s organ for foreign 
affairs’” (quoting Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111)); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 
197, 208 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Curtiss-Wright in endorsing 
the view that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the United States in the field 
of foreign relations”).  
 69. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of 
Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1012–21, 1028–33 & n.113 (2013). 
 70. For example, in 1906, Senator Spooner defended the President’s power 
as “the sole organ of negotiation and of communication between this country 
and foreign governments.” 40 CONG REC. 2142–43 (1906) (statement of Sen. 
Spooner). Senator Spooner’s words were endorsed by other Senators in the 
years that preceded Curtiss-Wright. See, e.g., 60 CONG. REC. 2171 (1921) 
(statement of Sen. Connally); 58 CONG. REC. 8011 (1919) (statement of Sen. 
Robinson); 58 CONG. REC. 7339–40 (1919) (statement of Sen. Connally). Con-
gressional support for the President’s role as sole organ also appears after 
Curtiss-Wright. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 9528–30 (1984) (statement of Rep. 
Gingrich) (citing the President’s sole organ status in arguing against congres-
sional interference with the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs); 118 CONG. 
REC. 11,839 (1972) (statement of Sen. McGee) (arguing that “more and more of 
us should drop out of the business of trying to play Secretary of State or Presi-
dent of the United States” as the Constitution places on the President the 
“awesome responsibility” of being the nation’s unified “voice in foreign af-
fairs”); 107 CONG. REC. 1653 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (asserting 
that the Constitution wisely establishes the President as the nation’s voice in 
foreign affairs); 103 CONG. REC. 1157 (1957) (statement of Rep. Udall) (citing 
Marshall’s sole organ speech in resisting congressional limits on the Presi-
dent’s power to carry out U.S. foreign policy, including by military force). But 
see, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 14,097 (1970) (statement of Sen. Harris) (noting a 
longstanding dispute regarding the scope of the President’s sole organ power 
and asserting Congress’s constitutional role in war making); 87 CONG. REC. 
1719–20 (1941) (statement of Sen. Wiley) (asserting a constitutional foreign 
policy role for Congress notwithstanding Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” lan-
guage). 
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fairs experienced some limited play in the judiciary before 
Curtiss-Wright. For example, in a dissenting opinion in 1852, 
Justice Nelson relied on Marshall’s speech in concluding that 
an extradition “demand must be made . . . . upon the President, 
who has charge of all [our] foreign relations, and with whom 
only foreign governments are authorized, or even permitted, to 
hold any communication of a national concern.”71
Occasional reliance on the one-voice doctrine also appeared 
outside the judiciary. Members of Congress endorsed the Presi-
dent’s role as sole organ before Curtiss-Wright.
 
72 The executive 
likewise asserted the President’s unique role in foreign affairs. 
In 1793, Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, wrote the no-
torious French ambassador, Citizen Genet, to explain that con-
sular commissions should be addressed to the President.73 As 
Jefferson explained, “the President[,] . . . being the only chan-
nel of communication between this country and foreign nations, 
it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to 
learn what is or has been the will of the nation, and whatever 
he communicates as such, they have a right, and are bound to 
consider as the expression of the nation” even if the President 
exceeded his authority or another branch of the federal gov-
ernment disagrees.74
 
 71. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 137 (1852); see also Williams v. 
Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) (declaring that “the execu-
tive branch of the government . . . is charged with our foreign relations,” in-
cluding determining the U.S. position regarding sovereignty over foreign terri-
tory); Brief on the Questions of Law, and Argument on the Facts for the 
Appellant at 37, La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 
(1899) (No. 29) (quoting Marshall’s sole organ speech in arguing that the Pres-
ident, not the courts, must decide how to execute an award issued by the Unit-
ed States-Mexico Claims Commission pursuant to a United States-Mexico 
treaty). 
 This same reasoning surfaced in April 
 72. See supra note 70. 
 73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Sec’y of State, to Citizen Genet, Minis-
ter Plenipotentiary from the Republic of Fr., to the U.S. (Nov. 22, 1793), in 
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS RELATIVE 
TO FRANCE AND GREAT-BRITAIN 93–94 (1793) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson]; see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Execu-
tive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 321–23 (2001) [hereinafter 
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power] (discussing the interaction with Genet in 
greater detail). 
 74. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 73; see also Alexander Ham-
ilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 33, 37–38 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969) (assert-
ing, in defending Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, that the executive, 
not the legislature, is “the organ of intercourse between the UStates [sic] and 
foreign Nations”); Galbraith, supra note 69, at 1015 (noting that President 
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1861, when Jefferson Davis convened the Confederate Congress 
in response to a de facto declaration of war by President Lin-
coln in order “to devise the measures necessary for the defence 
of the country.”75 In addressing the Congress, Davis explained 
that he “was not at liberty to disregard” President Lincoln’s 
declaration of war against the Confederacy, notwithstanding 
the fact “that under the Constitution of the United States the 
President was usurping a power granted exclusively to the con-
gress,” because the President “is the sole organ of communica-
tion between [the United States] and foreign powers” and in-
ternational law did not permit “question[ing] the authority of 
the Executive of a foreign nation to declare war.”76
Treatise writers, contemporary to Davis, likewise described 
the President as the sole organ for foreign affairs. John Norton 
Pomeroy, for example, divided the foreign affairs power “into 
two distinct branches: the power of intercourse, intercommuni-
cation, and negotiation . . . and the power of entering into . . . 
international compacts.”
 At least from 
an external perspective, then, the President possessed power as 
the nation’s organ that went beyond merely relaying policy to 
making and executing it. 
77 As to the first power, “[t]he President 
is the sole organ of communication between our own and all 
other governments. . . . [and] Congress has absolutely no con-
trol.”78 While this power to communicate was not, in Pomeroy’s 
view, as important as the power to make treaties,79
 
Grant “vetoed two trivial joint resolutions by Congress—resolutions that simp-
ly responded to congratulations sent by foreign nations—on the ground 
that . . . the President [is] the agent to represent the national sovereignty in 
its intercourse with foreign powers”). 
 it was far 
from ministerial. As sole organ, “the President [could], without 
any possibility of hindrance from the legislature, so conduct the 
foreign intercourse, the diplomatic negotiations with other gov-
ernments, as to force a war,” so that as a result of this power 
 75. Message of Jefferson Davis (Apr. 29, 1861), in 1 THE REBELLION REC-
ORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS 166, 167 (Frank Moore ed., 1861). 
 76. Id. at 172. 
 77. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 446 (1868). 
 78. Id. at 446–47; see also JOEL PARKER, THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 36 & n.* (1862) (explaining that “the inter-
course of foreign nations with the United States is through the Executive, and 
they are not authorized to go behind his acts, and to allege that they are nuga-
tory,” and citing Davis as someone who understood this); POMEROY, supra note 
77, at 446–48 (describing the President’s “untrammeled” power as sole organ). 
 79. POMEROY, supra note 77, at 446–48. 
  
976 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:953 
 
“the Executive Department . . . holds in its keeping the safety, 
welfare, and even permanence of our internal and domestic in-
stitutions.”80
III.  SCOPE OF THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE   
 
The foregoing Part illustrates both the historical roots of 
the one-voice doctrine and the contexts in which it appears. But 
what does it mean to say that an organ of the government is 
the nation’s voice? From its name, one might mistakenly as-
sume that the one-voice doctrine merely supports authority to 
communicate for the United States in international affairs.81 
Language from Supreme Court precedent nurtures that mis-
take. Curtiss-Wright spoke of “the President alone [having] the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”82 
Similarly, Baker v. Carr cited the need in certain circumstances 
for a “single-voiced statement of the Government’s views.”83 Of 
course, even if the one-voice doctrine only supported a power to 
speak, that power might well involve a measure of policy-
making discretion. As historical commentators saw it, the pow-
er to speak included the power to take positions that could lead 
the nation to war.84
 
 80. Id. at 447–48; see also CLARENCE ARTHUR BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF 
THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 25–42 (1921) (citing Pomeroy, Mar-
shall, and historical evidence in support of the principle that the President’s 
sole organ power relating to war “gives the President the whole power of initi-
ating and formulating the foreign policy of the government, and virtually of 
committing the nation to its execution”). 
 Consistent with this understanding, the 
doctrine has been understood and used in its different dimen-
sions to support more than mere authority to present the Unit-
ed States’s position. 
 81. Cf. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–
1984, at 207–15, 255 (5th rev. ed. 1984) (discussing the question whether the 
President’s role as sole organ of the United States in foreign affairs extends 
only to communicating for the United States or to making policy as well); 
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 243 (noting that “many 
scholars argue that the President is only a spokesperson” with few, enumerat-
ed foreign affairs powers). 
 82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) 
(emphasis added); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 
(2012) (emphasizing the listening function by noting that “[i]t is fundamental 
that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their 
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this 
subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States”). 
 83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (emphasis added). 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
  
2014] BEYOND ONE VOICE 977 
 
Three cases illustrate. In addition to referencing the Presi-
dent’s authority to speak and listen for the United States, 
Curtiss-Wright noted that the President “alone negotiates” with 
other countries85 and “manages our concerns with foreign na-
tions.”86 Curtiss-Wright further suggested that the President 
designs how we will interact with other countries87—that is, 
makes foreign policy—and perhaps dispositively assesses how 
certain acts will impact our foreign relations.88
Zschernig likewise perceived the one-voice doctrine as in-
volving more than oratory. In Zschernig, the Court rejected an 
Oregon statute governing nonresident alien inheritance rights 
because the statute, though addressing a matter of traditional 
state regulation,
 
89 led to state court assessment and criticism of 
foreign governments;90 produced “more than ‘some incidental or 
indirect effect in foreign countries,’” creating “great potential 
for disruption or embarrassment”;91
 
 85. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. 
 and generated decisions 
grounded in foreign policies (especially Cold War opposition to 
 86. Id. (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 (1901)). 
 87. See id. (noting, in discussing the President’s preeminence in foreign 
affairs, the need for “unity of design” in relations with other nations (quoting 8 
COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNIT-
ED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 (1901))). 
 88. See id. at 321 (noting that how or whether the President acts in for-
eign affairs may depend “upon the effect which his action may have upon our 
foreign relations,” something Congress may not be able to anticipate); see also 
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (suggesting that the 
President’s role as sole organ includes determining potential foreign relations 
consequences); Adler, supra note 68, at 26 (“[Curtiss-Wright] infused a purely 
communicative role with a substantive policymaking function and thereby 
manufactured a great power out of the Marshallian sole-organ doctrine.”). 
 89. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968). 
 90. Id. at 433–37 & nn.6–7, 440; see also id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (concluding that the provisions of the state law “necessarily involve the 
Oregon courts in an evaluation . . . of the administration of foreign law, the 
credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the policies of foreign gov-
ernments”). 
 91. Id. at 433–35 (majority opinion) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 
517 (1947)); see also id. at 440–41. But cf. id. at 459 (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the result) (concluding that, if Oregon could “deny inheritance rights to all 
nonresident aliens,” the Oregon statute seemed “wisely designed to avoid any 
offense to foreign governments . . . : a foreign government [could] hardly object 
to the denial of rights which it does not itself accord to the citizens of other 
countries”). 
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authoritarian states) and conditions.92 The statute, in the 
Court’s words, “illustrate[d] the dangers which are involved if 
each State . . . is permitted to establish its own foreign policy.”93 
Zschernig thus indicated that the federal government’s position 
as the nation’s voice meant that it had exclusive authority to 
formulate policy,94 criticize other states, and affect foreign rela-
tions in any significant way. States were precluded from adopt-
ing foreign policy even if that policy did not, as in Zschernig, 
cause concern to the executive or conflict with a federal treaty.95
Finally, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles the 
Court noted that states might improperly “prevent[] the Feder-
al Government from ‘speaking with one voice’” by provoking in-
ternational disputes, triggering retaliation against the entire 
country, and creating a patchwork of divergent regulations.
 
96 
Status as the nation’s one voice entailed “the achievement of 
federal uniformity.”97
 
 92. See id. at 435–39 & n.8 (majority opinion); see also id. at 442 (Stewart, 
J., concurring) (noting that Oregon’s law was “framed . . . to the prejudice of 
nations whose policies it disapproves”). 
 Other opinions similarly indicate that the 
 93. Id. at 441 (majority opinion). 
 94. Similarly, the Court in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Water-
man Steamship Corp. concluded that the President had power to make unre-
viewable, substantive decisions concerning citizen applications “to engage in 
overseas or foreign air transportation,” in part given the President’s status “as 
the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs.” 333 U.S. 103, 109–12, 114 (1948); see al-
so First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766–67 
(1972) (plurality opinion) (citing sole organ language and cases “emphasiz[ing] 
the lead role of the Executive in foreign policy”). 
 95. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (noting the executive’s position that 
application of the Oregon statute to the plaintiffs in Zschernig did not “unduly 
interfere[] with the United States’ conduct of foreign relations” (quoting Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429 (No. 21), 1967 
WL 113577, at *6 n.5)); id. at 441 (“[E]ven in absence of a treaty, a State’s pol-
icy may disturb foreign relations.”); id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring) (further 
describing the executive’s position).  
 96. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450–51, 453 
(1979) (quoting, with slight alteration, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 
276, 285 (1976)). But cf., e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 
U.S. 298, 327 (1994) (refusing to strike California’s approach to taxation 
“[g]iven [certain] indicia of Congress’ [sic] willingness to tolerate” the ap-
proach). 
 97. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added); see also id. at 449–52 
& n.14 (speaking of the need for uniformity “in regulating foreign commerce” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 453 (noting that a state statute was constitutionally 
infirm because it would “frustrate attainment of federal uniformity”); cf. 
Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (condemning state interference with the federal government’s 
ability to speak with one voice and the resulting interference with the 
achievement of federal tax policy). 
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need for one voice in foreign affairs justifies authority to make 
foreign policy.98
Because the doctrine reaches and influences the resolution 
of these important questions concerning control of U.S. foreign 
affairs, the doctrine’s soundness is of critical concern. As evi-
denced above, the doctrine has some historical support.
 Thus, the one-voice doctrine bears on important 
questions regarding authority to make and pursue foreign poli-
cy, not simply power to speak or even to negotiate. 
99 As 
noted below, the doctrine comports to some degree with the 
Constitution’s text, structure, and history, especially in its fed-
eralist dimension; under certain conditions, the doctrine also 
makes functional sense.100
The next five Parts identify features of the one-voice doc-
trine that ultimately render the doctrine untenable. The rea-
sons that some features are problematic will be obvious; the de-
fectiveness of other features will be less so. The primary 
objective of these Parts is to expose the critical features of the 
doctrine, not to convince that they are failings. Part IX takes up 
 Notwithstanding these virtues, the 
doctrine is fatally flawed.  
 
 98. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012) 
(reasoning that the federal government may decide “whether it is appropriate 
to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States,” as 
“[d]ecisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with 
one voice”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–14 (2003) (stating 
that in light of the need for uniformity in dealing with other countries that 
motivated the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs authority, state action 
bearing on foreign affairs “must yield to the National Government’s policy” 
and there is no “question generally that there is executive authority to decide 
what that policy should be”); Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 311 (speaking of the 
need for federal uniformity in regulating foreign commerce); Itel Containers 
Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 76 (1993) (concluding that a Tennessee 
sales tax did “not infringe the Government’s ability to speak with one voice 
when regulating commercial relations with other nations”); Container Corp. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (discussing when “a state tax at 
variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’ standard”); id. at 205 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A state] tax that is flatly inconsistent with federal 
policy. . . . prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one voice in a 
field that should be left to the Federal Government.”); Ray v. Atl. Richfield 
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 187–89 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (citing “[t]he federal interest in uniform regulation of commerce on 
the high seas” to justify state law preemption).  
Justices O’Connor and Scalia went so far as to suggest that the Presi-
dent’s sole organ power supports authority to terminate untrustworthy intelli-
gence agents without judicial review of alleged constitutional violations. See 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605–06 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); id. at 614–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. See supra Part II. 
 100. See infra text accompanying notes 324–25, 361–64. 
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the task of demonstrating why these features are flaws and ul-
timately support abandonment of the one-voice doctrine.  
IV.  THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S MULTIPLE 
DIMENSIONS   
As the history of the one-voice doctrine suggests, the doc-
trine is invoked along multiple dimensions. On the one hand, 
the one-voice doctrine uniformly addresses structural questions 
concerning the distribution of foreign affairs authority. On the 
other hand, the issues the doctrine is used to resolve are sever-
al. Thus, notwithstanding its name, the one-voice doctrine has 
multiple faces. Cleveland observed that the one-voice doctrine 
“has emerged from two related lines of doctrine: the principle 
that states are excluded from international relations, and the 
assumption that the President speaks as a soloist for the Unit-
ed States.”101 This observation merits two addendums. First, 
the one-voice doctrine has not escaped its provenance; it con-
tinues to address varying structural questions. Second, the doc-
trine has more than two dimensions.102
A. FEDERALIST DIMENSION 
 The doctrine has three 
fairly discrete dimensions as well as hybrids. Of its discrete 
dimensions, one sounds in federalism and two in separation of 
powers. 
In its federalist, or vertical, dimension, the one-voice doc-
trine serves to police state involvement in foreign relations on 
the ground that the federal government alone may speak in 
foreign affairs. The doctrine has been most prominent along 
this dimension. “[A] long line of [Supreme Court] decisions . . . 
has applied the ‘one-voice’ doctrine to address the validity of 
state activities impinging on foreign relations.”103 As noted in 
the history provided above, these cases involve the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, Import-Export Clause, the federal foreign 
affairs power, federal statutes, executive agreements, and ex-
ecutive policies.104
 
 101. Cleveland, supra note 
 In all these areas, the preeminence or exclu-
sivity of federal powers touching on foreign affairs result in the 
preemption of state law. 
1, at 982. 
 102. Cf. Bradley, supra note 5, at 448–49 (describing a political question 
argument as “[a] variation of [the related] one-voice argument”). 
 103. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 975; see also id. at 979. 
 104. See supra Part II.A. 
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B. SEPARATION OF POWERS DIMENSIONS 
In its horizontal—or federal separation of powers—posture, 
the one-voice doctrine applies to two questions: the foreign af-
fairs role of courts vis-à-vis the political branches,105 and the al-
location of foreign affairs power between the President and 
Congress.106 As noted above, with regard to the courts’ role in 
foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has reasoned that some for-
eign affairs issues present political questions, in part because 
they “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Govern-
ment’s views.”107 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter noted that the 
Court’s political question decisions in the area of war and for-
eign affairs “are usually explained by the necessity of the coun-
try’s speaking with one voice in such matters.”108 In applying 
the political question doctrine, the Court judges that the politi-
cal branches are the nation’s one voice or at least that the judi-
ciary is not.109
 
 105. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1223, 1256 n.139 (1999) [hereinafter Spiro, Federalism] (“[D]ecisions involving 
judicial demurral (including the political question cases) can all be justified on 
a variation of the ‘one-voice’ rule.”); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 
 
5, at 28 
(noting the one-voice metaphor’s relevance to the separation of foreign affairs 
powers between the judiciary and political branches). 
 106. The question whether the President or Congress is authorized to en-
gage in certain foreign affairs acts involves something of a false dichotomy 
since the President participates with Congress in lawmaking. See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3 (describing bicameralism and presentment). At the same 
time, the Constitution casts Congress as the primary lawmaker, as illustrated 
by the fact that Congress may enact law on its own through a bicameral, su-
permajority override of a presidential veto. See id. art. I, § 1 (vesting Congress 
with the legislative power delegated to the federal government); id. art. I, § 7, 
cl. 2 (detailing Congress’s authority to override a veto). 
 107. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1438 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(finding the political question doctrine applicable and reasoning that “where 
foreign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States to speak 
‘with one voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly important” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring))); Bradley, supra note 5, at 448–49 (describing a political question 
argument as “[a] variation of [the related] one-voice argument”). 
 108. Baker, 369 U.S. at 281 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). That does not 
mean that all such decisions rest on the one-voice doctrine. See id. “[C]ertain 
of the Court’s [political question] decisions have accorded scant weight to the 
consideration of unity of action in the conduct of external relations,” id. at 281 
n.11, focusing instead on the fact that certain issues have historically been de-
cided by the political branches on political criteria thus depriving the judiciary 
of standards by which to decide the matter, id. at 281–83.  
 109. Of course, as Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), hints, the polit-
ical branches may be divided, such that dismissal on political question 
grounds prevents the addition of a judicial voice but does not produce a single 
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Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Goldwater v. Carter110 illus-
trates. Several members of Congress challenged President 
Carter’s termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.111 
Justice Rehnquist concluded that where the Constitution was 
silent regarding the power to terminate a treaty, and the an-
swer might depend on the nature of the treaty, the issue ought 
to be left to the political branches, “each of which has resources 
available to protect and assert its interests.”112 That conclusion, 
he thought, was bolstered by the fact that the question sounded 
in foreign relations, where the political question doctrine is 
particularly appropriate.113
The second horizontal dimension of the one-voice doctrine 
concerns the distribution of authority between the President 
and Congress. As mentioned, Curtiss-Wright provides the par-
adigmatic example here.
  
114 Although the case concerned the 
constitutionality of a joint congressional resolution giving the 
President discretion to criminalize certain conduct to achieve 
foreign policy objectives, the Court emphasized the President’s 
role “as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations.”115 Designation of the President as the 
one voice in foreign affairs resulted in part from the need for 
“unity of design,” which the President is well suited to 
achieve.116
C. HYBRID DIMENSIONS 
  
In addition to these purely horizontal and vertical dimen-
sions, the one-voice doctrine operates along diagonal, or hybrid, 
dimensions. On these dimensions, questions of state law 
preemption might be resolved by reference to the allocation of 
power among the branches of the federal government.117
 
voice. See infra text accompanying notes 
 Both 
110–13; see also Steinhardt, Ortho-
doxy, supra note 5, at 35. 
 110. 444 U.S. 996. 
 111. Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 112. Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 
1002–05 & n.1; see also Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1441 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the political branches “have nonjudicial methods of working out 
their differences”). 
 113. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003–05.  
 114. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 115. Id. at 320; see also id. at 319–22. 
 116. Id. at 319 (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 (1901)). 
 117. Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1680 (noting the relevance of federal 
separation of powers to federalism questions regarding the preemption of state 
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majority and dissenting opinions in Garamendi involve hybrid 
applications of the doctrine.118 The majority relied on the Presi-
dent’s need to speak with one voice in foreign relations in decid-
ing to preempt a California law bearing on foreign relations.119 
That law required insurers doing business in California to dis-
close “‘insurance policies’ issued ‘to persons in Europe, which 
were in effect between 1920 and 1945.’”120 In the majority’s 
view, the law conflicted with an executive policy—reflected in 
several sole executive agreements—that favored voluntary co-
operation with an international commission designed to facili-
tate the settlement of Holocaust related insurance claims.121 In 
finding the California provision preempted, the Court did not 
merely focus on the national government’s preeminence in our 
federalist system but on the President’s122 preeminence in for-
eign affairs.123 The Court found that the California law “‘com-
promise[d] the . . . capacity of the President to speak for the 
Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments’ to re-
solve”124
 
law); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Orig-
inal Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
341, 374–79, 401–02, 429 (1999) [hereinafter Ramsey, Original Understand-
ing] (reasoning that preemption of state law based on presidential policy is “an 
issue of intrafederal separation of powers” as such preemption expands presi-
dential power). 
 Holocaust-era claims as “California [sought] to use an 
 118. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 119. See id. at 413–17, 420–21, 423–24. 
 120. Id. at 409 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 13804(a) (West Cum. Supp. 
2003)). 
 121. See id. at 405–08, 413, 420–25. 
 122. The Court also briefly touched on the allocation of foreign relations 
authority between the President and Congress. The Court explained that 
while it had not “give[n] policy statements by Executive Branch officials con-
clusive weight as against an opposing congressional policy” concerning foreign 
commerce, it relied on executive policy statements regarding Holocaust-era 
claims because “in the field of foreign policy the President has the ‘lead role,’” 
while Congress leads in regulating foreign commerce. Id. at 422 & n.12 (citing 
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328–30 (1994); First 
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 123. See id. at 401, 413–21. The Court’s focus on not just the national gov-
ernment’s, but the President’s, authority resulted from the Court’s refusal to 
decide whether field or conflict preemption was necessary to protect the execu-
tive’s foreign affairs authority from state intrusion. Id. at 419–20. Rather, the 
Court concluded that both field and conflict preemption rendered California’s 
law unconstitutional because it conflicted with a valid exercise of executive 
foreign policy power. See id. at 419–25. 
 124. Id. at 424 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 
363, 381 (2000)). 
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iron fist where the President ha[d] consistently chosen kid 
gloves.”125 Thus, while the case concerned the federalist distri-
bution of foreign affairs power, the Court resolved it in part on 
separation of powers grounds—that the President can and 
must be able to speak with one voice in foreign affairs.126
Justice Ginsburg in dissent similarly invoked separation of 
powers concerns to argue that the California law should 
stand.
 
127 Like the majority, Justice Ginsburg described the 
President as “the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly defer in 
matters of foreign affairs.”128 She argued, however, that because 
the President had not directly or formally addressed infor-
mation disclosure (the subject of the California provision),129 the 
judiciary improperly assumed the role of “expositor[] of the Na-
tion’s foreign policy” in “preempt[ing] state law[] on foreign af-
fairs grounds.”130 Upholding the law, by contrast, “would not 
compromise the President’s ability to speak with one voice for 
the Nation” when he decided to address the issue.131 For the 
dissent, then, the distribution of power between the judiciary 
and political branches foreclosed preemption of the state law.132
The hybrid use of the one-voice doctrine is also apparent in 
contrasting two cases concerning the Foreign Commerce 
Clause. In the older of the two, Japan Line, the Court consid-
ered a California tax that resulted in multiple taxation on “for-
eign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of internation-
al commerce.”
 
133 While the Court noted that the power to 
regulate foreign commerce is Congress’s,134 the opinion heavily 
emphasized the California tax’s fatal interference with the need 
for federal uniformity in regulating commerce with other 
states.135
 
 125. Id. at 427. 
 In other words, the Court focused on the federalist 
dimension of foreign commerce authority rather than on its 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 442–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 430. 
 129. See id. (“Absent a clear statement aimed at disclosure requirements 
by the ‘one voice’ to which courts properly defer in matters of foreign affairs, I 
would leave intact California’s enactment.”); see also id. at 438–43 & n.4. 
 130. Id. at 442–43. 
 131. Id. at 442. 
 132. Id. at 430–42. 
 133. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 436, 451–52 
(1979). 
 134. See id. at 444, 446, 453–57. 
 135. See id. at 448–54 (repeatedly referencing the need for national uni-
formity). 
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separation of powers component. In Barclays Bank, by contrast, 
the Court emphasized the separation of powers dimension.136
Like Japan Line, Barclays Bank involved California taxa-
tion: California’s use of a “worldwide combined reporting” 
method to assess “the state corporate franchise tax due” from 
multinational entities.
 
137 Relying on Japan Line, the Court and 
petitioners emphasized the need for national uniformity in reg-
ulating foreign commerce.138 Moreover, there were grounds for 
concluding that California’s approach prevented that uniformi-
ty. California’s approach differed from the approaches of both 
other states and the federal government.139 A “battalion of for-
eign governments . . . marched to [foreign petitioner’s] aid, de-
ploring [California’s approach] in diplomatic notes, amicus 
briefs, and even retaliatory legislation.”140 And the executive 
had opposed California’s approach through nonbinding “ac-
tions, statements, and amicus filings,” including introducing 
preemptive legislation.141 Nonetheless, the Court upheld Cali-
fornia’s approach as applied,142 reasoning that Congress’s 
“voice, in this area, is the Nation’s”143 and Congress had indi-
cated a “willingness to tolerate” California’s methodology.144
 
 136. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330–31 
(1994). 
 In 
 137. Id. at 302. 
 138. See id. at 302–03, 311, 320–31. 
 139. See id. at 303–07. 
 140. Id. at 320; see also id. at 324 & n.22, 328; id. at 337 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 141. Id. at 328–30 & n.30 (majority opinion). But cf. Itel Containers Int’l 
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1993) (relying on “various conven-
tions, statutes, and regulations” adopted by the federal government as well as 
an amicus brief from the United States to conclude that a state tax did “not 
infringe the Government’s ability to speak with one voice when regulating 
commercial relations with other nations”); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 195–96 (1983) (interpreting perceived executive silence as 
suggesting that a state tax did “not seriously threaten[]” U.S. foreign policy, 
and upholding the state tax); supra note 46 (explaining that the executive’s 
opposition to California’s tax methodology was not constant). 
 142. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 303, 327. 
 143. Id. at 331; see also id. at 324 (describing Congress as “the branch re-
sponsible for the regulation of foreign commerce”); id. at 329 (describing Con-
gress as “the preeminent speaker” with regard to the regulation of foreign 
commerce). 
 144. Id. at 327; see also id. at 326 (concluding “that Congress implicitly has 
permitted the States to use” California’s methodology); id. at 330 (describing 
California’s law as “congressionally condoned”); cf. Huddleston, 507 U.S. at 85 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reliance on an amicus brief 
from the executive because “the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
  
986 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:953 
 
reaching this conclusion, the Court also noted that it was not 
for the judiciary to strike California’s law in the face of con-
gressional acquiescence.145 The Court thus relied primarily on 
the separation of foreign relations authority among the federal 
branches to uphold California’s foreign affairs–related action.146
V.  THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S DIFFERENT THEORIES   
 
As these cases illustrate, one of the key features of the one-
voice doctrine is that it applies along many dimensions. Part IX 
will address why this feature is problematic, but first to the 
doctrine’s other critical features. 
In addition to addressing questions concerning the alloca-
tion of constitutional power along multiple dimensions, the one-
voice doctrine reflects different theoretical approaches to these 
questions. The first approach relies on sources such as constitu-
tional text, structure, and history to discern the allocation of 
foreign relations authority. Under this approach, the one-voice 
 
tions is textually delegated to Congress alone”). Halberstam argues that Ja-
pan Line and Barclays Bank cohere when viewed as examples of the Court’s 
zealousness “to preserve positive federal policy,” including policy derived from 
scant evidence. Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1063–66. The difference in out-
comes results from state law conflict with such a policy in Japan Line and 
consistency with such a policy in Barclays Bank. Id. 
 145. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 330 (“The Constitution does ‘not make the 
judiciary the overseer of our government.’” (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981))); see also id. at 334 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress, not the Executive or the 
Judiciary, has been given the power to regulate commerce.”); cf. Container 
Corp., 463 U.S. at 194 (noting, among other things, the judiciary’s limited 
“competence [to] determin[e] precisely when foreign nations will be offended 
by particular acts” in deciding whether state action “violate[s] the ‘one voice’ 
standard”).  
 146. Justice O’Connor’s partial concurrence and dissent took a similar ap-
proach, noting Congress’s, rather than the executive’s or judiciary’s, preemi-
nence in foreign commerce and rejecting reliance on “statements made and 
briefs filed by officials in the Executive Branch” in assessing preemption when 
Congress is silent. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 334 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Chy Lung also takes somewhat 
of the hybrid approach. The Court in that case rejected a California statute in 
light of the national government’s—but specifically Congress’s—foreign com-
merce power. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). 
A variation of this hybrid approach appears in Sabbatino. There the Court 
concluded that whether state courts may decide the validity of acts of foreign 
sovereigns within their own territory turns on whether it is appropriate as a 
matter of separation of powers for federal courts to do so. See Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–28 (1964); see also Harold G. Maier, 
Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 832, 835 
(1989) (noting that Sabbatino grounded the act of state doctrine’s preemptive 
effect in “federal separation of powers principles”). 
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doctrine generally appears as a conclusion.147 Based on text, 
structure, and history, one branch of government is identified 
as the authoritative voice. Barclays Bank illustrates this ap-
proach in simple form. Based on the Constitution’s textual as-
signment of the foreign commerce power to Congress, the Court 
concluded that Congress is “the Nation’s” voice “in [the foreign 
commerce] area,”148 and upheld, notwithstanding executive op-
position, a state statute that Congress appeared “willing[] to 
tolerate.”149
The other approach to constitutional interpretation reflect-
ed in the one-voice doctrine is functional.
 
150
 
 147. But cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 & n.25 (concluding that the act of 
state doctrine is a matter of federal, not state, law based in part on “constitu-
tional and statutory provisions . . . reflecting a concern for uniformity in this 
country’s dealings with foreign nations”). 
 Under this ap-
 148. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 331. 
 149. Id. at 327; see id. 321–22, 324–30 & nn.22–23, 30. But cf. supra note 
46. 
 150. The two theories mix in the federalist context when functional reasons 
that motivated the Framers (for example, the need to prevent a single state 
from triggering retaliation against the United States) are cited in order to as-
certain the structure reflected in the text actually adopted. Justice Souter re-
lies on this hybrid in Garamendi when he says: 
There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state 
power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National 
Government’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in this coun-
try’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the Constitution’s 
allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government 
in the first place. 
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. at 427 n.25); see Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 282–83, 
285–86, 293–94 (1976) (reasoning that the one-voice rationale motivated the 
Import-Export Clause such that state taxes that do not interfere with the fed-
eral government’s ability to regulate foreign commerce “with one voice” are 
not, absent other defects, subject to the Clause’s prohibition); see also Dep’t of 
Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752–54 (1978) (rely-
ing on Michelin for the same); id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing 
the Michelin approach as “a functional analysis based on [a state] exaction’s 
relationship to the . . . policies that underlie the [Import-Export] Clause”); in-
fra note 416. This mix arguably also appears in Japan Line, where the Court 
indicated that the Foreign Commerce Clause was animated in part by the 
need for uniformity in regulating commerce with foreign states. See Japan 
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448–50 & n.14 (1979). 
Where the Court concludes that the Constitution as adopted mandates a func-
tional analysis, the line between the two principal theories also blurs. 
In a similar vein, a court might invoke functional reasons that motivated 
the Framers without knowing or relying on that fact, in which case the court’s 
theory would be functional notwithstanding the coincidence of reasoning be-
tween the two approaches. Zschernig likely fits within this category. See 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding an Oregon law unconsti-
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proach, the doctrine may appear not only as a conclusion but 
also as a justification. It is in its functional form that Mike 
Ramsey describes the doctrine when he says that “[t]he ‘one 
voice’ invocation is . . . ultimately a policy prescription” that is 
deemed so “overriding . . . given the acute danger of missteps in 
foreign affairs, that it gains constitutional dimensions” even 
though it is inconsistent with constitutional text.151 Justice 
Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in Curtiss-Wright is perhaps 
the best example of the functional manifestation of the one-
voice doctrine.152 After concluding that federal foreign affairs 
power derives from U.S. sovereignty rather than from the 
states,153 Justice Sutherland identified various prudential rea-
sons why the President is the sole federal organ in foreign af-
fairs.154 Among these was the need for “unity of design” in in-
teracting with foreign states.155 National need to speak with one 
voice led to the conclusion that the President is that voice.156
The functional version of the doctrine is the most common 
version
 
157 and appears in recent opinions.158
 
tutional as applied, citing the danger U.S. states may produce if they may 
adopt their “own foreign policy”); see also infra note 
 For example, Jus-
171 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 8; see also Ramsey, Original Understanding, 
supra note 117, at 370–79 (arguing that the case for dormant foreign affairs 
preemption is ultimately based on policy not compelled by constitutional struc-
ture). 
 152. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 
(1936). 
 153. See id. at 315–19.  
 154. See id. at 319–22. In Pink, the Court similarly relied on functionalism 
in identifying the scope of the President’s authority as the one voice in foreign 
affairs. “Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations[, 
the Court reasoned,] requires no less” than the “modest implied [presidential] 
power” to settle claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments in the 
course of recognizing those governments. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 
229 (1942). 
 155. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–
1901, at 24 (1901)). 
 156. See id. at 319–20. 
 157. See Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 367–69 (not-
ing that the principal rationale for dormant preemption of state action bearing 
on foreign affairs is functional). 
 158. In addition to the opinions discussed in text, see South-Central Timber 
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasizing that state regulations burdening foreign, rather than merely in-
terstate, commerce are more readily subject to dormant preemption because 
“[i]t is crucial to the efficient execution of the Nation’s foreign policy that ‘the 
Federal Government . . . speak with one voice when regulating commercial re-
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tice Breyer’s dissent in Zivotofsky concluded that the case pre-
sented a political question as a result of “[f]our sets of pruden-
tial considerations,” including the fact that “the issue before 
[the Court arose] in the field of foreign affairs.”159 “The Consti-
tution[, he reasoned,] primarily delegates the foreign affairs 
powers ‘to the political departments of the government, . . .’ not 
to the Judiciary.”160 While he may have been relying on the 
Constitution’s text or the founding generation’s motivations for 
adopting that text in making this statement, he did not turn to 
either of those sources explicitly.161 Instead, he noted that the 
Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs authority is unsur-
prising in light of a variety of functional considerations. Among 
these was the presumption that “where foreign affairs is at is-
sue, the practical need for the United States to speak ‘with one 
voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly important.”162
Functional considerations likewise informed the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Munaf v. Geren that the judiciary should 
not second-guess the executive’s assessment of the likelihood of 
torture if American citizens held by the United States in Iraq 
were transferred to Iraqi keeping.
 Functional 
considerations, including the one-voice rationale, informed Jus-
tice Breyer’s sense of the judiciary’s role in foreign affairs. 
163 Judicial involvement was 
improper because it “would require . . . pass[ing] judgment on 
foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s abil-
ity to speak with one voice.”164 Unlike the judiciary, “the politi-
cal branches [were] well situated to consider [and adopt policies 
regarding] sensitive foreign policy issues,”165
 
lations with foreign governments’” (alteration in original) (quoting Michelin 
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978) (finding no dormant preemption of state law where 
there was no need for “a uniform national rule” on the matter); and id. at 186 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding no dormant 
preemption of state law where variable local conditions made local regulation 
“appropriate, and perhaps even necessary”). 
 at least in part be-
 159. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1437 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, 111 (1948)).  
 161. See id. at 1437–38. 
 162. Id. at 1438 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 
U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 163. See 553 U.S. 674, 702–03 (2008). 
 164. Id. at 702. 
 165. Id. 
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cause they “possess significant diplomatic tools and leverage 
the judiciary lacks.”166
The choice between the functional and what might be 
termed the structural approach to the constitutional allocation 
of foreign affairs authority is significant. On the one hand, a 
structural approach might handicap efforts of the President or 
states to respond to foreign affairs problems. On the other 
hand, a functional approach might lead to excessive executive 
authority in foreign relations. The Court in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan suggested as much when it noted “the never-ending ten-
sion between the President exercising the executive authority 
in a world that presents each day some new challenge with 
which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all 
live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of 
checks and balances.”
 
167
Perhaps as a result of the pros and cons of each approach, 
some cases emphasize one theory, while shades of both theories 
appear in others. The opinion in Zschernig presents a subtle 
example.
 
168 In Zschernig, the Court started from the assump-
tion, presumably grounded at least in part in constitutional 
text, that “the Constitution entrusts [the field of foreign affairs] 
to the President and the Congress.”169
 
 166. Id. at 703 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 20 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(Brown, J., dissenting)). 
 Yet, among other things, 
the Court cited functional considerations in determining 
 167. 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981). 
 168. For another example, see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). In 
that case, the Court cited both the textual commitment of foreign commerce 
authority to Congress and the need to prevent one state from “embroil[ing the 
United States] in disastrous quarrels with other nations” in concluding that 
Congress, not the states, possesses the authority to regulate immigration. Id. 
at 279–80. Similarly, in United States v. Pink, the Court relied on the Presi-
dent’s power to recognize other governments, “the historic conception of the 
powers and responsibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs,” 
and the functional need for the President to have certain powers to effectively 
“handl[e] the delicate problems of foreign relations” in upholding the Presi-
dent’s settlement of claims against the Soviet Union in conjunction with 
recognition of the new Soviet government. 315 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1942). In 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court relied primarily on functional 
considerations but also on “constitutional and statutory provisions . . . reflect-
ing a concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations and 
indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdic-
tion of federal institutions,” 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964), in concluding that 
the act of state doctrine is a matter of federal law, id. at 423–27 & n.25. 
 169. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). 
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whether Oregon had intruded into that federal trust.170 The 
Court looked at the state law’s “potential for disruption or em-
barrassment” in foreign affairs.171 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Garamendi followed the same pattern. Justice Ginsburg began 
describing the executive as “the ‘one voice’ to which courts 
properly defer in matters of foreign affairs,”172 a conclusion 
about the President’s foreign affairs authority apparently 
grounded in constitutional history and precedent;173 she then 
argued, however, that “[s]ustaining [the state law at issue] 
would not compromise the President’s ability to speak with one 
voice for the Nation,”174
VI.  THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S INCONSISTENCY WITH 
THE CONSTITUTION   
 arguably a functional reason for up-
holding the law. 
Even if the one-voice doctrine solely reflected a structural 
approach to constitutional questions, the doctrine would be 
flawed. Whether in its federalist or separation of powers di-
mensions, the doctrine is only partially supported by the Con-
stitution.175
A. FEDERALIST DIMENSION 
 
The one-voice doctrine derives greatest support from con-
stitutional text, structure, and history in its federalist dimen-
sion.176
 
 170. The Court considered more formal arguments as well, categorizing 
policymaking as within the federal foreign affairs domain and concluding that 
the states were making policy. See id. at 435–39 & n.8. 
 The Constitution’s text grants the federal government 
foreign affairs powers, such as the authority to make treaties 
 171. Id. at 435; see also id. at 441 (noting how “a State’s policy may disturb 
foreign relations” and “the dangers which are involved if each State . . . is 
permitted to establish its own foreign policy”). 
 172. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 430 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 173. See id. at 436–38 (citing id. at 415 (majority opinion)). 
 174. Id. at 442. 
 175. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 8 (“Whatever one thinks of the ‘one 
voice’ idea as a policy matter, it is fundamentally opposed to the constitutional 
design. The Constitution’s text divides foreign affairs power among multiple 
independent power centers[, a]nd . . . it is plain that this did not occur by acci-
dent. The Constitution deliberately fosters multiple voices in foreign af-
fairs . . . .”). 
 176. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 979–80 (“The principle that authority 
over foreign relations vests exclusively in the national government, to the ex-
clusion of the states, has strong constitutional roots . . . .”); id. at 990–91. 
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and to regulate foreign commerce,177 while prohibiting the 
states from foreign affairs activities such as treaty and alliance 
making.178 These provisions are consistent with a broader 
structure in which federal lawmaking is supreme and the 
states retain “powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.”179 Both text 
and structure reflect a pre-constitutional history in which fed-
eral inability to regulate foreign commerce and to enforce trea-
ties and customary international law led to efforts to provide 
the national government supremacy over foreign affairs.180
At the same time, the Constitution does not exclude the 
states from having some voice in foreign affairs.
  
181 In the highly 
unlikely event that a state is “actually invaded, or in such im-
minent Danger as will not admit of delay,” a state may go to 
war without Congress’s approval.182 More relevant, with Con-
gress’s permission, states may “lay . . . Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports,” impose “Dut[ies] of Tonnage, keep Troops, 
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into . . . Agreement[s] or 
Compact[s] . . . with a foreign Power, [and] engage in War.”183
 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
Since 1955, forty-one states have entered over 340 agreements, 
 178. Id. art. I, § 10. 
 179. Id. amend. X; see id. art. VI, cl. 2; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 990. 
 180. See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 36–46; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 
990 & n.112. This does not mean that constitutional history lacks any support 
for state involvement in foreign affairs. The fact that the Articles of Confeder-
ation prohibited states from sending ambassadors but the Constitution does 
not might support the conclusion that states have some room to send repre-
sentatives to other countries (for example, on trade missions). See Goldsmith, 
supra note 12, at 1707. The general history of the Constitution, however, is 
one of strengthening federal over state foreign affairs authority. 
 181. See David H. Moore, The President’s Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 623 (2011) [hereinafter Moore, Unconstitutional 
Treatymaking]; see also CORWIN, supra note 81, at 203–04 (“[S]ection 10 of Ar-
ticle I quite clearly recognizes the states as retaining a certain rudimentary 
capacity in [foreign affairs] . . . .”); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 1012 (briefly as-
serting that “the Framers’ primary concern [was] ensuring that the national 
government had authority to prevent states from interfering in the foreign af-
fairs area” rather than that the states never engage in behavior affecting for-
eign affairs, even behavior tolerated by the national government). 
 182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. A state may also, without congressional 
approval, “lay . . . Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . [as] absolutely 
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws” but “the net Produce of all Duties 
and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of 
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the 
Revision and Controul of the Congress.” Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 183. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3. 
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both binding and not, with other countries and their subdivi-
sions; over two hundred of these have been concluded in rough-
ly the last decade.184 Yet “Congress has reviewed fewer than a 
dozen [such agreements] in the last century, consenting to just 
six and rejecting only one outright.”185 Many of these agree-
ments are mundane, addressing issues such as transboundary 
highways, bridges, and firefighting.186 Yet some are more sub-
stantive and controversial.187 In 2003, for example, Kansas ap-
parently entered, without congressional authorization, a non-
binding agreement with Cuba under which “Cuba . . . commit-
ted to buy $10 million in Kansas agricultural products” and 
Kansas agreed to “encourage the repeal of federal trade and 
travel sanctions against Cuba.”188 In short, states are engaged 
in making international agreements on a significant scale.189 
Further, even if the Constitution universally required congres-
sional approval of even non-binding agreements,190
 
 184. Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
741, 744 (2010) [hereinafter Hollis, Compact Clause]; see also id. at 749–54, 
759, 769, 790–93. Moreover, “these numbers certainly undercount the actual 
practice, since no formal mechanisms exist for collecting or monitoring” these 
agreements. Id. at 744. 
 states would 
still play a role in initiating these agreements before, and carry 
them out after, congressional approval. Implementation of an 
agreement or compact with another nation undoubtedly in-
volves discretion and policy choices that may affect foreign af-
fairs. As a result, even state action that requires federal ap-
proval may result in more than de minimus involvement in 
foreign affairs. 
 185. Id. at 742; see also id. at 742 n.12. 
 186. See id. at 742 & nn.10–12, 750, 754–55. 
 187. See id. at 741–42 & n.3, 754–59, 787–88. 
 188. Id. at 741; see also id. at 741–42 & n.3, 759, 788. 
 189. Cf. Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign 
Policies, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1992, at 158, 158 (“The explosive growth of 
municipal foreign policy in the past decade has been impressive . . . .”). 
 190. In the interstate compact context, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
“category of interstate agreements that states can make free from any con-
gressional oversight or approval.” Hollis, Compact Clause, supra note 184, at 
759–60; see also id. at 743, 759–66, 769–70. Moreover, it is widely believed 
that the Court’s interstate compact jurisprudence applies to compacts with 
foreign states. See id. at 743, 759–60, 766–69, 805. But see id. at 743 n.17, 
744–46, 769–801, 805–06 (noting limited opposition to, and arguing against, 
this position). Thus, there may be agreements that states may enter with for-
eign states that do not trigger the need for congressional approval. Cf. Cleve-
land, supra note 1, at 994 (“[S]tate and local governments have entered 
agreements without congressional consent on local matters such as police co-
operation, border control and road construction.”). 
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Further, as a structural matter, the Constitution “re-
serve[s] to the States . . . or to the people” powers not delegated 
to the federal government.191 While the conventional wisdom is 
that the states did not retain exclusive foreign affairs powers, 
the Constitution might be understood as delegating, or prohib-
iting to the states, only certain foreign affairs powers.192 Moreo-
ver, even if the federal foreign affairs power is comprehensive, 
it may not be exclusive.193 For example, even if Article III could 
be read as extending federal judicial power to all justiciable 
foreign affairs controversies, Article III does not make the fed-
eral power exclusive.194 Indeed, it does not create any lower fed-
eral courts that might exercise the federal judicial power.195
 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This argument, of course, disregards Justice 
Sutherland’s discredited theory that the federal government’s foreign affairs 
authority, unlike its domestic authority, derived from Britain upon independ-
ence and not from the states. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–18 (1936) (developing Justice Sutherland’s theory of 
extraconstitutional federal foreign affairs authority); RAMSEY, supra note 
 The 
Constitution thus leaves open the possibility that cases bearing 
on foreign affairs will be heard not only by federal courts, but 
7, at 
13–48 (summarizing and discrediting Justice Sutherland’s theory); Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 379, 379–82, 386–437 (2000) (same). 
 192. Cf., e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federal-
ism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 100 (2000) (summarizing the argument that 
the treaty power should be understood to “allow the treatymakers the ability 
to conclude treaties on any subject but . . . limit their ability to create supreme 
federal law to the scope of Congress’s power to do so”). The possibility that the 
states retained some foreign affairs–related leeway grows if the vesting of ex-
ecutive power in the President does not include otherwise unenumerated for-
eign affairs powers. See Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 
348, 396–432 (noting, but ultimately rejecting, the argument that the Vesting 
Clause “gives the President a general foreign policy power” that supports 
preemption of state action affecting presidential foreign policy).  
 193. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1618–25, 1641–98 (arguing that 
while federal foreign affairs authority is plenary, the federal political branches 
generally must act to preempt state action bearing on foreign affairs); Ramsey, 
Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 347–48, 370, 379–90, 403–32 (ar-
guing that while the Constitution sought “to strengthen the national govern-
ment’s foreign affairs powers,” statements by the Framers combined with con-
stitutional text and pre- and post-ratification history support the conclusion 
that state foreign affairs activity is only limited by “the express or implied 
[constitutional] limitations directed at particular subjects such as war and 
treatymaking and the general preemptive power of [adopted] federal statutes 
and treaties under” the Supremacy Clause). 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 195. Id.  
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by the state courts.196
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS DIMENSIONS 
 In short, notwithstanding the historical 
goal to invest the federal government with foreign affairs pow-
er, under the text adopted there is some room for state in-
volvement in foreign affairs. 
The Constitution is more enigmatic when it comes to the 
horizontal distribution of foreign affairs authority and, in par-
ticular, to the scope of the President’s foreign affairs power.197 
This uncertainty arises, in large part, from the Vesting Clause, 
which states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”198 James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton debated the significance of this clause, 
with Hamilton arguing that it gave the President broad power 
subject only to express constitutional limitations that were to 
be strictly construed.199
 
 196. See Young, supra note 
 Under this view, for example, Con-
gress’s power to declare war, with its attendant authority to de-
cide whether any treaties of alliance obligate the United States 
to declare war, would not displace the President’s “similar right 
of Judgment” with regard to the same treaties under his “du-
9, at 425–32, 449 n.423 (describing in greater 
detail the role the Constitution leaves to state courts). But cf. Goldsmith, su-
pra note 12, at 1636 (describing cases in which federal courts have found fed-
eral question jurisdiction over state law claims that implicate foreign affairs). 
 197. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (noting, in as-
sessing the scope of presidential foreign affairs power, “that ‘[t]he great ordi-
nances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and 
white’” (alteration in original) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), as quoting Springer v. 
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); 
CORWIN, supra note 81, at 201 (describing the Constitution as “an invitation to 
struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy”). But cf. 
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 356 (“propound[ing] a 
. . . textual theory that finds in the Constitution a complete division and allo-
cation of foreign affairs authority”). 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 199. Hamilton, supra note 74, at 39, 42; see also James Madison, 
“Helvidius” Number 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
66, 67, 80 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter Madison, 
“Helvidius” Number 1] (summarizing Hamilton’s argument in the course of 
responding to it). The Supreme Court leaned toward Hamilton’s position when 
it stated in Garamendi that “[a]lthough the source of the President’s power to 
act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on 
the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized 
the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign rela-
tions.’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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ty . . . to preserve Peace till war is declared.”200 Madison took a 
narrower view of the Vesting Clause, contending that the exec-
utive power is not as broad as Hamilton suggested. In particu-
lar, he argued that the powers to declare war and to make trea-
ties are not executive in nature, such that constitutional 
exceptions to the vesting of these powers in the President 
should be construed against, not in favor of, the President.201 
Madison likewise rejected the notion that the President retains 
concurrent authority to do what has been assigned to Congress 
(or the judiciary).202 Debates over the proper interpretation of 
the Vesting Clause and the resulting scope of presidential pow-
er continue to this day.203
Whatever the ultimate scope of presidential power over 
foreign affairs, there is no plausible argument that executive 
power is exclusive.
 
204
 
 200. Hamilton, supra note 
 As I and others have noted, “[t]he Consti-
74, at 40. 
 201. See Madison, “Helvidius” Number 1, supra note 199, at 67–73; James 
Madison, “Helvidius” Number 2 (Aug. 31, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 199, at 80, 80–82 [hereinafter Madison, “Helvidius” 
Number 2]. 
 202. See Madison, “Helvidius” Number 2, supra note 201, at 81–87; id. at 
83 (“A concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the 
same function with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in prac-
tice, as it is unnatural in theory.”). 
 203. Compare, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 
234, 252–54, 256–58 (arguing that the Vesting Clause provides the President 
“a ‘residual’ foreign affairs power”), and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. 
Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 1591 (2005) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey, Defense] (same), with 
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2004) (discounting “the Vest-
ing Clause Thesis” on textual and historical grounds).  
 204. See Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, supra note 73, at 238 (noting 
that even a constitutional theory of presidential primacy “is fatally incom-
plete,” since “it lacks a textual basis”). Indeed, Prakash and Ramsey have ar-
gued that it is hard to find constitutional support even for presidential status 
as “sole organ of communication,” id. at 244, without relying on the Vesting 
Clause, id. at 243–44 & n.47, 251, 258 & n.108, 262, 323–24; see also Prakash 
& Ramsey, Defense, supra note 203, at 1674 (same); Ryan M. Scoville, Legisla-
tive Diplomacy, 112 MICH. L. REV. 331, 357–64 (2013) (discussing the diplo-
matic powers the President possesses under the executive’s discrete enumer-
ated powers and under the Vesting Clause, noting that it is harder to derive 
broad diplomatic authority from the President’s discrete powers than from the 
Vesting Clause); cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International 
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 206–15 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hathaway, Presidential Power]; id. at 210 (“[T]he President has a unilateral 
. . . power to communicate with foreign nations. . . . [But] there are limits on 
the President’s power to communicate and hence to make international legal 
commitments . . . .”). 
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tution distributes foreign relations authority among all three 
branches of the federal government.”205 Thus, even if Hamilton 
is correct that the President’s executive power properly in-
cludes concurrent, though ultimately subordinate, power over 
matters assigned to Congress, the fact remains that Congress 
possesses certain foreign affairs powers. Indeed, Congress re-
ceives the lion’s share of enumerated foreign affairs powers.206 
Congress may regulate foreign commerce207 and U.S. territo-
ries;208 impose “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”;209 borrow 
money and pay debt;210 “regulate the Value” of U.S. and foreign 
money;211 create naturalization rules;212 admit new states (for 
example, Puerto Rico);213 oversee certain foreign relations initi-
atives of U.S. states;214 “define and punish” violations of inter-
national law as well as “Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
high Seas”;215 create and vest in federal courts jurisdiction over 
certain foreign relations cases;216
 
 205. Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 
 “declare War, grant Letters of 
181, at 616; see al-
so, e.g., Bestor, supra note 7, at 34 (“Far from placing matters connected with 
foreign affairs exclusively in executive hands, the Constitution carefully par-
cels them out among the three branches. This fact is obvious on the very face 
of the document.”); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 984–85, 989 (“[I]t is clear that 
the Framers guaranteed, as a matter of constitutional design, that the United 
States would not ‘speak with one voice’ in foreign relations. The foreign affairs 
powers are carefully divided among the three branches of the national gov-
ernment.”); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1689 (“The Constitution does not 
purport to limit activity that affects foreign affairs to a single person or 
voice . . . .”). For an extensive, though nonexhaustive, chart of the distribution 
of foreign affairs authority among the three branches of the federal govern-
ment, see Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 617–19. 
 206. See Adler, supra note 68, at 19–20, 47; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 
984; Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 619. But see 
CORWIN, supra note 81, at 201 (“The verdict of history . . . is that the power to 
determine the substantive content of American foreign policy is a divided 
power, with the lion’s share falling usually, though by no means always, to the 
President.”). 
 207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 208. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 209. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (requiring that “[a]ll 
Bills for raising Revenue . . . originate in the House of Representatives”). 
 210. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1–2.  
 211. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 212. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 213. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 214. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 215. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 216. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3526 (3d ed. 
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Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water”;217 “provide for the common Defence,”218 in-
cluding by raising, supporting, and regulating an Army and 
Navy as well as regulating in certain ways and “calling forth 
the Militia”;219 appropriate funds;220 and enact laws “necessary 
and proper” to carry out both its own, and other branches’, 
powers.221 The President, by contrast, is “Commander in Chief” 
and exercises authority over executive agencies like the State 
and Commerce Departments.222 The President may enter trea-
ties and appoint ambassadors and consuls with Senate approv-
al;223 may “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; . . . 
[and must] take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”224 
The federal judiciary’s constitutional authority extends, among 
other things, to “Cases . . . arising under . . . Treaties”; “Cases 
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction”; and “Controver-
sies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects.”225 The Supreme Court possesses 
original jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls.”226 As a result of its juris-
dictional reach, the judiciary “may disrupt U.S. foreign rela-
tions policies in a variety of ways,” including by “refus[ing fed-
eral] extradition requests” and hearing “politically sensitive 
suits . . . against foreign states.”227
Not only does foreign affairs authority thus reach beyond 
the presidency to the other two branches (and particularly the 
legislative branch), but the President’s specific foreign affairs 
  
 
2008) (discussing the “orthodox view [that] Congress is free to grant or with-
hold” federal subject matter jurisdiction). 
 217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 218. Id. pmbl. 
 219. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (authorizing Con-
gress to purchase with state consent, and enact laws for, property “for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Build-
ings”). 
 220. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  
 221. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Moreover, Congress can, through legislation, 
trump a prior treaty as a matter of domestic law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) 
(1987). 
 222. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 223. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 224. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 225. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. But cf. id. amend. XI (restricting federal judicial 
power to hear lawsuits by foreign nationals against U.S. states). 
 226. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 227. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 988–89. 
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powers are all, in some sense, joint.228 While the President is 
Commander in Chief and receives ambassadors, “no less than 
six of the eighteen clauses in the eighth section of article I are 
grants to Congress of various specific powers crucial to the 
making of war” and “[t]he power to appoint ambassadors”—the 
other, and more important, leg of the power to conduct foreign 
relations—“is a power that the President is required to exercise 
in conjunction with the Senate.”229 Similarly, the President may 
enter Article II treaties only “with the Advice and [supermajor-
ity] Consent of the Senate.”230
VII.  THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S DIVERGENCE FROM 
PRACTICE   
 The Constitution thus makes 
clear that federal foreign affairs authority reaches beyond the 
President.  
The one-voice doctrine’s departure from constitutional text, 
structure, and history might be tolerable if it reflected how the 
Constitution has been understood in practice.231 However, nei-
ther the President nor Congress, the Supreme Court nor the 
states has consistently followed the doctrine in practice.232
 
 228. See, e.g., Bestor, supra note 
 The 
historical description of the doctrine above noted ways in which 
these actors have endorsed the doctrine; this Part exposes ways 
in which these actors’ practices diverge from the doctrine. 
7, at 33–34 (noting that of the four specific 
foreign relations powers given to the President, two are shared and two are 
half powers that “depend for [their] effectiveness upon the exercise of a com-
plementary power specifically vested elsewhere”). 
 229. Bestor, supra note 7, at 34. 
 230. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Bestor, supra note 7, at 33. The-
se days, the United States enters most international agreements through the 
congressional-executive, rather than Article II, process. See, e.g., Moore, Un-
constitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 606 & n.38 (citing Oona A. 
Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1254 n.45, 1258–60 & 
n.53 (2008) [hereinafter Hathaway, Treaties’ End]). Similar to Article II trea-
ties, these agreements require approval from a majority in both houses of 
Congress. See Hathaway, Treaties’ End, supra, at 1255. 
 231. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008) (noting that 
“[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power”; nevertheless “if pervasive 
enough, a history of congressional acquiescence can be treated as a gloss on 
‘Executive Power’ vested in the President” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)) (some internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 232. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1688 (“Foreign relations law is re-
plete with struggles between the statute-makers, the treaty-makers, the Pres-
ident, and sometimes the courts, for control of the federal foreign relations 
voice.”). 
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A. PRACTICE OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
As Edward Corwin famously put it, the Constitution’s allo-
cation of foreign affairs powers among the federal branches “is 
an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American 
foreign policy.”233 The political branches frequently accept that 
invitation.234 The President and Congress often speak with dif-
fering voices in matters of foreign affairs.235 The President ne-
gotiates and signs treaties only to have them languish in the 
Senate, sometimes for decades.236 Some of the modern era’s 
most prominent treaties, such as the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights237 and the Kyoto Proto-
col,238 have been signed by the executive but remain unrati-
fied.239
 
 233. CORWIN, supra note 
 Presidential nominations of ambassadors have met with 
foreign policy–based resistance in the Senate. In recent years, 
members of the Senate opposed the nomination of John Bolton 
81, at 201; see also id. at 255. 
 234. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1688–89 (“The federal govern-
ment . . . rarely speaks with one voice in foreign relations.”). 
 235. See, e.g., id. at 1688–89 n.287 (noting foreign policy disagreements be-
tween federal actors as well as within the executive); Nzelibe, supra note 9, at 
965 (providing examples of how “Congress and the President routinely joust 
for power in foreign affairs matters”); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 
34 (noting disagreements between the President and Congress on human 
rights policy); id. at 35 (“[I]t seems unrealistic and ahistorical, even vaguely 
romantic, to maintain the ‘one-voice’ ideal in the face of the near-constant 
struggle between Congress and the President on foreign policy.”). Moreover, 
regardless whether Congress disagrees with the President on any particular 
issue, it is clear that Congress actively participates in international relations. 
As Ryan Scoville has recently documented, members of Congress frequently 
travel (including under a permanent appropriation) to other countries to meet 
with a wide range of foreign officials and to address a wide range of issues. See 
Scoville, supra note 204, at 339–50, 355–56. Members of Congress likewise 
meet with, and are lobbied by, representatives of other nations at home. Id. at 
350–51, 355.  
 236. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 985–87; Levinson, supra note 9, at 
2195–96; Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 600, 608–
09, 660–61. Once ratified, treaties may be preempted as a matter of domestic 
law by a later in time statute. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 & cmt. a (1987); Ramsey, 
Non-preemptive, supra note 9, at 562. 
 237. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed by United States Oct. 5, 1977), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20933/v933.pdf.  
 238. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (signed by United States Nov. 
12, 1998), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume% 
202303/v2303.pdf.  
 239. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 600. 
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as Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations in light of 
Bolton’s previously expressed antipathy to the U.N.240 Legisla-
tive and executive disagreement on the distribution of war 
powers has been ongoing.241 The President and Congress have 
likewise repeatedly disagreed on specific issues, such as the 
proper U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem.242 In the 2011 
Term, the Supreme Court faced (and remanded) a claim arising 
from the executive’s refusal to implement “a statute providing 
that Americans born in Jerusalem may elect to have ‘Israel’ 
listed as the place of birth on their passports.”243 Moreover, not 
only do Congress and the President disagree, but successive 
Congresses and administrations, and actors within Congress or 
the executive may disagree.244 For example, the House and 
Senate or the Department of Defense and the Department of 
State may disagree on the correct foreign policy. Even the Pres-
ident at times has been reluctant to fully embrace the one-voice 
role, preferring for strategic or political reasons to involve Con-
gress in foreign policy decisions and treaty negotiations.245
 
 240. See, e.g., Julian Borger, Democrats Try to Block Bush’s Man for UN 
Job, GUARDIAN, Apr. 11, 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/ 
12/usa.unitednations; Elisabeth Bumiller & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President 
Sends Bolton to U.N.; Bypasses Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2005/08/02/politics/02bolton.html. 
  
 241. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 988. 
 242. See, e.g., Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, 
§§ 3(a)(3)–(b), 7, 109 Stat. 398, 399–400 (1995) (declaring U.S. policy that “the 
United States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem” and pro-
hibiting the State Department from using certain funds “until the Secretary of 
State . . . reports to Congress that the United States Embassy in Jerusalem 
has officially opened” absent presidential waiver for national security rea-
sons); id. § 2(13)–(14), 109 Stat. at 399 (describing past congressional support 
for “relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem”); Cleveland, supra 
note 1, at 987 (noting successive presidents’ refusal “to honor Congress’ [sic] 
effort to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem”). 
 243. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424, 1431 
(2012). 
 244. See James M. Lindsay & Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences 
Foreign and Defense Policy, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE 
POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17, 18 (Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 
1993); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 34. Steinhardt adds that Su-
preme Court separation of powers case law has undermined the notion “of a 
coherent and self-contained executive branch.” Id. at 35–36. 
 245. See, e.g., BERDAHL, supra note 80, at 33–34 (discussing President 
Jackson’s hesitance to recognize Texas’s independence without support from 
Congress); James M. Lindsay, Congress and Diplomacy, in CONGRESS RESUR-
GENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL, supra note 244, at 
261, 266–68, 271–73 (discussing situations in which the President has con-
sulted with, or included in treaty negotiations, members of Congress); Peter 
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B. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE  
1. Separation of Powers 
Supreme Court practice has also diverged from the one-
voice doctrine. Even as it continues to employ the doctrine, the 
Court recognizes the shared nature of federal foreign affairs 
power.246
 
Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in 
Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/ 
middleeast/syria.html (noting President Obama’s decision to seek congression-
al support for missile strikes on Syria). 
 In Zschernig the Court struck a state statute as “an 
 246. For additional opinions recognizing that federal foreign affairs author-
ity is shared, see, for example, Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1441 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (“The Executive and Legislative Branches frequently work out disa-
greements through ongoing contacts and relationships . . . [which] ensure that, 
in practice, Members of Congress as well as the President play an important 
role in the shaping of foreign policy.”); American Insurance Ass’n v. Gara-
mendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414, 424 n.14, 427 (2003) (emphasizing the President’s 
independent foreign affairs power, while also recognizing, among other things, 
that “Congress holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings 
with other nations in its war and foreign commerce powers”); Zadvydas v. Da-
vis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) (recognizing “Executive Branch primacy in for-
eign policy matters” while asserting a role for judicial review of executive alien 
detention decisions); Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
374–76, 381 (2000) (invoking Justice Jackson’s framework and recognizing the 
strength of the President’s authority in light of a statute delegating authority 
to the President); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 
327 (1994) (noting that the nuances of U.S. foreign policy “are much more the 
province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of [the Supreme] Court” 
(quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983))); 
Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 85 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional power over foreign affairs is 
shared by Congress and the President . . . .”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 662, 668–88 (1981) (noting “the never-ending tension between the 
President exercising the executive authority . . . and the Constitution . . . 
which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances,” 
and ultimately upholding the constitutionality of presidential acts pursuant to 
an executive agreement in light of congressional support for the acts); Goldwa-
ter v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004–05 n.1 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“Congress has a variety of powerful tools for influencing for-
eign policy decisions that bear on treaty matters. . . . [and] thus retains a 
strong influence over the President’s conduct in treaty matters.” (quoting 
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, C.J., concur-
ring in the result))); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 
427–28 (1964) (noting that “[t]he act of state doctrine [has] ‘constitutional’ un-
derpinnings” and that the doctrine’s “continuing vitality depends on its capaci-
ty to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and polit-
ical branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs”); id. 
at 461–62 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that while “political matters in the 
realm of foreign affairs are within the exclusive domain of the Executive 
Branch . . . . this is far from saying that the Constitution vests in the executive 
exclusive absolute control of foreign affairs” to the exclusion of the judiciary); 
  
2014] BEYOND ONE VOICE 1003 
 
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the 
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”247 
More systematically, in evaluating the constitutionality of “ex-
ecutive action in [foreign affairs],” the Court applies “the ac-
cepted framework” provided by “Justice Jackson’s familiar tri-
partite scheme.”248 That scheme, which originated in Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer,249 builds on the principle that “[p]residential powers are not 
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or con-
junction with those of Congress.”250
 
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 
103, 109, 111 (1948) (describing the President “as the Nation’s organ for for-
eign affairs” while recognizing that Congress possesses “power over foreign 
commerce” and that foreign policy “decisions are wholly confided by our Con-
stitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legis-
lative”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–74 (1941) (recognizing that “reg-
ulation of aliens” is an issue of foreign relations that both Congress and 
federal treatymakers can address); and Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 
297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of [foreign affairs] is committed by the Constitu-
tion to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Gov-
ernment . . . .”). 
 “When the President acts” 
 247. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (emphasis added); see 
also id. at 436 (“[T]he Constitution entrusts [foreign affairs and international 
relations] solely to the Federal Government . . . .”); id. at 438 (noting that for-
eign policy positions and conditions “are matters for the Federal Government, 
not for local probate courts”). 
 248. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008); see also Dames & Moore, 
453 U.S. at 661 (describing Justice Jackson’s concurrence as “bring[ing] to-
gether as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this 
area”). 
 249. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 250. Id. at 635. The other opinions in Youngstown likewise emphasized 
Congress’s power in deciding the constitutionality of the President’s actions. 
See id. at 585–89 (majority opinion) (asserting that “[t]he President’s power [to 
seize domestic steel mills threatened with closure by a labor dispute] must 
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,” and con-
cluding that Congress had rejected a presidential seizure power and that the 
Constitution assigned the legislative power to Congress); id. at 597–614 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (agreeing that the President’s seizure was unlaw-
ful where Congress had rejected rather than approved or acquiesced in a pres-
idential seizure power); id. at 630–33 (Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding 
that the President’s seizure was an exercise of legislative power entrusted to 
Congress); id. at 655–60 (Burton, J., concurring) (explaining that “[t]he validi-
ty of the President’s [action] turns upon its relation to the constitutional divi-
sion of governmental power between Congress and the President,” and con-
cluding that the President acted unconstitutionally where “Congress, within 
its constitutionally delegated power, . . . prescribed for the President specific 
procedures . . . . [and] reserved to itself” whether to take the action the Presi-
dent unilaterally elected); id. at 662–66 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(concluding that the President acted illegally in failing to follow the “specific 
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with congressional approval, “his authority is at its maximum, 
for it includes all that he possesses . . . plus all that Congress 
can delegate.”251 When the President contravenes Congress’s 
will, “his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only 
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.”252 When Congress is si-
lent, the President must “rely upon his own independent pow-
ers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain” such that the President’s actions may or may not be 
constitutional.253 This framework not only recognizes that for-
eign affairs authority is shared between the President and 
Congress, but recognizes a role for the courts in deciding how 
that authority is shared.254
The framework is foundational in foreign affairs jurispru-
dence and has provided the controlling analysis in recent for-
eign affairs cases, including war on terror cases.
 
255 In Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, in which the Court assessed the President’s ability to 
detain “a United States citizen on United States soil as an ‘en-
emy combatant,’”256
 
procedures [Congress had dictated] to deal with the type of crisis” at issue); id. 
at 672, 683, 700–04, 708–10 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the Pres-
ident acted constitutionally because the seizure served “to preserve legislative 
programs [for military procurement and wage stabilization] from destruction 
until Congress could act”). 
 the plurality and Justice Thomas both up-
held the detention after concluding that Congress, through the 
The Court in Dames & Moore acknowledged the tension between Youngs-
town’s limitation of presidential power and Curtiss-Wright’s emphasis on pres-
idential primacy. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661–62. See generally Unit-
ed States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 251. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jack-
son suggests (a) that Curtiss-Wright’s perspective on presidential power was 
so broad because the case involved a situation where the President acted pur-
suant to congressional authorization (and thereby “personif[ied] the federal 
sovereignty”), and (b) that Curtiss-Wright is precedent only for such cases. See 
id. at 635–36 & n.2, 638. 
 252. Id. at 637. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 
CONST. COMMENT. 87, 110–13 (2002) (discussing Youngstown’s import for ju-
dicial review of actions of the political branches). 
 255. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 621–22. 
But cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s 
Shadow, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29, 35–37 (2008) (arguing that the Court in 
Medellín and Hamdan “invoked Justice Jackson’s framework, even while ap-
pearing to deviate from it”). 
 256. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 516. 
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Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), had author-
ized the President to detain.257 Justice Souter, on the other 
hand, found that the AUMF did not satisfy an earlier statute 
that prohibited the detention of U.S. citizens in the absence of 
congressional authorization.258 Notwithstanding their divergent 
conclusions, the opinions consistently looked to both the Presi-
dent and Congress to assess the legality of the President’s de-
tention of a U.S. citizen. The Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
likewise looked to congressional action to determine the consti-
tutionality of a presidential plan to use military commissions to 
try war-on-terror detainees.259 The Court rejected the plan be-
cause Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohib-
ited the President’s resort to military commissions.260 As Jus-
tice Breyer highlighted in his concurring opinion, “[t]he Court’s 
conclusion ultimately rest[ed] upon a single ground: Congress 
ha[d] not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”261 Instead, 
“Congress ha[d] denied the President the legislative authority 
to create military commissions of the kind at issue.”262
As this case law demonstrates, the President does not 
stand alone in foreign affairs. Foreign affairs power is shared 
with Congress. There is obvious tension, however, between the-
 
 
 257. See id. at 509, 517–19; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). At the same 
time, Justice Thomas disagreed with limitations the plurality placed on “the 
President’s authority to detain enemy combatants.” Id. at 587–88. 
 258. Id. at 541–45, 547–51 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter express-
ly relied on the separation of powers between Congress and the executive in 
reaching this conclusion. Id. at 545. 
 259. See 548 U.S. 557, 593 & n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President 
has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene mili-
tary commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in 
proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.” (citing Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring))); id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court’s conclusion ultimate-
ly rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank 
check.’ Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to 
create military commissions of the kind at issue here.” (citation omitted)); id. 
at 636–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[This] is a case where Congress, in the 
proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government . . . has 
considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President’s 
authority.”); see also id. at 613, 627–28 (majority opinion); id. at 642–43 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, 
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 869, 931–32 (2007). 
 260. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567, 592–95, 613–33; see also id. at 636 
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 636–53 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 261. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 262. Id. 
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se cases and the cases invoking the one-voice doctrine in allo-
cating authority between the political branches. Arguably, the 
tension does not rise to the level of outright conflict because the 
Court relies in part on the one-voice doctrine in cases that also 
recognize a place for Congress in foreign affairs.263 For example, 
despite what it has come to stand for, Curtiss-Wright itself rec-
ognized a foreign affairs role for Congress. Curtiss-Wright con-
cerned the constitutionality of legislative delegation of discre-
tion to the President.264 The Court upheld the statute, noting 
that it was “here dealing not alone with an authority vested in 
the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such 
an authority plus the [independent,] very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations.”265
 
 263. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Marshall’s “sole organ” language to support the President’s primacy in foreign 
affairs, while also acknowledging that “Congress . . . has a substantial and es-
sential role in . . . foreign affairs”); Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 
414 (2003) (reciting language concerning the President’s role “as the Nation’s 
organ in foreign affairs,” while recognizing Congress’s foreign commerce and 
war powers (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 109 (1948))); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62, 668–
88 (1981) (quoting, without overruling, Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” language, 
but also highlighting “[t]he tensions present in any exercise of executive power 
under the [Constitution’s] tripartite system of Federal Government,” recogniz-
ing the paucity and inconsistency of precedents addressing executive power, 
and both noting Youngstown’s preeminence among these precedents and ap-
plying its shared-powers framework); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional 
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766–68 & n.2 (1972) (plurality opinion) (citing both the 
President’s “sole organ” status and constitutional commitment of foreign af-
fairs to the legislative and executive branches on the way to recognizing exec-
utive primacy in foreign relations). 
 Justice 
Sutherland, the author of Curtiss-Wright, in a later case simi-
larly recited precedent holding “that the conduct of foreign rela-
tions was committed by the Constitution to the political de-
partments” and held, more narrowly, that “the Executive had 
authority to speak as the sole organ of that government” with 
 264. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314–15, 
319–20 (1936); see also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (citing 
Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that “[a]lthough there is in the Constitution 
no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective reg-
ulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power 
in the law-making organ of the Nation”), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 
387 U.S. 253, 255–57, 263, 267–68 (1967) (rejecting the congressional power, 
recognized in Perez, to strip someone of U.S. citizenship, without denying an 
implied congressional power to regulate foreign affairs). 
 265. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20. 
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respect to “what was done” in the particular case.266 Moreover, 
the Court has recognized that Congress is the one voice in cer-
tain subject areas, including foreign commerce.267
Nonetheless, the one-voice doctrine suggests, and has been 
used to conclude, that the President possesses an exclusive role 
in foreign affairs.
 
268 One might attempt to harmonize the one-
voice doctrine with the Court’s broader foreign relations juris-
prudence by asserting that the one-voice doctrine only means 
that the President is the sole communicator with foreign states. 
However, the one-voice doctrine has not been so limited.269 The 
conclusion that the President is the one voice has been used to 
justify more than an exclusive authority to communicate. As 
noted above, it has supported authority to set foreign policy.270
The doctrine is likewise hard to square with case law that 
recognizes room for the judiciary in foreign affairs. The courts 
employ a number of doctrines—some generic, some unique to 
foreign relations law—to police judicial involvement in foreign 
affairs. Among the generic doctrines are standing,
 
As a result, it is hard to fully reconcile the doctrine with Su-
preme Court case law recognizing that both political branches 
play a role in foreign affairs. 
271 ripeness,272
 
 266. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328, 330 (1937). 
 
 267. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310, 324, 
329, 331 (1994); cf. Brief Amicus Curiae for Cochise County Sheriff Larry A. 
Dever in Support of Petitioners at 21, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 506637, at *21 (arguing that Congress is 
the nation’s voice regarding immigration). Congress is also often described as 
“the sole organ for levying taxes.” Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United 
States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974). 
 268. BERDAHL, supra note 80, at 25 (“[T]he power of intercourse, inter-
communication, and negotiation . . . . belongs exclusively to the President.”). 
 269. Moreover, even if the one-voice doctrine simply meant that the Presi-
dent was the sole communicator, it would not square with practice in which 
the states and congresspersons engage in missions to foreign countries. See 
supra note 235; infra text accompanying note 320. 
 270. See supra Part I. 
 271. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–24 (1997) (rejecting legis-
lative standing of congresspersons challenging the Line Item Veto Act because 
their votes had not been completely nullified and they did not suffer a personal 
or particularized injury). 
 272. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997–98 (1979) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (voting to dismiss on ripeness grounds the challenge of several 
congresspersons to President Carter’s unilateral termination of a treaty, rea-
soning that for prudential reasons “a dispute between Congress and the Presi-
dent is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken 
action asserting its constitutional authority”). 
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mootness,273 personal jurisdiction,274 forum non conveniens,275 
Chevron deference,276 and political question.277 While in many 
cases these doctrines serve to limit judicial involvement in for-
eign affairs matters, in other cases they do not. Thus, in its 
seminal political question opinion, the Court explained that, 
while there are issues the judiciary will not decide, “it is error 
to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”278 The Court listed a 
variety of issues that fit within judicial cognizance, such as 
whether a treaty preempts particular state laws and whether, 
in the absence of executive clarity, a foreign war exists that 
triggers statutes securing U.S. neutrality.279
 
 273. See, e.g., Weaver v. U.S. Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1431, 1435 n.3 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that a constitutional challenge to a regulation re-
quiring “[e]mployees of the State Department, the United States Information 
Agency[,] . . . and the Agency for International Development . . . to submit [for 
prepublication review] all speaking, writing, and teaching material on matters 
of,” among other things, foreign policy, was not moot where the regulation 
“remain[ed] in force”). 
 The Court’s recent 
opinion in Zivotofsky reaffirmed the judiciary’s role over certain 
 274. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 
102, 115 (1987) (concluding that California’s exercise of jurisdiction over a 
Japanese defendant facing a claim by a Taiwanese corporation would be un-
reasonable, in part due to federal foreign policy concerns). 
 275. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238–40, 246–61 
(1981) (dismissing a suit concerning a plane crash in Scotland in favor of a 
Scottish forum on forum non conveniens grounds). 
 276. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1347–54 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(applying Chevron deference to uphold the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service’s interpretation of an asylum statute in the Elian Gonzalez case). In 
this case, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that Chevron deference is particular-
ly appropriate in cases involving foreign affairs. See id. at 1351, 1353. As a re-
sult, Chevron deference may take on a unique form in the foreign affairs con-
text. 
 277. See, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002–05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (arguing that the challenge of several congresspersons to Presi-
dent Carter’s termination of a treaty presented a political question). 
 278. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1432 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring 
in part) (“A court may not refuse to adjudicate a dispute merely because a de-
cision ‘may’ . . . affect ‘the conduct of this Nation’s foreign relations . . . .’” 
(quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986))); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (not-
ing that while the Constitution commits foreign affairs to the political branch-
es, it does not prohibit the judiciary from hearing any case “which touches for-
eign relations,” and in particular “does not irrevocably remove from the 
judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state” (quoting 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 211)). 
 279. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212–13. 
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foreign affairs issues280 and may signal a retreat from the polit-
ical question doctrine in foreign affairs. As discussed previous-
ly, the question presented was whether Congress could statuto-
rily require the executive to list Israel on the passport of 
someone born in Jerusalem notwithstanding the President’s 
“power to recognize foreign sovereigns”281 and the State De-
partment’s “longstanding policy of not taking a position on the 
political status of Jerusalem.”282 The Court rejected the lower 
courts’ dismissal of the case on political question grounds.283 
The judiciary could properly resolve the question.284 Just as the 
Court found room for the judiciary in deciding the separation of 
powers question in Zivotofsky, the Court has asserted a role in 
policing state action even when the executive is unconcerned 
about that action.285
Other foreign affairs doctrines similarly calibrate, rather 
than eliminate, the judiciary’s involvement in foreign affairs.
  
286 
Under the act of state doctrine, U.S. courts “will generally re-
frain from . . . sitting in judgment on . . . acts of a governmental 
character done by a foreign state within its own territory and 
applicable there.”287
 
 280. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1428. 
 However, if there is clear international law 
that governs the foreign state’s conduct or if the concerns moti-
vating the doctrine are not implicated even though the doctrine 
technically applies, courts will disregard the doctrine and inde-
 281. Id. at 1426.  
 282. Id. at 1424. 
 283. Id. at 1424–27; see also id. at 1434–35 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
part) (same); id. at 1436–37 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). 
 284. See id. at 1425, 1427–30 (majority opinion); id. at 1434–35 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part); id. at 1436–37 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Justice Powell reached a similar conclusion in Goldwater v. Carter, 
which involved a challenge by members of Congress to the President’s termi-
nation of a treaty with Taiwan. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997, 
999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). In his view, “the question 
presented . . . concern[ed] only the constitutional division of power between 
Congress and the President,” a question that could be resolved using “normal 
principles of [constitutional] interpretation” and thus did not present a politi-
cal question. Id. at 999; see also id. at 1001–02. 
 285. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1620–21 (noting, while opposing, 
“[t]he orthodox view . . . that judge-made federal foreign relations law consti-
tutes [the nation’s voice to the preemption of state law] until the federal politi-
cal branches say otherwise”); supra text accompanying note 51. 
 286. See Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 23–26 (identifying judicial 
actions that bear on foreign affairs). 
 287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 443(1) (1987). 
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pendently assess the legality of the foreign sovereign’s acts.288 
Similarly, courts exercise ultimate discretion to decide whether 
to apply the act of state doctrine when the executive has repre-
sented that the doctrine need not apply.289 Under principles of 
international comity, courts may abstain from exercising juris-
diction in cases involving the executive, legislative, or judicial 
acts of foreign states.290 Pursuant to jurisdiction provided by the 
Alien Tort Statute, federal courts hear limited claims based on 
customary international law.291
 
 288. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 
409 (1990) (reiterating the Court’s prior suggestion “that the policies underly-
ing the act of state doctrine should be considered in deciding whether, despite 
the doctrine’s technical availability, it should nonetheless not be invoked”); 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“[T]he greater 
the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of interna-
tional law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions re-
garding it . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 443 (1987) (indicating that the act of state doctrine does 
not apply in the face of “a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding 
controlling legal principles”); id. § 443, cmt. b (noting the argument “that the 
doctrine was not intended to preclude review of an act of a foreign state chal-
lenged under principles of international law not in dispute,” but recognizing 
that “no such case had been decided” prior to the Restatement); id. § 443, rep. 
note 5 (discussing “the treaty exception to the act of state doctrine”). Four Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court have also advocated a commercial activity excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine. See id. § 443, rep. note 6 (citing Alfred Dunhill 
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 Invoking the Charming Betsy 
 289. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 
772–73 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result); id. at 773 (Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 776–78, 780–93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the notion that the act of state doctrine would not apply if the execu-
tive indicated that it need not, and noting that the four dissenting and two 
concurring Justices endorse that rejection); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443, rep. note 8 (1987). 
 290. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–99 & 
n.24 (1993) (suggesting, without deciding, that a court might be able to ab-
stain from exercising jurisdiction based on international comity, but indicating 
that the circumstances in which that would be appropriate are narrow); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 101, cmt. e (1987) (“Comity, in the legal sense . . . . is the recognition which 
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and con-
venience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under 
the protection of its laws.” (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 
(1895))). 
 291. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25, 732 (2004) (recog-
nizing some federal court authority to hear claims based on customary inter-
national law norms that are as well defined and widely accepted as the norms 
Congress contemplated in enacting the Alien Tort Statute); see also David H. 
Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
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canon, courts work to interpret federal statutes to avoid infrac-
tions of international law unless Congress has manifested in-
tent to violate.292 Similarly, in applying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, courts interpret federal statutes to 
apply only domestically absent clear evidence of congressional 
intent to the contrary.293 And under the range of deference giv-
en to the executive in the realm of foreign affairs, courts give 
more or less weight to the executive’s position in foreign affairs 
cases.294 The result is that while the courts recognize limits to 
their participation in foreign affairs matters,295
The room left for the judiciary results in disagreements be-
tween the political branches and the courts.
 those limits fall 
well short of outright exclusion. Many doctrines recognize a 
role for the judiciary in foreign relations. 
296 Even recently, 
the Court has rejected foreign relations–related positions taken 
by both the President and Congress. For example, in 
Zivotofsky, the Court rejected the executive’s claim that a chal-
lenge to the executive’s refusal to follow a statute endorsing Je-
rusalem as the capital of Israel presented a political question.297
 
1, 38–39 (2006) [hereinafter Moore, Emerging Uniformity] (discussing the 
same); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 
 
In Medellín v. Texas, the Court concluded that the President 
lacked unilateral authority to execute an otherwise non-self-
5, at 24–25 (identifying ways in 
which Alien Tort Statute litigation might harm U.S. foreign affairs and violate 
the one-voice rationale). 
 292. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 
(2010) (noting that the Charming Betsy canon is “a presumption about a stat-
ute’s meaning, rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate”); Hart-
ford, 509 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitu-
tional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed [under the 
Charming Betsy canon] not to have exceeded . . . customary international-law 
limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”). 
 293. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78, 2881–83. 
 294. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW 116–29 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing and illustrating the degree of 
deference courts give the executive on varying foreign relations matters); 
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic 
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1192–93 & n.375 (1990) [here-
inafter Steinhardt, Canon] (noting that cases rejecting the executive’s inter-
pretation of treaties depart from the one-voice rationale).  
 295. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412 
(1964) (“The courts[’] . . . powers to further the national interest in foreign af-
fairs are necessarily circumscribed as compared with those of the political 
branches . . . .”). 
 296. See Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 36–38, 42–43 (noting ex-
amples of disagreement between the courts and political branches). 
 297. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–25 
(2012). 
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executing International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment.298 And 
in Boumediene, the Court concluded that Congress had uncon-
stitutionally attempted to deny the writ of habeas corpus to de-
tainees at Guantánamo.299
2. Federalism 
 In its separation of powers dimen-
sions, then, the one-voice doctrine contends with a practice that 
involves multiple federal players.  
Just as Supreme Court practice recognizes foreign affairs 
authority beyond the President in Congress and the courts, 
Court precedent leaves room for state action bearing on foreign 
affairs.300 The Court has made room for such action, in part, by 
increasingly leaving preemption decisions to the political 
branches.301
 
 298. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499–500 (2008). 
 In 1979, the Court struck a California property tax 
 299. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008). 
 300. Cf. Bradley, supra note 5, at 447 (“[T]he Court’s one-voice statements 
have always been broader than the Court’s actual decisions, which have not in 
fact allowed the federal government unfettered power in foreign affairs.”). 
 301. Compare Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 
456–57 (1979), with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 
330–31 (1994) (evidencing a trend away from dormant preemption in foreign 
commerce arena); compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1968), 
with Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428–29 (2003) (evidencing a 
trend away from dormant preemption in foreign affairs preemption arena); 
compare Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941), with Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (arguably evidencing a trend 
away from dormant preemption in statutory preemption arena). The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), 
might be read as interrupting the trend away from dormant preemption in the 
statutory preemption context. In the historic Hines case, the Court stated in 
deciding whether state “law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes . . . of Congress,” that “it is of importance that 
[the state] legislation is in a field which affects international relations, the one 
aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded 
imperatively to demand broad national authority.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67–68. 
In other words, obstacle preemption analysis in the area of foreign affairs was 
stacked against the state with a dormant component. In Crosby, by contrast, 
the Court expressly declined to comment on dormant preemption, relying in-
stead on the conclusion that a state purchasing law designed to promote hu-
man rights in Burma stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the similar 
goals of a federal statute. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371, 372–86 & n.8. But cf. 
BARRY R. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2007) (noting widely 
divergent interpretations of Crosby, including interpretations that read Crosby 
as essentially a case of dormant preemption). In Arizona, the Court cited 
Hines in emphasizing immigration policy’s connection to the nation’s foreign 
affairs and foreign standing. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–99. Moreover, as to 
one of the three state law provisions the Court found preempted, the Court 
noted that “decisions of [the type addressed by the state provision (that is, re-
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because it interfered with a generic need for federal uniformity 
in regulating foreign commerce.302 This same need was coupled 
with executive branch and foreign opposition in the 1994 Bar-
clays Bank suit,303 but the Court upheld the California tax 
scheme in Barclays Bank on the ground that Congress has the 
power to regulate foreign commerce and Congress had demon-
strated a “willingness to tolerate” California’s methodology.304 
Since it is arguably more difficult for the political branches to 
create preemptive statutes, international agreements, or even 
policies than it is for the judiciary to preempt state action on 
dormant constitutional grounds, the trend toward political 
preemption leaves more space for the states to engage in for-
eign affairs–related behavior.305
In addition to expecting more involvement from the politi-
cal branches in preemption matters, the Court has resisted the 
immediate judicial enforcement of the primary sources of inter-
national law—treaties and customary international law
 
306
 
movability decisions)] touch on foreign relations and must be made with one 
voice.” Id. at 2506–07. While this point appears to be cumulative rather than 
dispositive in the Court’s obstacle preemption analysis, it arguably partakes of 
dormant preemption in a way that parallels Hines more closely than Crosby. 
For additional discussion of the trend away from dormant preemption, see, for 
example, Bradley, supra note 
—
absent congressional execution or incorporation of these 
5, at 447–48; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 983; 
Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 624. 
 302. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448–54 (repeatedly referencing the need 
for national uniformity). Halberstam reads Japan Line differently, and con-
sistent with Barclays Bank, by emphasizing the Court’s reliance, not on the 
general need for uniformity, but on a national policy to preempt California’s 
law. See Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1063–66. 
 303. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 302–03, 311, 320–31 (referencing the 
need for national uniformity); id. at 328–30 & n.30 (noting executive branch 
opposition); id. at 320, 324 & n.22, 328 (noting foreign opposition). But cf. su-
pra note 46. 
 304. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 327; see id. at 303, 324, 326–27, 329–31; 
see also Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9–13 (1986) 
(upholding state taxation because “the Foreign Commerce Clause [does not] 
insist[] that the Federal Government speak with any particular voice” and the 
federal government had adopted a policy permitting state taxation). As recog-
nized by the Court in Crosby, Barclays Bank stands for the proposition that 
Congress can exercise its authority in ways inconsistent with executive or for-
eign preferences. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 385 
(2000). 
 305. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 624. 
 306. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (identifying sources of international law); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
(1987) (same). 
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sources.307 The Court in Medellín308 endorsed a broad notion of 
non-self-execution that will render more treaties non-self-
executing.309 Such treaties do not preempt state law until exe-
cuted through legislation, preserving state law unless and until 
such legislation is passed.310 Similarly, in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain311 the Court suggested that federal courts may enforce 
customary international law to preempt state law only when 
authorized to do so by the Constitution or Congress.312
C. STATE PRACTICE 
 These 
cases reduce preemption of state laws affecting foreign rela-
tions. Thus, even as constitutional text, structure, and history 
provide significant (though not complete) support for the one-
voice doctrine in its federalist dimension, Supreme Court prac-
tice leaves room for state actions affecting foreign affairs. 
Not only do states possess significant leeway to affect for-
eign affairs as a matter of doctrine, but state (and other local) 
practice includes a wide range of behaviors that impact foreign 
relations, often with federal acquiescence or encouragement.313
 
 307. See Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 
 
181, at 624–25 
(discussing a trend away from direct judicial enforcement of international 
law). 
 308. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). Medellín considered whether a 
judgment of the International Court of Justice was judicially enforceable fed-
eral law. See id. at 498–99. The Court concluded that it was not. See id. 
 309. See David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: 
Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 
2264–65, 2286–89 (2010) [hereinafter Moore, Equivalence]; David H. Moore, 
Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status of International 
Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 490–91 (2010). 
 310. Then, technically, “it is the implementing legislation, rather than the 
agreement itself, that is given effect as [U.S.] law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, cmt. h (1987). 
 311. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 312. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 259, at 873, 892, 902–09, 
935–36 (arguing that following Sosa, customary international law becomes en-
forceable federal law on constitutional or congressional authorization); Moore, 
Emerging Uniformity, supra note 291, at 1, 8, 31–37, 48–49 (arguing that un-
der Sosa, customary international law is enforceable by federal courts when 
the political branches so authorize). 
 313. Many scholars have documented this phenomenon. See, e.g., Richard 
B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 
821, 821–22, 826–27 (1989) (identifying foreign relations activities in which 
states participate); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 991–1006 (discussing historical 
and current state involvement in foreign affairs and federal response to the 
same); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1634–39, 1674–78 (discussing state ac-
tions bearing on foreign affairs and federal acceptance of such actions); 
Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1027–47 (canvassing a range of state activities 
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In the arena of international economic policy, the federal gov-
ernment has been particularly inclusive of states—keeping 
states informed, soliciting their advice, and including them in 
international negotiation and dispute resolution—and has done 
so not just informally but through statutory or other formal 
mechanisms.314 States have been influential in affecting federal 
policy in this arena.315 States also affect foreign affairs outside 
the federal framework. To cite but a few examples, states some-
times go further than the federal government in trying to 
achieve international goals, such as decreasing greenhouse gas 
emissions.316 States adopt laws or resolutions implementing in-
ternational law or taking positions on foreign policy issues on 
the one hand,317 and commit their own international law viola-
tions on the other.318
 
bearing on foreign affairs, some of which have been embraced by the federal 
government); Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 
 States enact “Buy American” statutes re-
quiring use of domestic over foreign products, and at the same 
time adopt procurement and divestment laws designed to 
117, at 374–75 
(“[T]he category of state laws having some potential effect upon foreign policy 
is unmanageably broad.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1130–34 (noting that “the 
orthodoxy of a federal monopoly[ over foreign affairs] . . . never really existed” 
as “[s]tates have always had an effect on U.S. foreign relations”); Young, supra 
note 9, at 415–23 (2002) (dismissing the assertion that states do not exist in 
foreign affairs as silly and excessively formal in light of states’ current and in-
creasing relevance in foreign affairs); cf. Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 922–25, 930–32 (2006) (discussing cities’ in-
volvement in international relations). But cf. Spiro, Federalism, supra note 
105, at 1258 (rejecting the “suggestion that state-level activity may now be 
unproblematic because in some cases Congress may ‘agree’ with it”).  
 314. See Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1040–44 & nn.143, 153. The federal 
government has also included states “in the negotiation of international wild-
life treaties” given the states’ “superior knowledge of implementation issues.” 
Id. at 1046 n.163. 
 315. See id. at 1040–41 & n.136, 1046. 
 316. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 9, at 500–01 (noting state adoption of uniform 
laws that implement provisions of treaties the United States has not ratified); 
Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism 
and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 
EMORY L.J. 31, 34–35, 60–62 (2007) (discussing the role of state and local offi-
cials in incorporating international norms, including norms of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol); Felicity Barringer & Kate Galbraith, States Aim to Cut Gases by Mak-
ing Polluters Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A17 (discussing several 
states’ actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases notwithstanding feder-
al failure to pursue such efforts).  
 317. See Bilder, supra note 313, at 822, 826–27; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 
993 & n.125; Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1033 & nn.97–98, 1039 n.130; Ku, 
supra note 9, at 461, 463, 481–85, 490; Resnik, supra note 316, at 45–51, 56–
62. 
 318. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 998–1001. 
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achieve foreign policy goals like the historic dismantling of 
apartheid.319 Alone and in combination with each other and 
with foreign entities, states work to attract foreign trade and 
investment through incentives, missions, and foreign offices.320 
They likewise engage in cultural and educational exchanges.321 
State courts hear cases involving foreign states, foreign offi-
cials, and international law.322 And states apply their laws, in-
cluding their capital punishment law, to foreign or even U.S. 
nationals with international repercussions.323
 
 319. See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 
1990) (upholding a Pennsylvania Buy American statute); Cleveland, supra 
note 
 Thus, notwith-
standing the arguably strong footing of the federalist dimension 
of the one-voice doctrine, it remains inconsistent, at least at the 
1, at 995–98 (discussing state spending efforts motivated by foreign poli-
cy, including Buy American laws); Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1033 & n.98, 
1039 n.130 (noting procurement and divestment efforts aimed at Burma and 
Northern Ireland as well as Buy American laws); Elizabeth Trachy, Comment, 
State & Local Economic Sanctions: The Constitutionality of New York’s Di-
vestment Actions and the Sudan Accountability & Divestment Act of 2007, 74 
ALB. L. REV. 1019, 1019–22, 1030–32, 1038–40 (2011) (describing state di-
vestment efforts motivated by foreign affairs concerns). 
 320. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 313, at 822, 826; Cleveland, supra note 1, 
at 994; Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1674 & n.230; Halberstam, supra note 18, 
at 1028–32 & nn.73–74; Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1248–49; Nick 
Miroff & William Booth, Middle-class Mexicans Snap Up More Products ‘Made 
in the USA’, WASH. POST, Sept. 9. 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/the_americas/middle-class-mexicans-snap-up-more-products-made-in 
-usa/2012/09/09/27c9d1b4-f212-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html (noting a 
trade mission of the Colorado governor to Mexico and lucrative exports to Mex-
ico from U.S. states); see also Swaine, supra note 8, at 1239 (noting that 
“states have competed for overseas business since they were colonies”). 
Halberstam identifies “international economic development . . . [as] perhaps 
the most significant area of state foreign policy activity.” Halberstam, supra 
note 18, at 1028. 
 321. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 313, at 822, 826; Halberstam, supra note 
18, at 1032–33. These exchanges include sister-city relationships that have at 
times “preceded formal diplomatic ties at the national level” and have brought 
“into focus human rights and social justice issues otherwise neglected at the 
federal level.” Id. at 1032–33 & nn.92–93. 
 322. Cleveland, supra note 1, at 993. Indeed, Professor Ku asserts that 
state courts (and other bodies) have played a significant role in developing 
principles of international law. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 9, at 461 & n.13, 476–
81, 484, 486. 
 323. See Bilder, supra note 313, at 826; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 991–92, 
999–1000; Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1634–36, 1672–73; Ku, supra note 9, 
at 491; Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1251–52 & n.130, 1264. 
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margins, with the Constitution and, more deeply, with prece-
dent and practice.324
VIII.  THE ONE-VOICE DOCTRINE’S FUNCTIONAL 
FAILINGS   
  
The one-voice doctrine likewise rests on functional pre-
sumptions that are faulty or incomplete. In identifying this fail-
ing, the goal is not to prove that functional arguments invaria-
bly favor the designation of another player or multiple players 
to exercise the nation’s voice—undoubtedly, there remains val-
ue, for example, in preventing state action that shifts foreign 
affairs costs to the nation as a whole—but to identify signifi-
cant cracks in the one-voice doctrine’s functional footing in both 
its federalist and separation of powers dimensions. 
A. ALONG THE FEDERALIST DIMENSION 
The one-voice doctrine in its federalist dimension main-
tains that “[o]ur system of government is such that the interest 
of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the 
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal 
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free 
from local interference.”325 This reasoning is most compelling in 
the traditional areas of foreign affairs: military matters and 
“diplomatic issues” such as treaty making.326 As foreign rela-
tions has expanded to include new issues and actors and global-
ization has eroded the distinction between foreign and domes-
tic, state “interest in the regulation of foreign relations” has 
justifiably increased.327 The imperative that federal foreign au-
thority remain “free from [local] interference”328 has correspond-
ingly softened.329
 
 324. But cf. Swaine, supra note 
 
8, at 1237 (characterizing as “overstated” 
the notion that “[t]he federal government has . . . yielded its international role 
to the states”). 
 325. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); see also Zschernig v. Mil-
ler, 389 U.S. 429, 442–43 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting same). 
 326. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1670; cf. Ku, supra note 9, at 527–28 (as-
serting that “the states have more often than not been responsible for fulfilling 
. . . international obligations” that “intersect[] directly with areas of traditional 
state control” and that federalist and separation of powers values may out-
weigh the interest in national responsibility for insignificant international ob-
ligations). 
 327. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671–78. 
 328. Id. at 1620.  
 329. See id. at 1677. With regard to international obligations that are not 
particularly significant, allowance of state participation may have always been 
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The imperative derives in part330 from the presumption 
that if a state takes action in foreign affairs, the results will be 
detrimental,331 and not just for the state but for the United 
States as a whole.332
 
high. See Ku, supra note 
 This presumption falters on several 
9, at 527–28. 
 330. See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1237 (noting that “[t]he exclusive federal 
authority to control foreign relations was premised on several simple proposi-
tions,” including the principle that “multiple entreaties robbed the nation of 
the uniformity, credibility, and critical bargaining mass necessary to achieve 
advantageous treaties and stave off adverse actions,” that “separate state ac-
tion risked retaliation against the nation as a whole,” and that “uniformity 
would enhance national pride and dignity, thus indirectly assisting in foreign 
relations, and serve as a bulwark against internal collapse due to conflicting 
interests”). 
 331. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 578 (1840) (plural-
ity opinion) (noting that differing state approaches to extradition “would not 
be well calculated to preserve respect abroad or union at home”); Bilder, supra 
note 313, at 827 (noting the argument that the “achievement of U.S. foreign 
[policy] requires that other nations perceive our foreign policy as unified and 
coherent” and that state involvement in foreign affairs “may undermine the 
conduct of U.S. foreign relations and the credibility of our negotiating posture 
by conveying the appearance of disagreement, confusion, uncertainty and 
weakness in our Government’s stated foreign policy positions”). 
 332. As the Court reasoned in Chy Lung: 
[If an international claim resulting from California law be made on 
the United States, u]pon whom would such a claim be made? Not up-
on the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no 
exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the gov-
ernment of the United States. If that government should get into a 
difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, 
would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If we should conclude 
that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the inju-
ry, would California pay it, or the Federal government? If that gov-
ernment has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any for-
eign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of 
these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for 
this, done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to 
pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable 
to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit 
to the States the acts for which it is held responsible? 
  The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument. 
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875). Many cases repeat this 
theme. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (noting 
that “[i]mmigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomat-
ic relations for the entire Nation”); Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 
477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (explaining that a presumption in favor of uniformity pre-
vails in foreign commerce cases where “the Federal Government has remained 
silent” in order to “ensur[e] that the conduct of individual States does not work 
to the detriment of the Nation as a whole”); id. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (decrying state action that might interfere with the achievement of feder-
al international tax policy by triggering retaliation that will be suffered by the 
broader nation); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 
(1983) (noting, in assessing whether a California tax “violate[d] the ‘one voice’ 
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grounds. First, as Judith Resnik has observed, “[d]espite the 
ideology of each state acting alone . . . the practice is increas-
ingly coordinated.”333 Externalities felt by the nation as a whole 
due to acts taken by many states may be less troubling than ex-
ternalities produced by a single state. Second, as Peter Spiro 
has argued, the emergence of sub-state actors in foreign affairs 
who are “dependent on the global economy”334 has created a 
world in which foreign countries can identify and target the 
U.S. state that is the source of a foreign affairs offense, rather 
than target the United States as a whole.335 Moreover, if “undif-
ferentiated retaliation” occurs in a post-Cold War world, it is 
likely to be less severe than in prior times.336
 
standard,” that “a state tax . . . [risks] offending our foreign trading partners 
and leading them to retaliate against the Nation as a whole”); Japan Line, 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449–50 & n.16, 453 (1979) (quot-
ing Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942) 
(“If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences 
might ensue[; t]he nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State created 
difficulties with a foreign power.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63–64 
(1941) (quoting Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279); see also Halberstam, supra note 
 The reduced risk 
18, 
at 1021–27 (documenting this theme in the Supreme Court’s foreign affairs 
jurisprudence). 
 333. Resnik, supra note 316, at 42. 
 334. Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1261. 
 335. See e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Consti-
tution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 692–94 & nn.170–71 (2002); Spiro, Federalism, 
supra note 105, at 1224–26, 1259–70, 1275. But cf. Goldsmith, supra note 12, 
at 1679 n.253 (noting that the two examples of offending state polices cited by 
Spiro produced “national as well as local protests” and acknowledging Spiro’s 
concession that such examples are “a slim basis on which to discern a trend” 
(quoting Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-
Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 166 (1994))); Ramsey, Original Under-
standing, supra note 117, at 372–73 (stating that “it remains difficult to build 
an affirmative case for state interference in foreign policy” on Spiro’s asser-
tion); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1240–42 (questioning the prevalence “of ‘target-
ed retaliation,’” noting, for example, that even when countries target offending 
states, they also pressure the national government). This disaggregation of the 
state may also have separation of powers implications. First, Jean Galbraith 
argues that designation of the President as sole organ derives in part from in-
ternational law’s “need for a single representative” of each nation. See Gal-
braith, supra note 69, at 1012–15 & n.62. As international law looks less for a 
single representative, the President’s claim as sole organ likewise weakens. 
See id. at 1043–44 & n.169. Second, Robert Knowles asserts that, as “Ameri-
ca’s current structure of government has existed for” more than two hundred 
years, foreign officials ought to understand that the federal branches may 
reach different conclusions. Knowles, supra note 9, at 132. See also id. at 151. 
 336. See Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1226, 1242, 1246–47, 1258–
59. 
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of retaliation against the United States as a whole reduces the 
need to ensure federal exclusivity in foreign affairs.337
Third, state action does not inevitably produce detrimental 
effects.
  
338 It can produce the opposite result as well, and not just 
for the individual state. State action may improve the standing 
of the whole United States in international affairs. Consider 
the potential foreign relations effects of some of the state prac-
tices described above.339 State exchange and similar programs 
can foster friendly relations.340 State efforts to attract foreign 
business and investment, which may be more effective than 
federal efforts to do so, can strengthen the U.S. economy.341
States can also serve U.S. interests by furthering, or influ-
encing, U.S. foreign policy for the better.
 
342 For example, state 
procurement or divestiture measures targeting foreign regimes 
or human rights practices may secure beneficial results until 
Congress enacts a federal scheme, which may or may not re-
place the state regimes.343 State efforts may even spur enact-
ment of federal schemes or other federal responses.344
 
 337. See id. at 1226 (“In the new model, there is no justification for the 
courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in the face of con-
trary state-level preferences.”). 
 Alterna-
tively, the federal government may wish to rely solely, and 
 338. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1677–78 (briefly noting ways in 
which state involvement in modern foreign affairs can benefit the United 
States); Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1016–17, 1027–47 (developing the 
theme that state foreign affairs activity can benefit the United States). 
 339. See supra Part VII.C. 
 340. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra note 320 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith, supra 
note 12, at 1676–78; Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1031. 
 342. This, of course, assumes that actions that might benefit the United 
States are not defined exclusively by actions the federal government is willing 
to take. 
 343. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387 & nn.25–
26 (2000); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 995–98, 1001–02, 1010–12, 1014; Gold-
smith, supra note 12, at 1677. 
 344. See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 995 (describing state responses to 
apartheid that “mobilize[d] U.S. support for sanctions against South Africa”); 
Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1034–38, 1040 (describing state responses to 
the Arab League boycott, apartheid, and Nazi-era abuses that generated fed-
eral action). Interestingly, sometimes the federal government does not adopt a 
statutory regime but mediates between the states and localities who threaten 
sanctions on the one hand and the foreign entities threatened on the other, as 
has occurred in the context of Holocaust claims. See id. at 1036–37. Whatever 
the form of the federal response, Halberstam argues that the greatest benefit 
of state participation in foreign relations is in “challenging the Nation to ac-
tion.” Id. at 1057. 
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perhaps coyly, on state efforts, thereby achieving foreign rela-
tions goals without taking federal action that might produce a 
more strident response from targeted countries.  
States may also produce international goodwill by taking 
steps to comply with international law norms to which the fed-
eral government has not consented—for example, climate 
change standards.345 States can likewise assist in complying 
with international obligations the United States has assumed, 
including obligations more easily fulfilled at the state level.346 
Indeed, it is not uncommon for the United States to leave as-
pects of treaty compliance to the states.347 Congress has not 
chosen to give the federal judiciary exclusive jurisdiction over 
treaty claims, so treaties may be enforced in state courts.348 
Similarly, the United States ratifies various treaties pursuant 
to reservations,349 understandings, and declarations that main-
tain that compliance with certain obligations—for example, ob-
ligations within areas of traditional state regulation—will be 
carried out by state (or local) governments.350
 
 345. See supra note 
 To illustrate, the 
316 and accompanying text. State compliance with 
such norms may also “contribute to the formation of [CIL].” Ku, supra note 9, 
at 465, 530, 532. 
 346. See Ku, supra note 9, at 528–29 (“[S]tate institutions may be the most 
effective mechanisms for achieving compliance with[, for example,] . . . . obli-
gations to guarantee statutory notice in probate proceedings or exempt[] con-
suls from property taxes.”). 
 347. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374, 378 (1998) (per curiam) 
(concluding that the Virginia governor, but not the Supreme Court, could stay 
an execution in light of an International Court of Justice order requesting 
postponement); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (noting that 
“[f]requently the obligation of a treaty will be dependent on state law” and cit-
ing Prevost v. Greneaux, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1856), a case involving a treaty 
that secured rights to French nationals to the extent permitted by state law); 
Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints 
on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1360–63, 1370–86 (2006) [here-
inafter Hollis, Executive Federalism] (discussing various ways in which the 
federal government leaves treaty compliance to the states); Ku, supra note 9, 
at 486–87, 489–90, 501–04, 506–15, 520–26 (discussing federal reliance on 
states to implement both treaties and CIL). The federal government has sup-
ported state involvement in foreign affairs in other ways as well. See Gold-
smith, supra note 12, at 1674–77. For example, in adopting the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunity Act, Congress generally retained state law as the rule of 
decision in suits against foreign states. See id. at 1675. 
 348. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 993. 
 349. Such reservations may prevent Congress “from passing implementing 
legislation that would override state law” pursuant to the treaty. Ku, supra 
note 9, at 462. 
 350. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 1, at 993, 1003–04 & n.180, 1008–09 
(discussing this practice and citing examples); Hollis, Executive Federalism, 
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United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,351 one of two treaties forming the international 
bill of rights, pursuant to the understanding that the “Cove-
nant [would] be implemented by the Federal Government to the 
extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over 
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and lo-
cal governments.”352 Leaving room for the states may have been 
essential to U.S. ratification of the treaty,353 and makes the 
states critical to the nation’s compliance with its treaty com-
mitments.354
Not only does national treaty compliance sometimes fall to 
the states, but state compliance can be important in resolving 
international problems. For example, the United States faced 
international pressure when the ICJ found that the United 
States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
by failing to notify certain Mexican nationals on death row of 
their Convention rights and ordered the United States to re-
view and reconsider these nationals’ convictions and sentenc-
  
 
supra note 347, at 1378–81 (same). Similarly, in the trade arena, “[t]he federal 
government . . . negotiated for a limitation of the [GATT procurement] code to 
cover only the thirty-seven States that had declared their willingness to par-
ticipate. . . . and negotiated for the inclusion of an annex listing specific pro-
curement decisions exempted even in the case of participating States.” 
Halberstam, supra note 18, at 1042. It is unclear whether, on balance, “con-
cessions to states in recent treaties and implementing legislation outweigh 
parallel incursions into state sovereignty.” See Swaine, supra note 8, at 1237–
38 & n.381. 
 351. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 352. 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992); see also 140 CONG. REC. 14,326 (1994) 
(including a similar federalism understanding in the Senate’s resolution of ad-
vice and consent to ratification of the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195); 136 CONG. REC. 36,192 (1990) (including a similar 
federalism reservation in the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent to rati-
fication of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85). 
 353. Cf. Ku, supra note 9, at 530–32 (asserting that “[b]y leaving much of 
the incorporation, implementation, and execution of international law to the 
states, the federal government can confer the greatest amount of political le-
gitimacy on the new international law,” which addresses “a nation-state’s in-
teractions with its own nationals”).  
 354. See, e.g., BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 294, at 553; Ku, supra 
note 9, at 525–26. For examples of federal reliance on state implementation of 
treaty (and CIL) obligations, even in the absence of a federalism reservation or 
treaty provision, see id. at 491–98, 501–04. 
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es.355 In Medellín, the Supreme Court concluded that neither 
the ICJ judgment nor a presidential memorandum attempting 
to implement it could displace state procedural default laws 
that might stand in the way of the mandated review and recon-
sideration.356 Justice Stevens, though agreeing with the majori-
ty, noted “that sometimes States must shoulder the primary re-
sponsibility for protecting the honor and integrity of the 
Nation” and urged Texas to provide reconsideration notwith-
standing its procedural law.357 While Texas did not respond, 
Oklahoma took steps consistent with that counsel.358 Oklahoma 
courts reviewed the conviction and sentence of a death row in-
mate in light of the Vienna Convention violation he suffered, 
and the Governor independently commuted the inmate’s sen-
tence to life without parole.359 Oklahoma’s actions served to de-
flect foreign affairs problems. Of course, just as states may ef-
fect compliance with U.S. obligations, states may serve as a 
scapegoat for noncompliance as well. The overall point is that 
state action in foreign affairs certainly can,360
B. ALONG THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DIMENSIONS 
 but does not inev-
itably, generate negative consequences that will be suffered by 
the nation as a whole. 
Just as there are functional reasons for allowing states a 
voice in foreign affairs, there are reasons for favoring, at times, 
Congress or a multiplicity of federal voices in foreign affairs. 
The one-voice doctrine assumes that U.S. interests are best 
served through a unitary federal voice in international interac-
tions. As recently summarized by Justice Breyer, “where for-
eign affairs is at issue, the practical need for the United States 
 
 355. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 90, 106(1), 121, 153(4), 153(9) (Mar. 31). 
 356. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008). 
 357. Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 536–37. 
 358. See id. at 537 & n.4. 
 359. See id. at 537 n.4. This example admittedly cuts two ways. On the one 
hand, Texas law enforcement and Texas law generated both the breach of in-
ternational law and the hurdle to enforcement of the ICJ mandate that pro-
duced foreign affairs problems. On the other hand, Oklahoma’s actions 
demonstrate how states can remedy international problems. 
 360. See Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1249–50 (“[T]here continue 
to be instances in which state-level action may undermine the national inter-
est.”). 
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to speak ‘with one voice and ac[t] as one,’ is particularly im-
portant.”361
It is undoubtedly true that in certain circumstances U.S. 
interests are served by a unified position.
 
362 The Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino Court, for example, believed 
that the executive’s diplomatic efforts to address foreign expro-
priations of American citizens’ property could easily be under-
cut by court judgments on the expropriations’ legality.363 Espe-
cially if the expropriating state were a party to the suit, a 
judgment that the expropriation is illegal could offend the 
state;364 a judgment of legality would undercut the executive’s 
claim to the contrary or intentional ambivalence on the ques-
tion.365
 
 361. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1438 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pink, 
315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 Yet, the presence of multiple U.S. voices in foreign rela-
tions can advance U.S. interests as well. 
 362. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 711–12 (2001) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (predicting that the United States will fare worse in repatriation 
negotiations with other countries in light of Court-authorized “judicial orders 
requiring release of removable aliens”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363, 381–82 (2000) (assuming that the President will fare better in 
interacting with other countries if he has broad authority and presents a co-
herent policy); POMEROY, supra note 77, at 447 (asserting that in treaty nego-
tiations “one mind and will must always be more efficient . . . than a large de-
liberative assembly”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 1242–43 (discussing “the 
Framers’ argument that a federal monopoly is necessary in order to maximize 
and apply American bargaining power”); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (noting “the strong sense of the Judicial 
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign 
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals 
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international 
sphere”). 
 363. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430–33. But see id. at 462–68 & nn.25–26 
(White, J., dissenting) (discounting these concerns and noting concerns for un-
dercutting the executive that result from the Court’s approach to the act of 
state doctrine—in particular, its conclusion that lack of clarity in international 
law supports application of the doctrine and that the doctrine is a rule of deci-
sion rather than merely a basis for abstention). 
 364. See id. at 431–32, 437 (majority opinion). 
 365. See id. at 432, 437. Judicial determinations of legality might likewise 
undercut executive efforts to alter international law norms. See id. at 432–33. 
Even judicial uncertainty regarding legality might hamper the executive. Id. 
at 433. Relatedly, judicial doctrines requiring the executive to take a position 
on the appropriateness of judicial resolution of a case could interfere with the 
executive’s diplomatic strategy. Id. at 436. But see id. at 462, 468–72 (White, 
J., dissenting) (rejecting this contention and instead expressing willingness to 
abstain from adjudication, at least temporarily, if the executive so petitions). 
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The participation of other domestic actors may correct 
flaws or excesses in presidential policy.366 Participation may al-
so help to secure U.S. interests. Game theorists and negotiation 
analysts agree that negotiation strength can be increased if the 
negotiator must obtain domestic approval for any proposed 
agreement.367 Such an arrangement produces a two-level 
game.368 In one game the negotiator interacts with the negotia-
tor of the other states; in the other she interacts with the do-
mestic forces that must ratify any agreement formed.369 Under 
these conditions, game theory “predicts that while domestic 
constraints may decrease the likelihood of a mutually satisfac-
tory [and efficient] accord . . . they increase the likelihood that 
any agreement actually achieved will favor the constrained 
side.”370
 
 366. Adler, supra note 
 The President, for example, may be able to secure con-
cessions from other countries on the threat that the Senate or 
68, at 23–24 (“The structure of shared powers in for-
eign relations serves to deter the abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational 
action, and unaccountable behavior.”). 
 367. See Frederick W. Mayer, Managing Domestic Differences in Interna-
tional Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, 46 INT’L 
ORG. 793, 796–805, 809–17 (1992) (employing a negotiation analysis lens); 
Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 437–41, 443–44, 448–50, 452 (1988) (employing a 
game theory lens); see also R.B. Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade 
Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agree-
ment, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 837, 839 (1975) (noting the argument of a U.S. Sena-
tor that encouraging the executive to obtain Senate approval of certain claims 
settlement agreements with other countries “should appreciably strengthen 
the hand of our Government in all such negotiations” (quoting 109 CONG. REC. 
25,149 (1963))). 
 368. See Putnam, supra note 367, at 434; Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., Interna-
tional Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory 
and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission, 26 ENVTL. L. 95, 108 
(1996). 
 369. See Putnam, supra note 367, at 434–37; see also Schmidt, supra note 
368, at 108–09. The requirement of domestic buy-off can delay and complicate 
the treatymaking process. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE 
OF NEGOTIATION 166, 170–81 (1982) (providing an example from the negotia-
tion of the Panama Canal treaties). 
 370. Swaine, supra note 8, at 1243; see Putnam, supra note 367, at 437–41, 
443–44, 448–50, 452; Schmidt, supra note 368, at 117, 119–20; see also Mayer, 
supra note 367, at 804 (employing a negotiation analysis lens). At the same 
time, uncertainty regarding the prospect of ratification by one state may lead 
the other negotiating state to “demand more generous side-payments” on other 
issues. Putnam, supra note 367, at 453. And providing accurate information 
about the prospects of ratification may be beneficial “when the negotiators are 
seeking novel packages that might improve both sides’ positions.” Id. 
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Congress will not approve certain obligations.371 Thus, in nego-
tiating the Panama Canal Treaty, “Secretary of state Vance 
warned the Panamanians several times . . . that the new treaty 
would have to be acceptable to at least sixty-seven senators,” 
and “[President] Carter, in a personal letter to [Panamanian 
leader] Torrijos, warned that further concessions by the United 
States would seriously threaten chances for Senate ratifica-
tion.”372 Parallel American and foreign examples might be cit-
ed.373
 
 371. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 19 
(1980) (“[T]he power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make 
concessions and to meet demands.”); Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra 
note 
 
204, at 147, 233–36 (arguing that if U.S. negotiators “can demonstrate to 
their negotiating partners that they are constrained by the need to obtain con-
gressional approval, they may be able to refuse to make concessions that they 
would otherwise need to make to secure a deal”); Mayer, supra note 367, at 
796 (“U.S. negotiators . . . have long used the threat of congressional rejection 
as a device for leveraging concessions at the bargaining table.”); Putnam, su-
pra note 367, at 440, 448 (“The difficulties of winning congressional ratifica-
tion are often exploited by American negotiators.”); Swaine, supra note 8, at 
1244 (noting that the Constitution’s assignment of “negotiation to a substan-
tially independent President, while simultaneously liberating the Senate’s ad-
vice-and-consent function, meant that the President could reasonably assert 
that agreements under discussion would have to satisfy a third party”). But cf. 
Hollis, Executive Federalism, supra note 347, at 1395 (noting that attempts to 
accommodate state interests in treaty negotiation can impair U.S. interests by 
“depriving [the United States] of negotiating capital” or eliciting demands 
from other states to treat federal and nonfederal states the same); Lindsay, 
supra note 245, at 278–80 (discussing how congressional opposition can both 
strengthen and weaken the President in international negotiations); Swaine, 
supra note 8, at 1243–45 (explaining why adding state voices to negotiation 
would undercut national interests). 
 372. WM. MARK HABEEB & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE PANAMA CANAL NE-
GOTIATIONS 40, 42 (1986); see also Panama Canal—Defending the Canal, 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/panama 
-canal-defense.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (noting favorable treaty 
amendments regarding preferential passage of U.S. vessels through the Pan-
ama Canal secured by the Senate). 
 373. See, e.g., Lillich, supra note 367, at 837, 839–44 & n.34, 846 (cheering 
Congress’s blocking of an “unsatisfactory lump sum agreement” negotiated by 
the executive “to settle the claims of U.S. nationals” whose property was na-
tionalized by Czechoslovakia after World War II); Mayer, supra note 367, at 
797 (postulating “that the power held by extreme factions in Israel’s domestic 
political system . . . limits Israel’s ability to make territorial concessions and 
thereby empowers Israel in its dealings with its Arab neighbors”); id. at 806, 
810 (noting that a domestic agreement “to support production of the new Tri-
dent submarine with multiple warhead missiles. . . . blunt[ed] military objec-
tions to the [Salt I] deal . . . [but] may have weakened the U.S. bargaining po-
sition”). 
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Similarly, the President might be able to invoke the posi-
tion of Congress (or, returning to the previous section, states’ 
rights) to avoid participation in undesirable treaty regimes or 
provisions.374 The United States arguably did so to evade efforts 
at international private lawmaking grounded in civil as op-
posed to common law.375
The United States might gain not only from the existence 
of multiple governmental voices, but also from the efforts of 
private actors to further international negotiations in what has 
been called track two diplomacy.
 
376 Indeed, technological ad-
vancements have made it virtually impossible to prevent pri-
vate actors from having a voice in U.S. foreign relations, as evi-
denced by the fatal anti-American protests that erupted abroad 
over a Florida pastor’s Koran burning or by the private video 
coverage of Iranian protests that escaped Iran during the Arab 
Spring.377
The contrary notion that unity of position is best has its 
roots in the view that foreign affairs are complex, unpredicta-
ble, and rife with risk of reprisal.
 
378
 
 374. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical 
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 1075, 1241–42 & nn.551–52 (2000) (discussing invocations of states’ 
rights to avoid treaty-making). 
 In discussing the Presi-
 375. See id. at 1242 n.551. 
 376. See, e.g., DALIA DASSA KAYE, RAND NAT’L SEC. RESEARCH DIV., TALK-
ING TO THE ENEMY: TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH 
ASIA 105–06 (2007) (discussing the benefits of track two diplomacy), available 
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_ 
MG592.pdf; Charles Homans, Track II Diplomacy: A Short History, FOREIGN 
POLICY, Jul.–Aug. 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/ 
track_ii_diplomacy (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (noting briefly the history of 
track two diplomacy, including instances of its use in U.S. foreign relations). 
 377. See Taimoor Shah & Rod Nordland, Violence Continues in Afghanistan 
Over Koran Burning in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at A5; Matthew 
Weaver, Iran Protests: One-Man Video Channel That Is a Thorn in Tehran's 
Side, GUARDIAN, June 11, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/ 
11/iran-protest-videos-youtube-mehdi; WSJ Staff, Protest Videos Trickle Out of 
Iran, WALL ST. J. DISPATCH BLOG (Feb. 14, 2011, 3:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj 
.com/dispatch/2011/02/14/protest-videos-trickle-out-of-iran/; see also Stein-
hardt, Canon, supra note 294, at 1192 (“[P]rivate initiatives add to the im-
plausibility of a univocal foreign policy . . . .”); David Nakamura, White House 
Denounces Dennis Rodman’s Trip to North Korea, WASH. POST POL. BLOG 
(Mar. 4, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/ 
wp/2013/03/04/white-house-denounces-dennis-rodmans-trip-to-north-korea/ 
(providing an example of private travel affecting foreign affairs). 
 378. See Knowles, supra note 9, at 90–93, 111–27 (arguing that the claim 
that “foreign affairs demand that the executive enjoy vast discretion” rests on 
a classical realist view of international relations). 
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dent’s preeminence in foreign affairs, for example, the Court in 
Curtiss-Wright described the President’s foreign affairs power 
as “very delicate” and described foreign affairs as a “vast exter-
nal realm, with . . . important, complicated, delicate and mani-
fold problems.”379 The Court has also warned “that internation-
al controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading 
to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another’s 
subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.”380 This sort 
of environment, the Court has noted, requires discretion.381
 
 379. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 
(1936); see also id. at 319 (“The nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . 
requires caution . . . .” (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, at 24 
(1901))); id. at 320 (“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution . . . .” 
(quoting Letter from George Washington to the House of Representatives, 1 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 193, 194 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1896))); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 
1437–38 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing decisionmaking in the area 
of foreign affairs as “‘delicate’ and ‘complex’” in the course of explaining that 
“[t]he Constitution primarily delegates the foreign affairs powers ‘to the politi-
cal departments of the government’” (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Wa-
terman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948))); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 
(1981) (noting that Curtiss-Wright underscored “the volatile nature of prob-
lems confronting the Executive in foreign policy and national defense”); Wa-
terman, 333 U.S. at 111 (stating that foreign policy decisions “are delicate, 
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy”); United States v. Pink, 315 
U.S. 203, 232 (1942) (observing that issues of foreign policy “are delicate mat-
ters”); id. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that “diplomatic negotia-
tions so easily founder” if the negotiators are explicit). 
 The 
nation must be able to speak with one voice and that voice 
 380. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941); see also Japan Line, Ltd. 
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979) (“[A] slight overlapping of 
tax[ by multiple sovereigns] . . . might be deemed de minimis in a domestic 
context[ but] assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations 
and national sovereignty are concerned.”). But cf. Container Corp. v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 189 (1983) (rejecting the suggestion that Japan Line 
produces “an absolute rule” prohibiting any overlapping taxation in foreign 
commerce and stating instead that “[a]lthough double taxation in the foreign 
commerce context deserves to receive close scrutiny, that scrutiny must take 
into account the context in which the double taxation takes place and the al-
ternatives reasonably available to the taxing State”). 
 381. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (“[I]f, in the maintenance of our 
international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious embarrassment—is 
to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation 
which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the in-
ternational field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and 
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domes-
tic affairs alone involved.”). 
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must be sufficiently powerful to deal with the contingencies 
that arise.382
This reasoning fails to acknowledge that many foreign af-
fairs decisions are routine and do not require haste or un-
bounded discretion.
 
383 Moreover, the view of foreign affairs on 
which this reasoning is based, though perhaps justified histori-
cally, arguably has less traction today. Technological advances 
have made it easier (though by no means costless or fail proof) 
to assess what is happening abroad, to understand the charac-
teristics of other countries, and to communicate regarding prob-
lems. The development of international law and international 
and nongovernmental organizations has likewise facilitated 
communication, but perhaps more importantly has trained ex-
pectations and behavior. As a result, foreign affairs may be less 
wild, unpredictable, and capricious than previously.384
 
 382. See id. at 319–22; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 
(1981) (“[The] world . . . presents each day some new challenge with which [the 
President] must deal . . . .”); cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (find-
ing a congressional power to regulate foreign affairs based, in part, on the 
need for national power to respond to “the frictions that are unavoidable in a 
world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and interests”), 
overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255–57, 263, 267–68 
(1967) (rejecting the congressional power, recognized in Perez, to strip some-
one of U.S. citizenship, without denying an implied congressional power to 
regulate foreign affairs). 
 Even if 
foreign affairs have not changed in these ways, the threat of 
repercussions from missteps or multiple voices in foreign af-
 383. See Adler, supra note 68, at 24. 
 384. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Af-
fairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2013) (noting scholarship that at least im-
plicitly suggests that “[t]he proliferation of international organizations and 
tribunals, the increasing supply and demand for international law, and the 
declining utility of classical realist thinking, lead to the conclusion that lower 
levels of deference to the President and a greater role for courts are prefera-
ble”) (footnotes omitted); Knowles, supra note 9, at 138–45 (arguing that the 
claim for executive discretion rests on a classical realist view that is no longer 
accurate in today’s “U.S.-led international order [that] is unipolar, hegemonic, 
and, in some instances, imperial”); id. at 93, 152–58 (making similar argu-
ments); id. at 105–06, 146 (noting liberal theory critiques of the need for judi-
cial deference in foreign affairs); Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 44 
(referencing a State Department assertion “that changes in international 
law . . . exclude some matters from the untrammeled discretion implied by the 
term ‘foreign affairs’ and thereby narrow[] the proper reach of the ‘one-voice’ 
orthodoxy”). But see Abebe, supra, at 31–35 (questioning the constraint im-
posed by international and nongovernmental organizations and international 
law on great powers). 
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fairs is arguably reduced for the United States as a result of its 
hegemonic status.385
Moreover, because the President and Congress each repre-
sents and answers to the nation as a whole,
 
386 it is less trou-
bling when the President or Congress triggers foreign relations 
problems than when the states, who speak for only a subset, do. 
As between the President and Congress, there are clearly func-
tional reasons for treating the President as the nation’s voice in 
foreign affairs: the President’s ability to obtain information 
about foreign countries, to form a unified policy, and to act with 
speed and secrecy.387 Yet there are competing reasons to favor 
Congress as the one voice. Congress, it is generally understood, 
has authority to violate international law.388 In light of the 
Take Care Clause,389 the President’s authority to violate is more 
contested.390
 
 385. See Abebe, supra note 
 If only one branch must act as the nation’s voice in 
formulating and implementing foreign policy, arguably the 
branch with the broader discretion ought to do so. Similarly, 
given the importance of foreign affairs, perhaps the branch 
with the greatest democratic legitimacy ought to take the lead 
and responsibility. The President is elected every four years 
through a single national election generally presenting only 
384, at 39 (“When the United States is the su-
perpower, the threat environment changes; states are reluctant to challenge 
the United States. The kind of diplomatic skill required to achieve U.S. foreign 
policy goals in a [multipolar world] is not as uniquely important . . . .”). 
 386. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984) 
(“[W]hen Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented . . . .”); cf. 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“The Federal Government, repre-
senting as it does the collective interests of the . . . states, is entrusted with 
full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sover-
eignties.”). 
 387. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–21. 
 388. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “clearly has constitutional au-
thority to” violate the customary international law of prescriptive jurisdiction); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 114 (1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be 
construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international 
agreement of the United States.”); id. § 115(1) (noting that a federal statute 
may domestically supersede a prior treaty or provision of customary interna-
tional law even if the result is a violation of international law). 
 389. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 390. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Political 
Branches and the Law of Nations, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795, 1796–98 
(2010) (noting that “[m]ost scholars agree that courts must uphold acts 
of Congress that depart from the law of nations” but several scholars cite the 
Take Care Clause to “argue[] that customary international law is judicially 
enforceable against the President”). 
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two competitive candidates. By contrast, members of Congress 
are elected from smaller geographic regions and each region 
generally boasts two viable candidates. Representatives are al-
so elected more frequently. Again, if one branch must be cho-
sen, from a democratic perspective, that branch should be Con-
gress. 
A final reason for depriving the other federal branches of a 
voice in foreign affairs appears in Curtiss-Wright. There the 
Court quoted favorably from a report of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations asserting that “the interference of the 
Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations [is] calculated to 
diminish [the President’s] responsibility [to the Constitution] 
and thereby to impair the best security for the national safe-
ty.”391 That is, the Senate might divert the President from faith-
fully following the Constitution, and the President’s own sense 
of loyalty to the Constitution is the greatest check on misuse of 
the treaty power. This reasoning borders on the ludicrous. The 
Constitution is famous not for its reliance on each branch’s own 
restraint, but on checks and balances. The system of checks 
and balances operates not only in the context of domestic pow-
ers, but in relation to foreign affairs authority as well.392 One 
need not look beyond the treaty power for support. The history 
of the Treaty Clause reveals a strong preference for legislative 
involvement in treatymaking.393 Indeed, in convention, the 
power to make treaties was originally vested in the Senate.394 
While some desired to shift that power to the President, others 
feared abuse from the concentration of power in the President 
alone.395 To protect against abuse, some even proposed a role for 
the House of Representatives.396 The ultimate text, of course, 
gave treatymaking to the President and Senate.397 The Senate’s 
role was not limited, however, to approving treaties, but to 
providing “Advice and Consent.”398
 
 391. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–
1901, at 24 (1901)). 
 And the Senate could only 
 392. See, e.g., Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 
616–22, 626–32. 
 393. Id. at 626–32. 
 394. Id. at 626–27. 
 395. Id. at 627. 
 396. Id. at 628. 
 397. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 398. See id.; Moore, Unconstitutional Treatymaking, supra note 181, at 
628–29. 
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approve by supermajority.399 The Senate thus serves as a check 
on the abuse of power by the President. The judiciary similarly 
can serve as a check on abuse by both the political branches.400
IX.  IMPLICATIONS   
 
In short, functional considerations do not uniformly favor the 
one-voice doctrine’s concentration of foreign affairs power in the 
federal government or the President.  
Having exposed the above features of the one-voice doc-
trine, it remains to emphasize that these features are flaws and 
to consider the implications of these flaws for the future of this 
prominent doctrine. 
A. MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS 
The fact that the one-voice doctrine is employed along mul-
tiple dimensions is not itself problematic. This feature of the 
doctrine arguably would not be troubling (a) if the different 
contexts in which the doctrine is used were governed by the 
same law, or (b) if the Court recognized that the doctrine ap-
plies in multiple contexts and applied the doctrine with sensi-
tivity to the unique nature of the context at issue. Neither of 
these contingencies prevails, however.  
The dimensions along which the doctrine is applied all pre-
sent questions of constitutional structure.401 However, the an-
swers to these questions are governed by different constitution-
al principles. To illustrate, the general role of the states in 
foreign affairs is governed by the structure reflected in the 
Tenth Amendment that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple”;402
 
 399. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Moore, Unconstitutional 
Treatymaking, supra note 
 by the delegations made to the President, Congress, and 
181, at 629. 
 400. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585–
89 (1952) (holding that the President lacked authority to seize domestic steel 
mills in connection with the Korean War). 
 401. This is the case, at least, if one accepts that federal foreign affairs su-
premacy derives from the Constitution. But see United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–18 (1936) (claiming that federal foreign 
affairs supremacy results not from the Constitution, but from the transfer of 
sovereignty from Britain to the national government of the United States).  
 402. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–35 
(1920) (invoking both the Tenth Amendment and “invisible radiation from the 
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judiciary in Articles I–III;403 and by the prohibitions on state 
involvement in foreign affairs in Article I, section 10.404 Specific 
questions of state authority in foreign affairs may turn on dif-
ferent provisions from within this group.405 By contrast, the al-
location of authority between the President and Congress is 
governed by the provisions of,406 and interaction between,407
More troubling, it is not clear the Court has noticed the 
uniqueness of the questions it is addressing when invoking the 
one-voice doctrine. As mentioned, in Garamendi the Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a California statute that re-
quired insurance companies doing business in the state to dis-
close information about European insurance policies that were 
in effect before and after World War II to facilitate recovery on 
policies by Holocaust victims.
 Ar-
ticles I and II. 
408 The law was challenged as in-
consistent with the policy reflected in executive agreements 
President Clinton entered to address the problem of Holocaust 
victim insurance policies that were not properly paid.409
 
general terms of the Tenth Amendment” in assessing the validity of a treaty 
the United States had entered). 
 There 
is a sense in Garamendi that the strength of the national gov-
ernment’s claim to foreign affairs authority vis-à-vis the states 
strengthened the majority’s perception of the scope of executive 
 403. Articles I–III delegate, for example, the power to regulate foreign 
commerce to Congress, the power to receive ambassadors to the President, and 
the power to resolve controversies arising under treaties to the courts. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 404. Id. art. I, § 10.  
 405. Compare, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (Im-
port-Export Clause), with Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 
298 (1994) (Foreign Commerce Clause). 
 406. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (authorizing Congress “[t]o de-
clare War”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (naming the President Commander in Chief).  
 407. Hamilton and Madison, in their famous Pacificus-Helvidius debate, 
disagreed on the interaction between Article I and II. While Madison believed 
that Articles I and II’s enumerated grants of foreign affairs authority to the 
President and Congress controlled the allocation of foreign affairs authority, 
Hamilton maintained that Article I’s Vesting Clause located foreign affairs 
power in the President with limited, express exception as enumerated in Arti-
cles I and II. Compare Madison, “Helvidius” Number 1, supra note 199, at 69–
72 (Madison as Helvidius), and Madison, “Helvidius” Number 2, supra note 
201, at 81–84 (Madison as Helvidius), with Hamilton, supra note 74, at 36–42 
(Hamilton as Pacificus). 
 408. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 409–10 (2003). 
 409. See id. at 401, 405–08, 413. 
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power, leading to the conclusion that mere policies reflected in 
sole executive agreements could preempt state law.410
 
 410. See id. at 401 (holding the state law preempted). For example, the 
Court alternates between speaking of executive power and policy, and national 
power and policy. Compare id. at 413 (referring to “foreign policy of the Execu-
tive”), and id. at 414 (referring to “executive authority to decide what [foreign] 
policy should be”; “the President’s power to act in foreign affairs”; and the 
scope of the President’s “independent authority to act” in foreign affairs), and 
id. at 415 (citing to the President’s lead foreign affairs role, the President’s 
unique responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, and presidential control over 
foreign affairs), and id. at 419 (citing to executive conduct of foreign affairs 
and to “the executive foreign relations power”), and id. at 420 (referring to “the 
Executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs” and “the national Execu-
tive[’s] . . . responsibility to maintain the Nation’s relationships with other 
countries”), and id. at 421 (referring to “Executive Branch diplomacy”), and id. 
at 423 (referring to “effective exercise of the President’s power”), and id. at 424 
n.14 (referring to “the President[’s] . . . considerable independent constitution-
al authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues”), and 
id. at 427 (referring to “the President . . . consistently [choosing] kid gloves” in 
response to a foreign policy matter, the President’s foreign relations objectives, 
“Executive Branch foreign policy,” and “Presidential foreign policy”), and id. at 
429 (referring to “the President’s policy”), with id. at 401 (referring to “the Na-
tional Government’s conduct of foreign relations”), and id. at 411 (referring to 
“the National Government’s concern”), and id. at 413 (referring to “the Na-
tional Government’s policy” and “the foreign relations power [allocated] to the 
National Government”), and id. at 419 (referring to the effective conduct of the 
foreign policy of the Nation), and id. at 419 n.11 (referring to “federal foreign 
policy interest[s]” and to the established principle “that the Constitution en-
trusts foreign policy exclusively to the National Government”), and id. at 420 
(referring to “express foreign policy of the National Government”), and id. at 
421 (referring to a foreign policy issue “the National Government has ad-
dressed” and “the national position” reflected in executive agreements), and 
id. at 425 (referring to “a [foreign policy] goal espoused by the National Gov-
ernment”; “the National Government’s” force calibration “in dealing with” a 
foreign policy issue; “express federal policy”; and resolving conflict with state 
law “in the National Government’s favor”), and id. at 426 (referring to “the 
National Government[’s interest] in devising its chosen mechanism for” ad-
dressing a foreign policy problem and to “the responsibility of the United 
States”), and id. at 427 (referring to “conflict with national policy” and “the 
National Government’s policy”). Of course, “national” is a proper descriptor of 
presidential power exercised and policy adopted for the federal government, 
but reference to national power and policy may reflect reliance on the strength 
of national authority vis-à-vis the states to uphold the executive’s authority in 
making foreign policy. Relatedly, the Court considers the import of 
Zschernig—a case regarding federalism in foreign affairs—for the protection of 
executive foreign relations authority. See id. at 419–20 (declining to decide 
whether “a categorical choice between the” conflict and field preemption ap-
proaches manifest in the opinions in Zschernig was necessary to secure “re-
spect for the executive foreign relations power”). The Court also acknowledges 
that, given the absence of congressional authorization, the President did not 
act with the plenary authority he had exercised in other preemption scenarios, 
but that “conflict with the exercise of [the President’s considerable independ-
ent] authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of state law.” Id. 
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A similar blending of issues addressed by the one-voice 
doctrine is evident in Munaf, where the Court rejected the ha-
beas petitions of two American citizens held in Iraq who sought 
to avoid transfer to Iraqi authorities.411 In that case, the Court 
refused to second guess the executive’s assessment that trans-
fer did not present a risk of torture.412 Independently evaluat-
ing that assessment, the Court reasoned, “would require feder-
al courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and 
undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in 
this area.”413 In support of this invocation of the one-voice doc-
trine, the Court cited Madison’s oft-quoted statement from 
Federalist 42: “If we are to be one nation in any respect, it 
clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”414 However, this 
statement was made to defend the Constitution’s transfer of 
authority from the states to the federal government.415
 
at 424 n.14. Finally, the majority perceives executive authority more broadly 
than Justice Ginsburg in dissent, who is unwilling to derive preemptive policy 
from executive agreements that do not address the precise issue or from the 
statements of subordinate executive officials. See id. at 430, 438–43 & n.4 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 It con-
cerned the vertical distribution of authority, not the horizontal 
distribution between the political branches or between the po-
litical branches and the courts. Yet the Court relied on the 
statement to support its conclusions concerning political 
 411. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679–81, 683–84 (2008) (describing 
the facts of the case). 
 412. See id. at 700–02 (2008). 
 413. Id. at 702. 
 414. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 415. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961) (addressing “powers lodged in the General Government”); id. (as-
serting that powers “which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations . . . . 
form[] an obvious and essential branch of the f[e]deral administration”); id. 
(noting that the Constitution removes the impediment to the treaty power 
“under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the 
States”); id. at 280–81 (“The power to define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, belongs 
with equal propriety to the general government; and is a still greater im-
provement on the articles of confederation. . . . [which] leave it in the power of 
any indiscreet member to embroil the confederacy with foreign nations.”); id. 
at 281 (“The regulation of foreign commerce . . . has been too fully discussed to 
need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal ad-
ministration.”); see also Ramsey, Original Understanding, supra note 117, at 
383–84 (explaining that in making this oft-quoted statement “Madison was 
justifying the grant of particular foreign relations powers to the federal gov-
ernment” and was “not suggesting a generalized constitutional preclusion of 
the states”). 
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branch, and particularly executive, primacy in relation to the 
judiciary.416
Curtiss-Wright manifests a similar, though more subtle, 
conflation of issues. The question in Curtiss-Wright was wheth-
er Congress had abdicated its responsibilities and unconstitu-
tionally delegated lawmaking authority to the President 
through a joint resolution empowering the President to crimi-
nalize U.S. arms sales to the countries engaged in the Chaco 
War.
 
417 In building to the conclusion that the President acted 
constitutionally in executing the resolution, the Court noted the 
unique nature of federal foreign affairs authority and the fact 
that that authority rests on “the irrefutable postulate that 
though the states were several[,] their people in respect of for-
eign affairs were one.”418
These examples suggest that the Court has not consistent-
ly recognized the different questions to which the one-voice doc-
trine has been applied. Again, this might not be troubling if the 
Court nonetheless answered the question presented based on 
reasoning relevant to that question. However, the above cases 
suggest that the one-voice doctrine in its strong, federalist di-
mension has been used horizontally to expand the scope of 
presidential power.
 The strength of federal foreign affairs 
authority vis-à-vis the states was again used to lay the 
groundwork for a finding of presidential authority. 
419
 
 416. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702–03. In Garamendi, the Court rightly cited 
this and similar statements from the Federalist Papers in noting why the 
Constitution allocated “foreign relations power to the National Government in 
the first place.” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–14 (2003) (cit-
ing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 n.16 (2000) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961)) (“[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a 
PART.”)); THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 299 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961) (identifying “the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate 
to foreign powers”); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 & nn.9, 11 
(1941) (quoting Madison and other Founding-era sources to establish the fed-
eralist division of foreign affairs authority). 
 Carelessness concerning the different di-
mensions of the doctrine has arguably produced a serious se-
cond generation problem—the aggrandizement of executive au-
thority. Given the protean nature of the one-voice doctrine, the 
 417. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314–15 
(1936). 
 418. Id. at 317; see id. at 315–19 (asserting that federal foreign affairs 
powers, unlike federal domestic powers, did not derive from the states); id. at 
329 (upholding the discretion vested in the President). 
 419. See supra notes 408–18 and accompanying text. 
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risk remains that errors of this type will not only continue but 
expand. 
B. MULTIPLE THEORIES 
Greater care in recognizing the different issues the one-
voice doctrine addresses might solve this problem and justify 
continued use of the doctrine if it were not for another of the 
doctrine’s features: its reflection of varying approaches to con-
stitutional interpretation.420 The fact that a doctrine straddles 
multiple theories of constitutional interpretation may be a vir-
tue rather than a vice. A doctrine might be hailed for capturing 
the outcome or the core analysis of multiple theories. The one-
voice doctrine straddles multiple theories in a more problematic 
way, however. The Court’s one-voice jurisprudence does not 
achieve theoretical accord but, as noted above, alternates be-
tween competing theories.421 At a minimum, then, the one-voice 
doctrine obscures the Court’s theoretical approach. The result 
is that the Court invokes the doctrine, not only without ac-
knowledging the different contexts in which it is used, but 
without acknowledging or justifying the varying theoretical 
perspectives motivating the doctrine. Indeed, sometimes the 
theory motivating the doctrine is simply left unclear.422
The Court has done better in other contexts at making 
transparent its approach to constitutional interpretation. Take, 
for example, the issue of the extraterritorial reach of Bill of 
Rights limitations on federal action. In United States v. Verdu-
go-Urquidez, the Court considered “whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States 
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and lo-
cated in a foreign country.”
 
423 Justice Rehnquist for the majori-
ty relied primarily on constitutional text,424 history,425 and prec-
edent,426 and secondarily on functional considerations,427
 
 420. See supra Part V. 
 in 
 421. See supra Part V.  
 422. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (citing the need for “sin-
gle-voiced statement of the Government’s views” evidently as a functional rea-
son for treating an issue as a political question, rather than as shorthand for a 
judgment that the Constitution designates the President or Congress as the 
nation’s sole voice). 
 423. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 424. See id. at 265–66, 269, 274. 
 425. See id. at 266–68, 274. 
 426. See id. at 268–74. 
 427. See id. at 273–74. 
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concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply.428 Jus-
tice Kennedy, while fundamentally agreeing with the majority, 
wrote separately to discount the Court’s textual analysis and 
emphasize the importance of functional considerations in cali-
brating the extraterritorial reach of Bill of Rights guarantees.429 
Justice Kennedy’s functional approach became the majority’s in 
Boumediene, which concerned the constitutional rights of alien 
detainees at Guantánamo.430
The Court could, of course, be more transparent regarding 
the theoretical approach reflected in the one-voice doctrine in 
future cases. Yet the doctrine’s theoretical multiplicity com-
bined with its multiple dimensions make it difficult to conceive 
of a unitary one-voice doctrine going forward.  
 Whatever the merits of the shift in 
Boumediene, it was, at a minimum, apparent. 
C. INCONSISTENCY WITH THE CONSTITUTION 
Not only does the one-voice doctrine obscure the varying 
constitutional methodologies employed and conflate the consti-
tutional questions presented, the doctrine can lead to unconsti-
tutional results. As explained above, the Constitution nowhere 
vests foreign affairs power in one branch of the federal govern-
ment nor utterly precludes its exercise by the states.431 When 
the doctrine suggests otherwise it lacks constitutional footing 
and points toward unconstitutional results. The Court’s actual 
practice, of course, reveals that the Justices have not followed 
the one-voice doctrine to its broadest conclusions. Even while 
retaining the one-voice doctrine, the Court has recognized the 
shared nature of foreign affairs power.432
 
 428. See id. at 261, 274–75. 
 This is comforting as 
it suggests that the most flagrantly unconstitutional conclu-
sions that might result from the doctrine might not materialize 
in the Court. The level of comfort declines, however, upon the 
realization that the most one can say is that these results may 
not materialize. The expansiveness and staying power of the 
doctrine generate risk that the doctrine will yet be used to ex-
ceed constitutional limits. Moreover, even if the risk does not 
materialize in the Supreme Court, the doctrine invigorates the 
executive to claim broad authority outside the courts and may 
 429. See id. at 275–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 430. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732, 766–71, 793–97 (2008); 
see also Moore, Equivalence, supra note 309, at 2258–64. 
 431. See supra Part VI. 
 432. See supra Part VII.B. 
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provide Congress cover for accepting those claims.433 It might 
also dissuade constitutional action by the states or more critical 
review by lower courts.434
The constitutional risks posed by the broadest version of 
the one-voice doctrine might not persist if the doctrine were 
trimmed. It might be appropriate, based on a review of consti-
tutional text, structure, and history, to label the President the 
one voice for certain purposes—perhaps deciding which ambas-
sadors to receive. A cropped version of the doctrine along these 
lines, however, would not be particularly helpful. First, there 
would be no need to invoke the one-voice metaphor in support 
of this conclusion. The Court could simply hold, for reasons of 
text, structure, and/or history, that the President possesses ex-
clusive power to accredit ambassadors. Second, there are likely 
few, if any, foreign affairs powers that are exclusively assigned 
to a single actor. Even in reliance on express textual grants like 
the assignment of foreign commerce power to Congress, it may 
be misleading to describe Congress as the nation’s foreign 
commerce voice. The President can certainly negotiate treaties 
governing foreign commerce,
 
435 and the courts might preempt 
state action unconstitutionally interfering with Congress’s 
power436
 
 433. See supra notes 
 so that Congress is ultimately not alone in this area. 
Third, if there are contexts in which the one-voice label is accu-
rate, the label now carries sufficient baggage that it may lead 
to inaccurate assumptions or extensions. As a result, even the 
retention of a much narrower version of the one-voice doctrine 
is problematic. 
65, 70 and accompanying text. 
 434. See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 
1075–77 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on Zschernig—notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s failure to do so since Zschernig was decided—to preempt a California 
statute facilitating insurance claims by “Armenian Genocide victim[s]” be-
cause the statute did not “address[] an area of traditional state responsibility” 
and “intrude[d] on the federal government’s exclusive power to conduct and 
regulate foreign affairs”); In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 
117–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on Garamendi and its one-voice rationale to 
dismiss state law Holocaust claims against an Italian insurer as inconsistent 
with federal policy notwithstanding the absence of an executive agreement 
with Italy).  
 435. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the authority 
to enter into treaties). 
 436. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. 
  
1040 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:953 
 
D. INCONSISTENCY WITH PRACTICE 
The problems that arise from the one-voice doctrine’s in-
consistency with constitutional text, structure, and history are, 
of course, grounded in the assumption that the Constitution is 
properly interpreted by reference to those sources. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that while historical practice does 
not create constitutional power in the President,437 “‘a systemat-
ic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge 
of the Congress and never before questioned,’ can ‘raise a pre-
sumption’” of congressional consent which can in turn “be 
treated as a ‘gloss on Executive Power vested in the Presi-
dent.’”438 The principle that practice may influence constitu-
tional meaning, however, holds out little hope for the future vi-
ability of the one-voice doctrine. Even if the principle might, as 
would be necessary to fully retain the doctrine, also affect con-
stitutional understanding of congressional, judicial, and state 
power, and even if the principle could trump contrary constitu-
tional text, structure, and history, practice does not provide suf-
ficient support for the one-voice doctrine. As the history at the 
outset of this Article demonstrates, the one-voice doctrine is not 
entirely a recent invention, even if it has been strengthened by 
key twentieth-century precedents.439 At the same time, the doc-
trine has not met a consistent reception in the Supreme Court, 
let alone in Congress, the political branches generally, or the 
states.440
Practice is relevant to the doctrine’s fate for another reason 
as well. Practice provides empirical evidence that arguably 
weakens any presumption that the political branches prefer 
preemption of state action bearing on foreign affairs or that na-
tional uniformity is best.
 As a result, it would be exceedingly difficult to argue 
that the one-voice doctrine should survive as a reflection of ac-
tual practice.  
441
 
 437. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008) (“[T]he Court has 
been careful to note that ‘[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.’” (al-
teration in original) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 
(1981))). 
 As these presumptions fade, it is 
 438. Id. at 531 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686) (some internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 439. See supra Part II. 
 440. See supra Part VII. 
 441. I say arguably, because the import of political branch failure to quash 
state action turns on the ability and will of the political branches to police and 
preempt such action. Scholars are divided as to the political branches’ preemp-
tive ability and will. Compare Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1666–67, 1680–89 
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less clear that the judiciary should engage in dormant preemp-
tion.442 If national uniformity is not consistently ideal, for ex-
ample, it is easier to conclude that while the Constitution gen-
erally allocates the nation’s voice to the federal government, it 
does not through that allocation “insist[] that the Federal Gov-
ernment speak with any particular voice,” uniform or other-
wise.443
E. FUNCTIONAL FAILINGS 
 
Having failed to accurately capture the Constitution either 
as a matter of text, structure, and history or as a matter of 
practice, the one-voice doctrine might yet survive in its func-
tional form. Unfortunately, even from a functional perspective, 
the one-voice doctrine is flawed. As evidenced above, whether 
along separation of powers or federalist dimensions the one-
voice doctrine in its functional form does not always lead to the 
right answer. Functional considerations may favor one voice in 
some circumstances but multiple voices in others.444 State ac-
tion or the threat of rejection by a coordinate voice may ad-
vance U.S. foreign policy interests in certain contexts.445 The so-
lution might be to downgrade the one-voice doctrine to a 
rationale whose strength the courts might evaluate under the 
circumstances of each case. Yet this solution quickly crumbles. 
Once the doctrine is reduced to a rationale that may or may not 
prevail in any given case, courts are left without consistent di-
rection regarding whether to require, or secure, one-voiced ac-
tion.446
 
(rejecting the notion that the political branches lack the will and capacity to 
police state actions bearing on foreign affairs), with Swaine, supra note 
 Courts must make functional judgments regarding 
8, at 
1246–50 (arguing that Congress may under-protect foreign policy interests out 
of solicitousness to the states). 
 442. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1666–67 (noting that the need for 
dormant preemption rests on the assumption that “the federal political 
branches desire exclusive control in” foreign affairs matters). 
 443. Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 13 (1986). 
 444. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1679–80 (noting that “the values to 
be attached to the competing federalism and foreign relations interests appear 
increasingly contested” such that the political branches preempt state law in 
some contexts but not in others). 
 445. See supra text accompanying notes 338–59, 367–75. 
 446. Cf. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 32–34 & n.58 (recognizing 
that the one-voice rationale does not provide courts with guidance—nor sug-
gest judicial competence—to decide whether adjudicating or abstaining from 
human rights litigation will embarrass the United States in its foreign affairs, 
though also noting that courts have made such judgments in the past, espe-
cially on jurisdictional matters). 
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whether a one-voice approach is best. The rationale does not 
dictate whether those judgments should be made on a case-by-
case basis or for categories of cases.447
Moreover, the rationale can serve multiple ends—the pro-
tection of U.S. foreign relations and the protection of the politi-
cal branches’ power to conduct foreign relations
 
448—
exacerbating the lack of guidance for the judiciary in evaluat-
ing one-voice arguments.449 These goals do not always point to-
ward a one-voice solution, nor always point in the same direc-
tion. For example, in some cases accommodating state voices 
might further national goals without forcing the political 
branches to expressly endorse the states’ course of conduct, po-
tentially securing both U.S. foreign affairs interests and politi-
cal branch discretion. In other cases, preempting state voices 
might protect political branch discretion to formulate foreign 
policy but ultimately undermine national foreign affairs inter-
ests. Similarly, allowing a court to resolve an international law 
dispute as to which the political branches are divided might 
further U.S. foreign policy interests, but improperly elevate one 
of the political branches.450 And the consequences might com-
bine in additional ways. Courts are ill suited to decide on their 
own the mix of goals that should prevail, not the least because 
judicial fixing of goals infringes on political branch lawmaking 
power, circumvents lawmaking procedures that protect state 
interests, and “lacks democratic legitimacy.”451
 
 447. See id. at 32–33. 
 
 448. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1632–33 (discussing briefly the dif-
ference between these two ends). But cf. Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, 
at 43 (identifying “the potential for embarrassment” as “the sine qua non of 
‘one-voice’ deference”). 
 449. But cf. Abebe, supra note 384, at 49–50 (noting that courts make 
judgments about “the consequences of their decisions on U.S. foreign policy 
and the potential dangers of interfering with the political branches’ foreign 
affairs prerogatives” in, for example, applying prudential doctrines like act of 
state, political question, and comity). The judiciary is likely better suited to 
decide one-voice arguments grounded in protecting political branch preroga-
tives than U.S. foreign policy interests as the former are guided in part by 
judgments concerning the constitutional distribution of foreign affairs authori-
ty. However, protection of political branch power may also turn on an assess-
ment of the course that would best preserve political branch discretion to pur-
sue particular policies, in which case the distinction between the two goals 
begins to fade. 
 450. See Steinhardt, Orthodoxy, supra note 5, at 35. 
 451. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1667, 1678; see also Chi. & S. Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (noting that foreign pol-
icy decisions “should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the 
people whose welfare they advance or imperil”). But cf. Spiro, Federalism, su-
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Furthermore, once goals are chosen, courts lack compe-
tence to conduct the balancing required to reach those goals, 
especially if the goals chosen include furthering substantive 
U.S. foreign policy.452 By their own admission, courts are inferi-
or to the political branches in deciding matters of foreign poli-
cy.453 Among other things, courts “generally lack foreign rela-
tions information and expertise.”454 Judges typically are 
generalists with no particular training in foreign relations.455 
On the information front, courts receive, from adverse parties 
during the limited duration of a lawsuit, information gathered 
and presented under restrictions imposed by discovery and evi-
dence rules.456
 
pra note 
 Further, in light of their number as well as the 
delay and limited reach of appellate and especially Supreme 
Court review, even federal courts are unlikely to achieve con-
105, at 1258 (“[S]tate interests of any magnitude are unlikely to justi-
fy the potentially high national costs of a disrupted foreign policy . . . .”). 
 452. But see Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1256 & n.139 (“[A] find-
ing that state activity has crossed the constitutional line does not involve the 
crafting of a federal rule or policy, but rather only the insulation of a rule de-
veloped by the political branches . . . .”). 
 453. See, e.g., Waterman, 333 U.S. at 111 (explaining that foreign policy 
decisions “are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, 
facilities nor responsibility”); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 
349, 369 (2005) (quoting Waterman in noting the danger in having the judici-
ary predict foreign affairs consequences); Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1701–
03 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has acknowledged incompe-
tence to make, and has retreated from making, foreign policy judgments). But 
cf. Knowles, supra note 9, at 127–38, 148–58 (arguing that courts can and 
should engage foreign affairs issues in essentially the same way they engage 
domestic issues); Spiro, Federalism, supra note 105, at 1253–58 & n.139 (argu-
ing that judicial competence is a concern in deciding separation of powers, but 
not federalism, questions in foreign affairs; that the courts are competent to 
decide when state action “is likely to disrupt national foreign policy”; and that 
the political branches require judicial assistance in policing state foreign af-
fairs activity). 
 454. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1668. 
 455. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs 
Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 543–44 (2011); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond 
Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 186–87. 
 456. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting discovery generally to 
“nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”); id. at 
60(b)(2), (c)(1) (limiting the time and circumstances under which a court may 
alter a judgment based on “newly discovered evidence”); FED. R. EVID. 401 (re-
stricting relevant evidence to evidence regarding a “fact . . . of consequence in 
determining the action”); Ku & Yoo, supra note 455, at 183, 194–95 (discussing 
information limits of the judiciary). 
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sistency, at least with any speed.457 And court decisions “must 
deal in doctrines” justified by reasoning that is sensitive to 
precedent such that decisions may not provide flexibility or re-
main current with altered circumstances.458
Notwithstanding judicial incompetence to evaluate func-
tional one-voice arguments, the prospect of foreign relations 
doctrine moving to a place where these arguments are treated 
as political questions is slim.
  
459
  CONCLUSION   
 Whatever the prospects, it is 
clear that at most the functional one voice is a rationale to be 
assessed case-by-case and not a doctrine to be applied reflexive-
ly. As a result, even the functional version of the one-voice doc-
trine cannot survive. 
The one-voice doctrine is a frequent player in foreign rela-
tions law, having been invoked to answer critical questions re-
garding the foreign affairs powers of the President, Congress, 
courts, and states. Until now, the doctrine has escaped compre-
hensive evaluation. Filling that void, this Article demonstrates 
that the doctrine cannot withstand scrutiny. Not only is the 
doctrine inconsistent with constitutional text, structure, and 
history, as well as actual practice, but the doctrine applies 
along various dimensions that present divergent questions, 
masks different theories of constitutional interpretation, and 
ignores functional reasons for other or multiple voices in for-
 
 457. See Abebe & Posner, supra note 455, at 542; Goldsmith, supra note 12, 
at 1668, 1694–95; Ku & Yoo, supra note 455, at 187–89, 192–93; see also Gold-
smith, supra note 12, at 1695–98 & n.319 (providing examples of judicial in-
consistency in making foreign affairs judgments). 
 458. Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1668 (quoting Louis Henkin, The Foreign 
Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 826 
(1964)); see Ku & Yoo, supra note 455, at 183, 197.  
 459. From a historical perspective, this result might not be revolutionary. 
Goldsmith argues that for much of U.S. history, judicial preemption in the ab-
sence of political branch action in foreign affairs—which would include 
preemption based on one-voice arguments—was unknown. See Goldsmith, su-
pra note 12, at 1641–61, 1664, 1713. Nor does he find that changed circum-
stances warrant departure from this historical practice, or that judicial 
preemption is a better option than leaving states to their own devices until the 
political branches act to preempt. See id. at 1661–98. To the extent that aban-
donment of one-voice arguments and reasoning is perceived as too extreme, 
the functional one-voice rationale in the federalism context might at least be 
recast to require an analysis that courts are more competent to perform, such 
as assessing whether state law is motivated by a foreign affairs goal. See id. at 
1711. However, it is far from clear that such an assessment would identify 
those state actions that merit preemption and only those actions. 
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eign affairs. In light of these flaws, the one-voice doctrine 
should be abandoned. At most it may be appropriate to argue 
for a single federal voice in individual cases, but such argu-
ments must be evaluated on their own. They cannot masquer-
ade as part of a one-voice doctrine, for it is too much to believe 
that there is or that we should retain such a thing.  
 
